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ABSTRACT 
 
In the last three decades, the rapid economic growth of China has attracted increasing 
research on its corporate governance and disclosure practices. However, there is, in 
general, a lack of understanding from the outside world due to the specific knowledge 
needed of the unique situation of China. In addition, previous studies lack research on the 
relationship between corporate governance and environmental disclosure in developing 
countries.  
In this thesis, the roles of ownership structure and board composition on the extent of 
environmental disclosure in the annual reports are examined through evidence from the 
Chinese market. The sample of this research is collected from both the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). In this study, the quantity of 
environmental disclosure (measured by the mechanistic content analysis approach) and 
the quality of environmental disclosure (measured by the interpretative approach) are 
employed to estimate environmental disclosure variables. The results indicate that both 
qualitative and quantitative environmental disclosures increase with state ownership, 
greater blockholder ownership, and with a larger supervisory board. Environmental 
disclosures are not significantly associated with the proportion of independent directors 
on the board of directors. Furthermore, this study denotes that much less environmental 
information is disclosed in the annual reports of most Chinese listed companies 
compared to those of developed countries and so China is in a budding stage of 
development in disclosure practice. It suggests that firms should reveal more 
environmental information in the future for a win-win situation between themselves and 
their stakeholders under the stakeholder-agency framework.  
This thesis also examines how the market reacts to qualitative and quantitative 
environmental disclosures from annual reports during relatively long periods, compared 
with the event study. Using two sets of databases (CCER and CSMAR) and annual 
reports from two Stock Exchanges, financial data and environmental disclosure 
information are collected to test the regressions using Chinese observations between 
2009 and 2011. Voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual report is expected to 
provide value relevant information in the Chinese market based on signalling theory and 
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the concept of information asymmetry. The findings indicate that quantitative 
environmental disclosure is positively value relevant in the market, and it also influences 
the firm value in the subsequent year; in contrast, qualitative environmental disclosure 
merely relates to the firm value in the same year, but it does not affect the subsequent 
year.  
The uniqueness of China motivates the research on corporate governance in China, 
which would be a reference for countries processing similar mechanisms or attempting to 
advance their corporate governance. This research contributes to the existing literature on 
accounting about corporate governance, managerial structure, and disclosure practice in 
fast growing developing countries such as China. It enhances the understanding of 
influences from different corporate governance compositions on environmental 
disclosure. In addition, this research contributes to the knowledge about the association 
between market value and environmental information in fast developing countries such 
as China based on a large sample during consecutive years. Moreover, it is an up-to-date 
empirical research, which enhances the understanding in terms of qualitative and 
quantitative environmental disclosures and provides useful information for various 
stakeholders.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
The People’s Republic of China was founded on the 1st of October, 1949. At that time, 
the state had already taken over important enterprises such as electricity, railway, and 
banking. Thenceforth, the state started to nationalise the remaining private-ownership 
enterprises. By 1956, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had successfully replaced all of the 
private-ownership businesses in China (Wei, 2003). The following Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976 (Mao’s death), was a violent mass movement 
that spread to major social, political, and economic upheaval. During that decade, 
people’s freedom of thought, action and expression was seriously inhibited and the 
economy was impacted seriously, which lead to nationwide upheaval and economic 
stagnation.  
1978 was a turning point of economic reform. The Chinese government adopted an 
‘open-door’ policy in order to improve its economy. There have been many successful 
cases of privatising SOEs in developed countries through share-issuing privatisation 
since the 1980s (Megginson and Netter, 2001). China also chose this way to reform its 
economic system. The early 1990s began to see a change. In December 1990, the first 
stock exchange started trading in Shanghai. Then Shenzhen Stock Exchange was set up 
in April 1991. Many businesses started to restructure from SOEs to companies listed on 
these two stock exchanges. Taken data from the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook 2003, 
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figure 1.1 shows the trend of development of China’s stock market between 1992 and 
2003. It expresses a steady growing of Chinese listed companies from zero to 1200 firms 
during the first 12 years. By 6th March of 2015, the companies listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges had increased to 2,659 firms and the total market value 
amounted to RMB 40,520 billion.  
Figure 1.1 
The development of China’s Stock market between 1992 and 2003 
 
At present China is one of the fastest developing countries with large emerging market in 
the world. According to the World Bank by 2007 and an OECD survey in 2010, China 
had become the 3rd largest global economy. Over the last decide, Chinese corporate 
governance, both in practice and in theory, has been given much attention as a worldwide 
research topic (Zhao, 2014). The rapid economic growth in China has attracted 
increasing interest from scholars to explore what the framework, style and construction 
of China’s corporate governance are; and how it advances the economic development?  
Although Chinese corporate governance is relatively new compared with the US and the 
UK (Tam, 1999), in the last two decades, the government set up a number of regulatory 
bodies (e.g., People’s Bank of China (The Central Bank of China), the Ministry of 
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Finance, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and the State Economic 
and Trade Commission) and passed a series legislations (e.g., Company Law (1994), 
Audit law (1994), Securities Law (1998), Accounting Law (1999), new Bankruptcy Law 
(2005), new Securities Law (2006) and new Company Law (2006)) to make sure of an 
appropriate corporate governance system. Thus, examining Chinese corporate 
governance during recent years is becoming more important. 
In the last three decades, the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly. At the same 
time, pollution and other environmental issues are also growing rapidly in China. 
According to the BBC (2005) and the New York Times (2007), the industrial pollution 
(air and water) problems in China seriously threaten the health of the people. In the 
Environmental Performance Index 2012, China was ranked 116th out of 132 countries 
(Zhao, 2014). Recently, news of severe pollution in Beijing, the Chinese capital, 
frequently appeared in BBC News between 12 January, 2013 and 31 January, 2013. The 
news indicated that air pollution has soared to hazardous levels outlined by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), that hospitals were overrun by the young and the old with 
respiratory problems, and that people were warned to stay indoors. Official Beijing city 
readings on 12 January, 2013 suggested that air pollution levels are over 400	  
microgrammes per cubic metre while an unofficial record from a monitor of the US 
embassy showed that the levels are over 800. However, average concentrations of the 
tiniest pollution particles should be no more than 25 microgrammes per cubic metre 
(PM2.5) as outlined by WHO guidelines. Air is unhealthy when levels are above 100 
microgrammes. In other words, air pollution in Beijing is seriously impacting people's 
health. According to the data from the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the 
People’s Republic of China on 15th January 2013, there were merely 2 out of 68 cities 
(2.95%) evaluated as having good air quality, but 36 cities were measured as having 
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minor or moderate pollution and 3 cities were estimated as having serious pollution.	  
CCTV (China Central Television) news reported that serious air issues are resulting in an 
increase of respiratory diseases in hospital. Economic growth has left severe air problems 
in many cities in China.  
China, as a country with a pivotal role in global environmental protection (Rowe et al., 
2009), is confronted with a series of environmental issues at present. The huge pressures 
to China come from increasing concerns of the residents and the public. Companies need 
to reveal voluntary environmental information in order to reduce the pressures for 
themselves and the government. Then, what are the determinant factors of environmental 
disclosure in annual report is an important research area in China. In previous studies, the 
role of firm performance (e.g. firm size, firm age, industry, profitability, and leverage) is 
always employed to investigate the association with disclosure practice. Based on 
Chinese evidence, this research will examine the relationship between two hotspots 
(corporate governance and environmental disclosure) in China, and firm performance is 
adopted as control variable to complete the regression test.  
In 2001, Jinglian Wu, a famous Chinese economist, said: “China’s stock market is worse 
than a Casino. At least in a Casino there are rules.” In China, the lack of transparent and 
voluntary disclosure is the major problem to establishing an effective and mature stock 
market, because stakeholders and other market participants cannot get adequate 
information to make proper decisions (Lin and Chen, 2005). In recent years, there have 
been a series of corporate scandals by Chinese listed companies. The biggest scandal was 
Yinguangxia in 2002, which was a RMB745 million fraud (Singh and Gaur, 2009). 
These scandals reflect the fact that Chinese listed companies lack transparency and 
voluntary disclosure. Whether or not the ‘dominating state-owned share monopolises 
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under internal control’ (Xu and Wang, 1997) is the main reason which leads to 
asymmetric information is yet to be determined. Whether or not the quality and quantity 
of environmental information in the annual report of Chinese listed company is value 
relevant which could assist an effective and mature stock market is yet to be determined. 
In this research, the answers would be found by examining the relationship between 
corporate governance and environmental disclosure, and by exploring value relevance of 
environmental disclosure in China.  
 
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
China is a socialist developing country with a large emerging market. Corporate 
governance has been developing very fast in China during the last three decades. 
Although China does not hold a fully effective corporate governance system or a well-
developed market such as the UK and the US, yet the development of corporate 
governance in China cannot be overlooked. Since corporate governance was introduced 
in China in the 1980s, the Chinese government has been attempting to move from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-oriented system in a short period of time (Wei 
and Geng, 2008). Tricker (2010) mentioned that ‘China has achieved in less than two 
decades what took the US and European countries over a century’ (p.489). In addition, 
there has been 10 per cent of growth each year, on average, in the Chinese economy over 
the past twenty years and the trend is expected to continue in future (Cheung et al., 2008; 
Jia and Tomasic, 2010). As a socialist developing country, at the beginning, China 
borrowed many experience of corporate governance development. For instance, Chinese 
company law was drawn up that was based on the existing corporate law in Western 
countries (Liu, 2009). This means that corporate governance in China and Western 
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countries are similar in some ways. On the other hand, divergences between China and 
Western countries also exist because of varied social, political, and economic 
environments. At present, China processes its own system of corporate governance to 
develop the Chinese economy. It reduced effectively the influence from the 2007 
financial crisis and the worldwide slowdown, when many countries with mature 
corporate governance and market economies, such as the UK, the US, and Japan, were 
impacted seriously. These situations increase interest in the research on corporate 
governance in China. The uniqueness of China motivates this study, which would be a 
reference for countries processing similar mechanisms or attempting to advance their 
corporate governance. 
Economic development is causing significant impact on life and health. In 2010, the 
listed company, Zijin Mining, discharged acidic waste water into a river containing 
excessive copper. Recently, news of severe air pollution in many cities of China was 
frequently appearing in BBC News (between January, 2013 and January, 2014). At the 
beginning of 2013, the China smog crisis mainly enveloped Beijing, the Chinese capital. 
The BBC news indicated that air pollution there had soared to hazardous levels outlined 
by the World Health Organisation (WHO). A BBC correspondent pointed out that coal 
dust and car fumes are the main sources of air pollution. These matters have attracted 
attention from the Chinese government. They started to	  curb coal use to combat China's 
air quality crisis. However, any effect of controlling air pollution is not immediately 
obvious. The China smog crisis remained in September 2014 and had expanded to 
Northern China. Economic growth has left a severe air problem in many cities in China. 
Therefore, corporate social responsibility, especially in its environmental aspect, is now 
under more attention and pressure from various circles, such as society, government, 
residents, shareholders, and managers. Environmental disclosure ‘appears to reflect 
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public social priorities, responds to government pressure, accommodates environmental 
pressures and sectional interests, and protects corporate prerogatives and corporate 
images’ (Guthrie and Parker, 1990, pp.171-172). Meng et al. (2013) indicated that 
environmental information disclosure is becoming a significant issue for companies to 
achieve ecological sustainability (p.217). The research on the relationship between 
corporate governance and environmental disclosure and its value relevance could help to 
further realise the effect of environmental disclosure in China, and thus to assist 
corporations ameliorate their environmental practice.  
In previous studies on the association between corporate governance and disclosure 
practice, the mixed results of empirical research mainly occur in the impact to voluntary 
disclosure from two mechanisms of corporate governance: ownership structure and board 
composition. The inconsistent findings also appear in the value relevance studies. These 
problems are produced because of two broad reasons: differences in disclosure 
measurement and variation in valuation models used. In the measurement of 
environmental disclosure, this paper applies the method which integrates mechanistic 
content analysis approach (disclosure volumes and/or frequencies) (e.g., Ness and Mirza, 
1991; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Campbell, 2003) and interpretative approach 
(meaning and understanding of disclosure) (e.g., Buhr and Reiter, 2006; Coupland, 2006) 
to reduce errors of research results. In the valuation model, the Ohlson (1995) model is 
regarded as ‘best-known conceptual model of value relevance analysis’ (Carnevale et al., 
2009). According to experience of previous studies and the actual status of China, the 
regression in this research is developed based on a modified Ohlson (1995) model.  
Although several studies have investigated the relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and corporate governance in China (e.g., Qiao, 2003; Xiao and 
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Yuan, 2007; Li and Qi, 2008；Cheung et al., 2010; Fu, 2010), most of them examined 
corporate disclosure or financial disclosure. They lack research on environmental 
disclosure that relates to the mechanisms of corporate governance in China. Liu and 
Anbumozhi (2009) tested the effect of pressure from blockholder ownership on the 
extent of VED, but they only touched on a few of the corporate governance mechanisms. 
It overlooked to examine the impact from other ownership structures and board 
components on the extent of VED. Moreover, Xiao and Yuan (2007) investigated the 
impact of ownership structure and board composition on voluntary disclosure based on 
559 Chinese listed companies in 2002, and then suggested that a future researcher should 
examine a longitudinal study in this area. This research employs data from 1,230 Chinese 
listed companies during a 3-year period between 2009 and 2011.  
Value relevance of disclosure practice has been widely studied in developed markets. In 
the developing market, there is a growing body of research on corporate social 
responsibility/ environmental disclosure and its value relevance. For example, Murcia 
and Santos (2010) observed corporate voluntary disclosure and its determinants in Brazil 
based on the top 100 largest non-financial listed companies between 2006 and 2008. A 
significantly positive effect on firm value (Tobin’s Q) was found from social-
environmental disclosure and total disclosure respectively. The reaction of the stock 
market to firms’ corporate responsibility reporting (CRR) was investigated by de Klerk 
and de Villiers (2012) through the evidence of the top 100 South African companies 
between 2007 and 2008. The finding indicated that a higher level of CRR improves share 
prices. Iatridis (2013) examined whether or not environmental disclosures are value 
relevant and how they impact investor notions based on 529 Malaysian listed companies 
(looking at chemical, industrial metals and mining industry, food and drink producers, 
and forestry and paper companies) during the period of 2005-2011. These three countries 
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have in common that they were colonies of European countries, either the UK or 
Portugal. Their legal system, culture and economic development were influenced by 
European countries. In the same way, the corporate governance system in these three 
countries has vestiges of the UK or Portugal. China is a very fast growing developing 
socialist country. ‘Relatively high levels of collectivism and power distance, and strong 
uncertainty avoidance’ are exhibited in this socialist country (Ronnie Lo, 2009, p.7). This 
author asserted that ‘societal values of high collectivism and large power distance 
suggest a tendency for the members of a society to adhere to rules and regulations, 
conform to peer norms, follow the guidance from leaders, and refrain from risk-taking 
due to uncertainties’. Based on the characteristics of this society, Chinese companies 
would tend to reduce transparency and reveal less voluntary information in the annual 
report compared with European countries and the US.  
The Chinese stock market has been developing rapidly since the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges were set up in the early 1990s. According to Zeng (2012), the Chinese 
stock market experienced unprecedented development and had become the largest in 
developing countries by 2001; and by December 2010, market capitalisation of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange had become the 5th largest in the world. However, in contrast 
with the UK and the US, the two Chinese stock markets are underdeveloped and are 
substantially affected by state policies (Liu, 2009). The main reason is that whilst 
China’s economy is changing rapidly, the development of the Chinese legal and political 
system is still lagging behind. This is because the government need to protect the rights 
and status of Chinese Communism and guard communist ideology. Under this market 
circumstance, an information asymmetry exists between the state, controlling 
shareholders, minority shareholders, and the agencies. It leads to the Chinese stock 
markets being highly speculative and volatile (Morck et al., 2000). Although China is 
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similar to most developing countries with a low level of report practices and information 
transparency, the uniqueness of China and its stock market environment under the 
nation’s political, legal, and economic context points to the importance of research on the 
value relevance of its environmental disclosure. 
In the beginning of China’s economic reform, many codes and practices of corporate 
governance and reporting regulation were borrowed from developed countries. On 7th 
January, 2001, the “Code of corporate governance for Listed Companies in China” was 
issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State Economic 
and Trade Commission. In 2006, 38 Chinese accounting standards for Business 
Enterprises, which involve 22 newly-promulgated and 16 revised accounting standards, 
were issued under the assistance of Deloitte, one of the Big-4 international CPA firms 
(Liu, 2009). The new accounting standards cover all topics of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs). This research will explore the development of 
environmental disclosure and its value relevance under the effects of the “Code of 
corporate governance for Listed Companies in China” and the new accounting standards.  
Wu and Shen (2010) employed a sample from the Chinese stock market to explore the 
relationship between environmental disclosure and firm value. They mentioned that 
environmental disclosure would not necessarily add firm value when the firm merely 
reveals good news and hides bad news. In the study, the authors applied the Global 
Reporting Initiative sustainability reporting guidelines for environmental disclosure 
measurement and Tobin’s Q for firm value measurement. They did not find evidence to 
prove that environmental disclosure significantly impacts firm value based on 145 listed 
chemical firms from Chinese stock markets in 2008. Their study merely focused on the 
chemical industry in a single year which lacks time-series analysis and cannot reflect a 
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holistic value relevance of VED in the Chinese market. Due to the limitations of research 
on the association studies of value relevance, this research examines data of 2,850 firm-
year observations during the period 2009 to 2011 covering 12 different industries based 
in the Chinese market. 
 
1.3 AIMS OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the research, it is composed of three empirical chapters. In this part, the aims, 
objectives, research question and hypotheses of each empirical chapter is presented. 
Empirical Chapter One  
– The relationship between corporate governance and quantity of environmental 
disclosure: empirical evidence on Chinese firms 
The main aim of the first empirical chapter is to examine the role of ownership structure 
and board composition on the quantity of environmental disclosure in the annual reports 
through evidence from the Chinese market between 2009 and 2011.  
From the motivation and research aim of the empirical chapter one, the following main 
research questions that the first empirical chapter would explore are: 
1. What is the extent and current status of quantitative environmental disclosure in 
the annual reports of Chinese listed companies? What is the percentage of Chinese listed 
companies which reveal environmental information at present? What is the trend in 
quantitative environmental disclosure in the research period?  
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2. To what extent does a relationship between different ownerships and quantitative 
environmental disclosure exist? Do increased numbers of independent directors (non-
executives) enhance environmental disclosure in the annual reports? Does the size of a 
supervisory board have any impact on the extent of environmental disclosure? 
3. What are the relationship between control variables (e.g., FSIZE, DEBT, ROE, 
AGE, and INDUSTRY) and the extent of environmental disclosure practice? Is there any 
conflict between corporate governance and quantity of environmental disclosure? 
There are 7 research hypotheses of the empirical chapter one developed around the 
relationship of the extent of environmental disclosure practice in the annual reports with 
five different ownership structures (e.g., state ownership, blockholder ownership, 
managerial ownership, legal-person ownership, and foreign ownership) and two board 
composition (e.g., independent directors and supervisory board), respectively. 
Empirical Chapter Two  
– The relationship between corporate governance and quality of environmental 
disclosure: empirical evidence on Chinese firms 
The main aim of the second empirical chapter is to examine the influence of ownership 
structure and board composition on the level of environmental disclosure in the annual 
reports through evidence from the Chinese market between 2009 and 2011. 
The following research questions that the empirical chapter two would explore are: 
1. What is the extent and status of qualitative environmental disclosure in the annual 
reports of Chinese listed companies at present? What is the trend of environmental 
disclosure quality in the research period?  
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2. To what extent does a relationship between different ownerships and the level of 
environmental disclosure exist? Is there any affect on environmental disclosure quality 
by the structure of board in Chinese listed companies? 
3. What is the relationship between control variables (e.g., FSIZE, DEBT, ROE, 
AGE, and INDUSTRY) and qualitative environmental information in the annual reports 
in Chinese market? Is there any consistent and/or different findings compared with 
previous studies in the same research area? 
In the second empirical chapter, there are also 7 research hypotheses developed around 
the association between the level of environmental disclosure practice in the annual 
reports and the mechanisms of corporate governance (e.g., state ownership, blockholder 
ownership, managerial ownership, legal-person ownership, foreign ownership, 
independent directors, and supervisory board), respectively. 
Empirical Chapter Three  
– The value relevance of environmental disclosures: some Chinese evidence 
The aim of this empirical chapter is to explore the value relevance of voluntary 
environmental disclosure (both quantity and quality) in the annual report based on data 
from a fast growing developing country, China. The main objectives are to find the 
importance of environmental disclosure practice in Chinese market and the difference of 
function between quantity and quality of environmental information for various 
stakeholders.  
The following research questions that the third empirical chapter would explore are: 
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Does voluntary environmental disclosure revealed by a company have an effect in 
relation to the value of the firm? Is it positive or negative? To what extent does the 
relationship between voluntary environmental disclosure and firm value exist? What are 
the different roles between qualitative and quantitative environmental disclosure on its 
value relevance? 
The hypothesis in this empirical chapter includes four parts which are 1) the relationship 
between quantitative environmental disclosure and firm value in the same year; 2) the 
relationship between quantitative environmental disclosure and firm value in the 
following year; 3) the relationship between qualitative environmental disclosure and firm 
value in the same year; and 4) the relationship between qualitative environmental 
disclosure and firm value in the next year.  
To sum up, in this thesis, the theoretical evidences and empirical findings will answer the 
above research questions. The uniqueness of Chinese case can be identified through the 
fit between theories and the findings as well as the distinction of the finding in this study. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research integrates mechanistic content analysis approach and interpretative 
approach to measure both quantity and quality of disclosure information.  Beck et al. 
(2010) pointed out that there are some limitations if only a mechanistic content analysis 
instrument is employed, although it is commonly used in the prior research by many 
scholars (e.g., Ness and Mirza, 1991; Unerman, 2000; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; 
Hasseldine et al., 2005). The mechanistic content analysis approach is regarded as form 
oriented which involves ‘routine counting of words or concrete references’, but it 
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overlooks meaning orientation which ‘focuses on the underlying themes in the texts 
under investigation’ (Smith and Taffler, 2000, p.627). The interpretative approach 
‘attempt[s] to capture meaning by disaggregating narrative into its constituent parts and 
then describing the contents of each disaggregated component’ (Beck et al., 2010, p.208). 
It aims to seek greater understanding of what communication the firms need to express 
by disclosing information in the annual report. To some extent, interpretative analysis 
effectively remedies the limitation of mechanistic studies in the research of 
environmental disclosure. In this empirical chapter, both the quantity of environmental 
disclosure measured by the mechanistic content analysis approach and the quality of 
environmental disclosure measured by the interpretative approach are adopted to estimate 
the environmental disclosure variable.  
In the first and second empirical chapters, due to a limitation in OLS when the dependent 
variable is measured by content analysis to generate a part of the sample without any 
disclosure and hence be scored as a zero value (Salama et al., 2012) and the other part is 
more than zero, TOBIT formulation supplies a powerful check on the model with the 
value of the dependent variable not less than zero. Therefore, OLS, TOBIT and ordered 
PROBIT regressions are employed to examine the relationship between the extent of 
voluntary environmental disclosure and characters of corporate governance in order to 
minimise any loophole in regressions. 
In the third empirical chapter, the value relevance of environmental disclosure is 
explored. The Ohlson (1995) model, ‘best-known conceptual model of value relevance 
analysis’ (Carnevale et al., 2009), supplies a framework which ‘is fully articulated in that 
it relates the value of the firm to the information provided in the income statement 
(earnings), the balance sheet (book value of equity), and other value-relevant information’ 
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(Berry and Wright, 2001, p745). Carnevale et al. (2012) indicated that book value (per 
share) and earnings (per share) traditionally influence the market value (stock price). It is 
a very popular model applied in research on the value relevance of voluntary disclosure 
(e.g., Hassel et al., 2005; Liu and Liu, 2007; Moneva and Cuellar, 2009; Semenova et al., 
2009; Schadewitz and Niskala, 2010; de Klerk and de Villiers, 2012; Iatridis, 2013).  ‘In 
order to mitigate the problems that might result from the appearance of potential scale 
effects in the estimation of price models, the variables have been divided by the total 
assets of the firm at the beginning of period (TAt-1)’ (Moneva and Cuellar, 2009, p448). 
Similarly, Semenova et al. (2009) also deflate all accounting and market-based variables 
by TAt-1 for controlling size differences. In addition, De Klerk and de Villiers (2012) 
utilised variables divided by opening book value to control the size. Therefore, the 
Ohlson (1995) model in this empirical chapter is adjusted to all accounting and market-
based variables divided by opening book value of the firm. Hassan et al. (2009) 
suggested that the ratio of market-to-book value of equity (MTBR) ‘shows whether 
securities are undervalued or overvalued ... if the ratio is greater than (less than) one then 
the firm is overvalued (undervalued)’ (p.91). In other words, once measured, dependent 
variables in this research could indicate whether (certain) Chinese listed companies are 
undervalued or overvalued. In accordance with previous studies and the actual status of 
China, firm size, leverage ratio, growth in sales and industry are employed as the control 
variables. 
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1.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This study expects to contribute to the research on the relationship between corporate 
governance, environmental disclosure, and firm value in five main areas. 
First, it provides a more comprehensive understanding in terms of Chinese corporate 
governance and voluntary environmental disclosure. In detail, this study applied five 
aspects, which include corporate governance model, development of Corporate 
Governance Codes, ownership structure, board structure, and agency problem to look for 
the uniqueness of Chinese corporate governance compared with that of the UK and the 
US. In terms of voluntary environmental disclosure, quantitative and qualitative 
environmental information are collected through the mechanistic content analysis 
approach (number of sentence) and the interpretative approach (scale system). It 
enhances knowledge about the current situation of environmental disclosure revealed by 
Chinese listed companies. 
Second, this research contributes to the existing literature on accounting about corporate 
governance, managerial structure, and disclosure practice in fast-growing developing 
countries such as China. It enhances the understanding of influences from different 
corporate governance characters on environmental disclosure. 
Third, the research contributes to the knowledge about the relationship between market 
value and both qualitative and quantitative environmental information in annual reports 
in fast developing countries such as China based on a large sample during consecutive 
years.  
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Fourth, it is an up-to-date empirical research on quality and quantity of voluntary 
environmental disclosure and its value relevance under both cross-sectional and time-
series data of the Chinese market in English. 
Finally, the research provides useful information for various stakeholders. For the 
investors, this empirical study would add to their knowledge and understanding about the 
function of environmental disclosure in the annual report and assist their decision-
making in the Chinese stock market. To the managers, it would help them to realise 
whether or not voluntary environmental disclosure increases a firm’s market value and to 
decide on their company’s disclosure practices. Scholars would further comprehend the 
Chinese stock market and disclosure development in China. In addition, this research 
would uncover some issues in environmental disclosure in the annual reports of Chinese 
listed companies, which would assist in the development of compliance regulations for 
disclosure practice in future. The author expects an efficient stock market built by the 
government in China.  
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This section	   outlines the structure and organisation of the thesis. Chapter one is an 
introductory chapter that gives the background and motivation of the study. The research 
aims and research questions are addressed after that. Then the chapter briefs the 
measurement of environmental disclosure and main methodologies employed in three 
empirical chapters. At the end, the importance of the study and research contribution to 
knowledge are highlighted.	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Chapter two provides background information on the uniqueness of China in corporate 
governance. China’s unique characteristics are found and measured by comparing them 
with the UK and the US. In this chapter, there are five aspects to analyse and evaluate the 
difference in corporate governance. They include corporate governance model, 
development of corporate governance code, ownership structure, board structure, and 
agency problem.  
Chapter three examines the role of ownership structure and board composition on the 
extent of quantitative environmental disclosure in the annual reports through evidence 
from the Chinese market. In this chapter, the literature review includes a large number of 
previous studies on voluntary disclosure and its determinants. The relationship between 
corporate governance and the quantity of environmental disclosure is reviewed and 
evaluated in the next part to look for gaps in the previous research. After that, research 
hypotheses are provided based on the Stakeholder-agency theory. Then, data collection 
and methodology are designed and applied in order to test the research models. Finally, 
empirical findings are found and analysed.  
Chapter four examines the influence from ownership structure and board composition on 
the quality of environmental disclosure using Chinese evidence. This empirical chapter 
focuses on the extent of qualitative environmental disclosure to design research 
hypotheses and evaluate empirical findings.  
Chapter five explores the value relevance of environmental disclosure within the Chinese 
context. In contrast with the event study, this chapter employs the association study to 
examine how the market reacts to qualitative and quantitative environmental disclosures 
in the annual report during relatively long periods. Voluntary environmental disclosure in 
the annual report is expected to provide value relevant information in the Chinese market 
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based on signalling theory and the concept of information asymmetry. Empirical results 
are tested and analysed after data collection and research models are operated. 
The conclusion and research limitations are provided in the last chapter. It summarises all 
the chapters of the current thesis and points out the limitations of this study, which would 
be to assist and advance future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has attracted much attention from both analytical and empirical 
scholars, because it is generally recognised as a vital element in business. As Tricker 
(1984) pointed out, if management is the running of a company, corporate governance is 
ensuring that business is ran properly. In the last decade, there has been a rapid growth in 
corporate governance, particularly since the financial scandal of Enron in 2001 and some 
corporate collapses which have been experienced in various countries (Mallin 2007). 
However, the development of corporate governance has varied in different regions of the 
world depending on the stage of development of the country, its legal system, and 
cultural traditions. For many, corporate governance in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g., 
China) is viewed as weak compared to the UK and the US (e.g., Roche, 2005; Clarke, 
2007; Singh and Gaur, 2009). Thus, most studies just focused on the UK and the US (e.g., 
Short and Keasey, 1997; Brown, 1997; Fox and Opong, 1999; Gamble and Kelly, 2001; 
Toms and Wright, 2005; Aguilera et al., 2006).  
Although China does not hold an effective corporate governance system or a well-
developed market such as the UK and the US yet, the development of corporate 
governance in China cannot be overlooked. Since corporate governance was introduced 
in China in the 1980s, the Chinese government has been attempting to move from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-oriented system in a short period of time (Wei 
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and Geng, 2008). Tricker (2010) reviewed the study of Leng Jing’s “Corporate 
Governance and Financial Reform in China’s Transition Economy”, and pointed out that 
‘China has achieved in less than two decades what took the US and European countries 
over a century’ (p.489). In addition, there has been 10 per cent of growth each year, on 
average, in the Chinese economy over the past twenty years and the trend is expected to 
continue in future (Cheung et al., 2008; Jia and Tomasic, 2010). In the recent financial 
crisis, many countries with a more mature corporate governance and market economy, 
such as the UK, the US, and Japan, were impacted seriously. In contrast, the Chinese 
economy was impacted less by the worldwide slowdown. That situation increases interest 
in research on corporate governance in China. 
In the system of Chinese corporate governance, there are many similarities to the UK and 
the US. China is relatively new to corporate governance after a nationwide upheaval and 
the following economic stagnation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. At the 
beginning, the Chinese government mainly adopted corporate forms and practices of 
Western systems, such as the Anglo-American system and the German board structure. 
Chinese company law was drawn up that was based on the existing corporate law in 
Western countries (Liu, 2009). These factors have meant that corporate governance in 
China and Western countries have some similarities. On the other hand, divergences 
between China and Western countries also exist because of varied social, political, and 
economic environments. In this chapter, the development of corporate governance in 
China is examined and its uniqueness is analysed by comparing it with those in the 
Western countries (in particular, the UK and the US). The remainder of this chapter 
proceeds as follows. The definition of corporate governance is provided in both its board 
and narrow perspectives. Then, the uniqueness of China in terms of corporate governance 
is analysed and summarised through comparison between China and Western countries.  
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2.2 THE DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance is ‘… one key element in improving economic efficiency and 
growth as well as enhancing investor confidence. (It) involves a set of relationships 
between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined’ (OECD, 2004, p.11). According to the Cadbury Committee, 
corporate governance is defined as ‘the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled’ (Cadbury Report, 1992, para. 2.5). It sets out the basic role of the three 
significant groups in firms: ‘Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of 
their companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the 
auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place 
(Cadbury Report, 1992, para. 2.5)’. ‘The role of the auditors is to provide the 
shareholders with an external and objective check on the directors’ financial statement 
(Cadbury Report, 1992, para. 2.7)’.  The World Bank supplies a perspective from a 
public policy: ‘corporate governance is about nurturing enterprises while ensuring 
accountability in the exercise of power and patronage by firms. The role of public policy 
is to provide firms with the incentives and discipline to minimise the divergence between 
private and social returns and to protect the interests of stakeholders' (Iskander and 
Chamlou, 2000, p.3). Demb and Neubauer (1992) defined corporate governance as ‘a 
process by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of 
stakeholders’ (p.187). The right and responsibilities of each group of stakeholders are 
effectively delineated in a corporation (Ho and Wong, 2001). Compared with the above 
definitions of corporate governance, there is a narrow view that states ‘corporate 
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
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themselves of getting a return on their investment’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.737). 
Bringing together many of the elements of the above varied definitions, Brickley and 
Zimmerman (2010) gives a comprehensive and broad definition: ‘corporate governance 
is the system of laws, regulations, institutions, markets, contracts, and corporate policies 
and procedures (such as the internal control system, policy manuals, and budgets) that 
direct and influence the actions of the top-level decision makers in the corporation 
(shareholders, boards, and executives). Of particular importance in this system are: (1) 
the allocation of top-level decision making rights among the three groups, and the 
comprehensive set of mechanisms that (2) measure their performance and (3) provide 
performance-based rewards and penalties’ (p.236). The aims of corporate governance are 
to maximise shareholders wealth and minimise the divergence of interests in stakeholders, 
corporations and society. 
 
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – UNIQUENESS OF CHINA  
2.3.1 Model of corporate governance 
A system of corporate governance in a country is influenced by both internal factors 
(corporate ownership structure, policies of government, and the legal system) and 
external factors (capital and investment from abroad, and the global economic climate) 
(Solomon & Solomon, 2004). The individual situation of a country decides its model of 
corporate governance.  
The UK is a typical country using an Outsider-dominated system, which separates 
control from ownership. This system was commonly adopted by Britain’s colonies and 
many countries with the common law system. The US was one such British colony and it 
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inherited its common law system. The model of corporate governance in the US relates 
closely to that of the UK. Since the Second World War, the development of corporate 
governance in the US has expanded quickly and has been shaped by its own culture and 
history. By the 1960s, the US had already become a dominant country in the global 
economy (Toms and Wright, 2005). Sharing the same salient features (such as a unitary 
board) in corporate governance, the system in these countries is summarised as the 
‘Anglo-American’ model.  
Another model of corporate governance is the ‘Continental European’ model. There is a 
dual board system, which consists of an executive board of management and a 
supervisory board, generally in the countries with the civil law system. There is a clear 
separation between the functions of these two boards. The executive board of 
management ‘makes key investment plans and the board of supervisors oversees the 
decision-making process and performance of senior management and directors’ (Roche, 
2005). It strictly separates control from management in companies. Germany and Japan 
are two typical countries using this model.  
In China, the communist revolution began in 1927; since the communists took over the 
means of production and established its own regime in 1949, the private property and 
incorporated companies were prohibited (Tricker, 2012). At that time, the state was 
engaged in nationalising private-ownership enterprises. By 1956, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) had successfully replaced all of the private-ownership businesses in China (Wei, 
2003). In 1958, the intention of making the country self-sufficient was put forward by 
Chairman Mao, and than millions city worker and educated youths are required to go and 
work in the countryside and mountain areas. The following Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, from 1966 to 1976 (Mao’s death), was a violent mass movement that spread 
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to major social, political, and economic upheaval. Many state-owned enterprise needed 
state subsidy. 
1978 was a turning point of economic reform. The Chinese government adopted a form 
of market economy, but with a centralised, Communist-state orientation (Tricker, 2012). 
Since corporate governance was introduced in China in the 1980s, the Chinese 
government has been attempting to move from a centrally planned economy to a market-
oriented system (Wei and Geng, 2008). China, a relatively new country in the 
development of corporate governance, combined the Anglo-American model and 
German board style (the Continental European model), to form a characteristic Chinese 
board structure. The dual board system in China includes a supervisory board and a 
board of directors. In terms of ownership, the state directly and indirectly owns more 
than half of the shareholdings in most firms. Compared with the UK and the US, China 
has a highly concentrated ownership structure. In short, the model of corporate 
governance in China is a mixed model of the Anglo-American and continental European 
model with Chinese characteristics.  
 
2.3.2 Development of Corporate Governance Codes 
The UK is a pioneer developing the concept of corporate governance. Its corporate 
governance relies heavily on self-regulation (Wei, 2003). A series of reports in the UK 
are regarded as the basic framework of company law and standards by many countries 
around the world. They are the Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury Report (1995), the 
Hampel Report (1998), the Combined Code (1998), Turnbull (1999), Myners (2001), 
Higgs (2003), Smith (2003), Tyson (2003), the Combined Code (2003), and the 
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Combined Code (2006) (Mallin, 2007; Tricker, 2009). Among them, the Cadbury Report 
(1992) is widely recognised as the foundation of the Best Practice system and some or all 
of its content has been incorporated into the corporate governance codes of many 
countries (Mallin, 2006). This report states that companies should have three independent 
directors (non-executive directors (NEDs)) who ‘should be independent of management 
and free from any business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the 
exercise of their independent judgement’ (Cadbury Report, 1992). Its content also sets 
out the code of Best Practice, and looks at the functions of the board, auditing, and the 
shareholders. The Cadbury Report’s drafter believed that a voluntary self-regulatory 
approach rather than a legislative approach is preferred, because the latter one would 
bring a negative outcome. The principle of Combined Code (2006) also accords with the 
self-regulation system: the ‘comply or explain’ basis means that the ‘company has either 
to confirm that it complies with the Code’s provisions or – where it does not – to provide 
an explanation’.  
Compared with the UK’s permissive approach, the US takes a ‘rule based’ model. 
Tricker (2009) mentioned that corporate governance in the US is regulated by many 
mandatory rules and legal statutes. The US has the largest number of corporate 
governance codes and corporate laws in the world, because there are many states in the 
US and each of them possesses its own corporate code and law. These multiplicities 
increased the disparity of economic development in different states in the US. For 
example, the Delaware Law has fewer procedures than other states. Thus, Delaware 
became a more attractive state in which to register companies. The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act attempted to mitigate this problem and strengthened corporate governance under the 
penalty of law. However, its stringent and numerous provisions not only increased 
expenses and burdens to US-firms, but also conflicted with the items in law of some 
	  
	  
28	  
states. As a result some companies are delisting from the NYSE and the Act is deterring 
other potential non-US firms from investing in the US (Mallin, 2007). 
The development of corporate governance code in China borrowed many legal rules and 
experiences from the UK and the US (Wu et al., 2009). Compared with the UK’s 
‘principles based’ model, China is closer to the US’s ‘rule based’ model. In detail, 
Chinese listed companies have less voluntary self-regulation than in the UK. China 
developed the code of corporate governance in line with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Singh 
and Gour, 2009), although the provisions are not as rigorous as the US. The Chinese 
government has been attempting to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance 
from the aspect of corporate code development, particularly since China’s entry into the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. In the same year, “Guidelines for Introducing 
Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies” was released. 
Furthermore, the “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China” was 
issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State Economic 
and Trade Commission on 7th January, 2001. The code of corporate governance is 
produced in accordance with the Company Law, the Securities Law and other relevant 
regulations. It sets out the rights of shareholders and stakeholders, and behaviour rules 
for controlling shareholders. It states the rules, duties, and responsibilities for directors, 
supervisors, and managers. In the board of directors, it requires that the listed company 
establish an audit committee, a nomination committee, a corporate strategy committee, 
and a remuneration and appraisal committee, and it describes the main duties of each 
committee. Lastly, information disclosure and transparency of the listed company are 
required. This code was amended twice respectively on 30th June, 2002 and 30th June, 
2003. The last amendment requires that a company’s independent directors (IND) should 
not be less than a third of the board. To sum up, the government in China has paid 
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particular attention to putting in place a code of corporate governance with the aim of 
creating a strong corporate governance structure.  
It is worth mentioning that there is an issue in the corporate code development in China. 
The state holds two important roles in corporate governance: the controlling shareholder 
“player” and the political power holder “judge”. In a good way, the state’s dual role 
could increase monitoring and protect its own rights by its political power. However, 
where there are conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholder (the state) and 
minority shareholders, the state with its political power has the difficulty of deciding 
whose interest is protected: either its own interest or the fair interest of all shareholders. 
Thus, Wu et al. (2009) suggested that the state’s dual role should be separated, which 
would advance the development of corporate governance code in future. However, Chen 
et al., (2010) pointed out a likely disconcerting phenomenon of managers abusing their 
power, if the state withdraws its control from corporations currently and there is no 
mechanism in place of this control. He (1998) noted that many managers in listed 
companies tend to use their new independence and power to engage in their own self-
interest. It implies that the state should separate its dual role for an effective development 
of corporate governance, but that this process should happen over a long time during 
which a mechanism should be established to control managers’ actions. 
 
2.3.3 Ownership structure 
China is a socialist country, which means that the state is at the core of both political and 
economic development. Although the Chinese government is attempting to restructure 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to listed companies in order to establish an effective 
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stock market and improve the market economy, the state still owns most listed companies 
in China. According to Roche (2005), the government has more than 50 per cent of the 
shares in many firms, and in some of them up to 80 per cent. If the state is the dominant 
shareholder in most listed companies, it increases the difficulty in governing these 
companies in a rigorous manner (Mallin, 2006). Therefore, the state appointed a legal-
person to control the shares, which are the investment of SOEs, to mitigate this problem. 
In China, empirical researchers of corporate governance generally divided the categories 
of ownership into blocker ownership, managerial ownership, state ownership, legal-
person ownership and foreign listing/share ownership (e.g., Xiao and Yuan, 2007). From 
the view of shareholders, the typical ownership structure in Chinese listed companies is 
shown as Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 
Typical ownership structure in China 
 
 
This figure also indicates three classes of ownership shares: state-owned shares, legal-
person shares, and individual shares. State-owned shares were converted from the SOEs’ 
net assets or investment when SOEs became listed companies. They are held by the 
government and prohibited to trade publicly. Legal-person shares can only be traded 
Chinese listed Company 
State Shareholder Legal-Person 
Shareholder 
Foreign Investors Domestic Individual 
Shareholder 
State-Owned Shares Legal-person shares	   Individual Shares 
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between legal entities with the approval of the government (Xiao and Yuan, 2007). Only 
individual shares (such as, A-Shares and B-Shares) are allowed to issue and trade on 
Stock Exchanges. In detail, A-shares are tradable shares which issued and traded in RMB 
(Chinese currency) on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. B-Shares are also 
issued by these two Stock Exchanges, but traded in foreign currency (such as US dollars).  
Ma et al. (2010) pointed that both the state-owned and legal-person shares are about two-
thirds of all shares, on average, in Chinese listed companies in the domestic market. The 
remaining shares are held by a large number of individuals and some institutional 
investors. It reflects the unique characteristics of ownership in Chinese listed companies 
with ‘a high level of ownership concentration and a low level of marketability’ (Ma et al., 
2010). Table 2.1 proves the viewpoint of Ma et al. (2010).  
Table 2.1 
Shareholding structure from 2001 to 2010 in Chinese listed companies 
 
(Source from Wei and Geng, 2008, p.940; the CSMAR database) 
 
In Table 2.1, the proportion of non-tradable shares on average is 54.72%, which is more 
than tradable shares of 45.28% from 2001 to 2010. In particular, the percentage of non-
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negotiable shares is about twice as much as negotiable shares between 2001 and 2006. 
Moreover, shareholdings of Chinese listed companies are heavily concentrated in the 
hand of the state. In contrast to other owners, the state is the largest shareholder who 
controls absolutely the most listed companies in China. Zhao (2014) pointed out that 
state ownership is the biggest factor that impacts corporate governance in China. It is 
worth mentioning that 2009 was a turning point in the share market. The proportion of 
negotiable shares is 69.11%, which is more than twice of non-negotiable shares (30.89%). 
In 2010, the proportion of negotiable shares (75.98%) is more than triple of non-
negotiable shares (24.02%). A large number of non-tradable shares were transferred to 
tradable shares. It means more and more stocks into the market, which reduces the 
companies’ control by state ownership, although the state still hold the dominant right in 
the most Chinese listed companies at present. 
According to Wei and Geng (2008), the five largest shareholders, on average, own 56.46 
per cent of the total issued shares in China in 2007, compared with less than 25 per cent 
in the US. Li et al. (2010) put forward some advantages and disadvantages of a high level 
of ownership concentration in China: to some extent it mitigates the conflicts between 
the principal and the agent, because ownership concentration is recognised as “an 
effective internal monitoring mechanism”. As noted by Singh and Gaur (2009), ‘a higher 
ownership concentration minimises the agency problem and enables the decision makers 
to make quick decisions’ (p.419). However, concentrated ownership, especially in the 
hand of the state, increases the power of large shareholders to set up a relationship of 
collusion between managers and themselves to control decision-making and achieve their 
aims by appointing directors and managers. It leads to a negative effect on the protection 
of minority shareholders and foreign investors. 
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In contrast with China, the ownership is quite dispersed among a large number of 
individuals and institutional investors in the UK and the US (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Chew and Gillan, 2005). Aguilera et al. (2006) mentioned that institutional investors own 
the most shares, exceeding the proportion of individual investors (as shown in Table 2.2). 
The institutional investors in the UK are mainly insurance companies and pension funds 
who have 15 per cent of the shares on average; the government has the least ownership 
holding less than 1 per cent (Liu, 2005). As a large shareholder in most companies, with 
professional expertise, both the Cadbury report (1992) and the Hampel Report (1998) 
expected the institutional investors to take on the role of monitoring management on 
behalf of other shareholders and to take a long-term view of their shareholding positions 
(Short and Keasey, 2005). Currently, although many institutions participate passively in 
corporate governance, they have yet to increase their enthusiasm in the corporate affairs 
for their investment return. Most of the institutional investors in listed companies in the 
US are investment companies. They held 28 per cent of total shares in 2002 which 
increased from 6 per cent in 1990 (Binay, 2005). In contrast with the passive UK 
institutions, more and more American institutional investors actively participate in 
corporate affairs, such as attending corporate governance meetings of the companies. 
Table 2.2 
Summary of ownership in the UK, 1963-2004 and the US, 1981-2002 
The UK The US 
  1963 1981 2002   1981 2002 
  % % %   % % 
Pension funds 6 27 16 Investment companies 8 28 
Insurance companies 10 21 20 Insurance companies 10 7 
Individuals 54 28 14 Independent investment advisors 26 37 
(Source: Binay, 2005; Short and Keasey, 2005) 
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Another difference in the ownership structure between the US and China is the duties and 
the power of the shareholders. In terms of duties, the US listed companies just demand 
that their shareholders vote on major business decisions such as merger or sale. Other 
business decisions are dealt with by the board of directors. In China, the company law 
requires all shareholders to be included in a shareholder committee for their listed 
companies, which except private business. Like the shareholders in US companies, 
Chinese shareholders are required to vote on the major business decisions. Moreover, 
they need to make other business decisions (such as issuing bonds, increasing or 
decreasing registered capital, and so on) (Liu, 2009). In terms of the balance of power, 
the American Corporate Law gives much power to the board of directors, but less 
authority to the meeting of shareholders (Wei, 2003). This reflects the characteristic of 
the US’s corporate governance: “strong managers and weak shareholders”. That is why 
the amount of shareholder litigation is high in the US. Shareholder litigation is a useful 
way to solve problems between them and to help shareholders monitor management. 
Aguilera et al. (2006) pointed out that the levels of litigation are high in the US and low 
in the UK. In China, the appointment of managers and directors is influenced by the 
government (large shareholder). Some of them have political motivation. Moreover, a lot 
of former government officials are appointed as managers in listed companies by the 
government (Chen et al., 2010). Therefore, the large shareholder (state-owned ownership) 
has enough power to control managers and directors. Xue (2001) ironically states that the 
large shareholder dominates the board of directors and makes the independent non-
executive directors window dressing. In short, the duties and the power of shareholders 
are much more extensive in the listed companies in China than in the US. 
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2.3.4 Board structure 
Companies structure the boards in accordance with the legal system in their countries 
(Gul and Tsui, 2004). Generally, a unitary board structure is used in a country under the 
common law system; a dual (2-tier) board is the norm under the civil law system. Brian 
(2006) mentioned that most countries have a unitary board system (e.g. the UK, the US, 
and the majority of EU Member States). Companies in these countries just have one 
board, which comprises executive and non-executive directors, responsible to the 
shareholders. The board of directors, an important part of the corporate structure, makes 
the link between the shareholders and the managers (Monks and Minow, 2004). In the 
dual board system, corporate governance consists of an executive board of management 
and a supervisory board (e.g. Germany, Austria, and Japan). This system clearly 
separates the functions of supervision and management. Where the UK and the US listed 
companies have a single board (mixed board), Japan its insider-dominated boards, and 
Germany its two-tier supervisory and management boards (Charkham, 1994), the listed 
companies in China combined the Anglo-American model and German board style to 
form a mixed model containing Chinese characteristics which has dual boards: the 
supervisory board and the board of directors (see Figure 2.2). This figure shows that 
China has a more complex board structure, compared with UK/US and Continental 
European system. In particular, board of supervisors in Chinese listed companies need to 
deal with more relationships with various stakeholders who involve the state, 
shareholders, board of directors, CEO and general managers, and employee 
representation.  
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Figure 2.2 
Differentiation of Board structure 
 
(Source: Tricker, 2012, p.446) 
 
2.3.4.1 The supervisory board 
The listed companies in China are required to have a board of supervisors, who are 
elected by shareholders. Their responsibilities include ‘overseeing the decision-making 
process and performance of senior management and directors’ (Roche, 2005). Liu (2009) 
found that the duties of the Chinese supervisory board are similar to the functions of 
outside counsel in US corporate governance. Numerous scholars have deemed that the 
supervisory board in Chinese companies just looks like an ineffective ornament. Chinese 
supervisory boards do not have the right to appoint or dismiss executive board directors 
(Mallin, 2006). Dahya et al. (2003) pointed out five important items lacking in the 
Chinese supervisory board: legal power, independence, technical expertise, information, 
and incentives. Wei and Geng (2008) satirised that they are merely holding a rubber 
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stamp without virtual right. However, Ding et al. (2010) mentioned that the rights of the 
supervisory board were significantly improved via the amendment of Corporation Law in 
2005. The supervisory board now has the power to propose dismissal of directors and top 
management, sue managements who commit frauds, raise questions and make 
suggestions at the board meeting, and curb executive compensation (Xi, 2006; Ding et al., 
2010). In Chinese Company Law 2006, it set that ‘a limited liability company shall have 
a supervisory board composed of no less than three members. Where a limited liability 
company has a small number of shareholders or is comparatively small in scale, it may 
have one or two supervisors instead of a supervisory board’ (Act. 52). The supervisory 
board should monitor ‘the acts of the directors and senior executives performing their 
functions’ (Act. 54(2)). The function and power of board members include ‘to bring the 
proposal to dismiss those directors and senior executives violating the law, administrative 
regulations, the articles of association of the company or the resolutions of the 
shareholders meetings’ (Act. 54(2)) and to ‘demand directors and senior executive to 
make corrections if any of their acts are found to have damaged the interests of the 
company’ (Act. 54(3)). In addition, the board member can ‘bring a lawsuit against the 
directors or senior executives in accordance with the provisions of Article 152 of 
Company Law 2006’ (Act. 54(6)). These articles give the supervisory board clear 
function and right to do its jobs. The supervisory board should be ‘accountable to all 
shareholders’ (Zhao, 2014). 
 
2.3.4.2 The board of directors 
The responsibility of the board of directors is setting objectives and monitoring and 
controlling the firm’s activities (Brown et al., 2011). In a firm, it is central to the making 
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of decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Compared with the UK and the US, the board of 
directors in Chinese listed companies has less power. In China, concentrated 
shareholdings are owned by the state in most companies. As a result, the board of 
directors is in the hand of the state. Moreover, Zhen (2014) indicated that the largest 
shareholder (state ownership) has strong control over the decisions of the board of 
directors, because most listed companies in China are former SOEs. The state’s interest 
is the principal aim of the directors’ actions. The other shareholders’ rights are always 
overlooked.  
The development of independent directors is already mature in the UK and the US. A 
1999 survey of Economic Cooperation and Development shows that independent 
directors make up 62 per cent of the board in the US and 34 per cent in the UK (Wei and 
Geng, 2008). It reflects the significance of independent directors in these two countries in 
particular in the former. In China, the development of independent directors is relatively 
new and immature in the listed companies. It was not a compulsory requirement to 
appoint independent non-executive directors in the Corporate Law of 1994. Attention 
was given to their role in the following years by the regulatory bodies of corporate 
governance with regard to their number and functions. In 2001, the CSRC produced 
“Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of listed 
Companies”. On 30th June 2003, the “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in China” states that at least one-third of the board should be made up of 
independent directors. Now, the Corporate Law (2006 version) compulsorily requires a 
board of directors to have independent directors. However, Zhang (1999) and Wei (2002) 
argued that many independent directors in China are too busy to care about the 
companies or they lack the knowledge and experience to exert any substantial influence 
on the board. Moreover, Zhao (2014) mentioned that ‘the roles of independent directors 
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are easy to overlook due to the existence of the supervisory board. The allocation of 
power and how to reconcile the relationship between the independent directors and 
supervisory board are important problems in the development of the Chinese corporate 
governance model.’ (p.99) 
In respect of motivation, the UK and the US adopted an equity-based incentive as a 
means of remuneration (Liu and Fong, 2010). As the standpoint of Minow and Bingham 
(1995) shows, ‘nothing makes directors think like shareholders more than being 
shareholders’ (p.497). In China, this system is still in its infancy. Equities are just offered 
to the insider directors. For independent directors, they are not allowed to hold more than 
1 per cent of total share directly or indirectly under the CSRC provisions (Li et al., 2008). 
As an overview, compared with executive directors and independent directors who play a 
vital role in corporate governance in the UK and the US, the dual boards in Chinese 
listed companies are not effective enough. There are still some issues with the board of 
supervisors, with executive directors, and with independent non-executive directors. For 
example, the roles of the supervisory board and the independent directors overlap to a 
great extent that is an important problem in the development of the Chinese corporate 
governance model (Zhao, 2014). However, the government has been making some 
efforts to improve the Chinese characteristic mixed model through using the experience 
of other countries, reducing the state-owned shareholdings, and amending company law 
and the corporate governance code. It means Chinese characteristic dual boards will be 
more mature and effective in the future. 
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2.3.4.3 Chairman/CEO duality 
In the study of Aguilera et al. (2006), chairman/CEO duality was found as a divergence 
between the UK and the US. Higgs (2003) mentioned that approximately 80 per cent of 
CEOs hold the position of the chairman in the US listed companies. In the UK, the 
Combined Code (2003) requires ‘a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the 
company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the 
running of the company’s business.’ There, there are just 10 per cent of CEOs serving as 
the chairman. 
In contrast, the chairman/CEO duality in Chinese listed companies is less than the US, 
but much more than the UK. According to Zhong (2002), there were 60.9 per cent of 
CEOs who also are the chairmen of the same companies. In 2010, the proportion of 
chairman/CEO duality reduced to 18.5 per cent (GTA database, 2011). Dalton et al. 
(2005) pointed out that stewardship and organisation theories suggest that centralisation 
of authority, such as CEO duality, is conducive to good firm performance. However, 
many scholars deem its disadvantages much more significant than its merits. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) noted that if the CEO and the chairman is one 
individual, it reduces the effectiveness of the board’s key function. With a similar 
viewpoint, Chahine and Tohmé (2009) and Lin and Liu (2009) found that chairman/CEO 
duality significantly impacts board independence and transparency of the CEO’s 
activities. Thus, the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) (2001 a, b) requires 
that the CEO can only serve as the chairman in Chinese listed company, if at least half of 
the directors’ board is made up of independent directors to improve monitoring. 
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2.3.4.4 Board committees 
Board committees are very common in the listed companies in the US and the UK. Wei 
(2003) noticed that more than 80 per cent of boards have two committees and more than 
half of them have three in the US. By now, all of the listed companies there should have 
at least three committees: audit, compensation, and nomination committees, in 
compliance with the mandatory requirements of the stock exchange regulations and the 
SOX (Liu and Fong, 2010). In the UK between 1995 and 1996, 96 per cent of companies 
had an audit committee, 95 per cent had a remuneration committee. and 50 per cent had a 
nomination committee (McKnight and Weir, 2009). In China, it is not mandatory for 
board committees to be established. A survey of the larger Chinese listed companies 
between 2004 and 2006 shows: 47 per cent of them had an audit committee; 51 per cent a 
remuneration committee; and 38 per cent a nomination committee (Liu and Fong, 2010). 
These results clearly reflect fewer committees in China compared to the UK and the US. 
However, there is an outstanding development in recent years. Based on the data in 2010 
from the CCER database, there are 99.86 per cent of Chinese listed companies had an 
audit committee; 99.05 per cent a remuneration committee; 71.69 per cent a stratagem 
committee; and 71.21 per cent a nomination committee.  
Under the Chinese political and economical environment, Chinese limited companies 
have to establish a Chinese Communist Party organisation (Liu, 2009). It helps the state 
to monitor the process of companies. This organisation is a special committee only seen 
in China. The Chinese Communist Party is very vital in the People’s Republic of China. 
It plays a significant role in the development of corporate governance. ‘Every major 
corporate governance plan had first to be endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party 
before it could be drafted in to law by the National People’s Congress or a Standing 
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Committee’ and ‘the natural choice of any market economy, and the establishment of 
corporate governance is the result of adopting and borrowing from Western models that 
are enforceable in China until they are explicitly banned by the controlling communist 
Party’ (Zhao, 2014, p.91). It means that the Chinese Communist Party committee hold 
enormous right which can influence the decision-making process in Chinese listed 
companies. However, Chang and Wong (2002) found that ‘the existing level of party 
control is excessive and reducing decision-making power of the local party committees 
tends to improve the performance of China’s listed firms’ (p.2).  
 
2.3.5 Agency Problem 
Agency problems arise due to a separation of shareholders (the principal) and the 
directors and managers (the agent) (Brealey and Myers, 1996). This problem arises when 
the directors misuse corporate assets and lack effective control (Mallin, 2007). In the UK, 
the principle of corporate governance is maximising the shareholders’ wealth. There are 
some disciplines and incentives imposed on the agent who has to operate in the best 
interest of the principal. In particular, corporate governance is the internal control system 
that ensures that the company can impose its own discipline on achieving the aim of the 
firm. In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) mentioned that shareholders can deal with 
the problems by monitoring the actions of management, such as employing independent 
auditors to audit financial statements, introducing external analysts, and voting at the 
annual general meeting. The improvement of corporate governance is achieved through 
increased transparency and the credibility of accounts. In other words, ‘transparency’ and 
‘credibility’ are crucial to strengthen and ameliorate the relationship between managers 
and shareholders. 
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At present, in China, the state still owns the large shareholdings in many companies, and 
therefore, the minority shareholders’ right is usually ignored. Agency problems arise at a 
new level in the relationship between the strong controlling shareholders (the principal) 
and the weak minority shareholders (the principal) (Yao et al., 2010); another is between 
the directors (the agent) and the minority shareholders (the principal). For the second 
problem, the directors are in the hand of state-owned ownership. In addition, many 
managers, who are former government officials, are appointed in listed companies by the 
government. They have a close relationship with the government. Hence, they just 
respond to the controlling shareholders and overlook the interest of the minority. In some 
firms, the board and managers are empowered too much to make decisions, which 
impairs the voting right of the minority shareholders. As noted by Wu et al. (2009), only 
the large shareholders can expect a return of their investment. The new agency problem 
of the principal and the principal (P&P) is shown in the different aims of shareholders. 
The state as the controlling shareholder focuses on wealth distribution, political aim, and 
social goals (Shen and Lin, 2009). But the minority shareholders’ primary objective is 
enhancing the value of their own investment. The controlling shareholders easily 
expropriate the assets and interests from the minority shareholders via the greater voting 
power of the large shareholding. These phenomena are called “wealth tunnelling” (Xu et 
al., 2011). Li et al., (2010) pointed out that the P&P problem has become increasingly 
apparent, and thus protecting the minority shareholders’ right raises the public voice. In 
2002, the CSRC initiated a classified voting system (CVS) to protect the minority 
shareholders (Yao et al., 2010). In detail, companies need to give 50 per cent of the votes 
to the tradable investors (such as, minority shareholders). Whether this system could 
really protect the minority shareholders’ right is questionable. According to Stalin noted, 
‘it is important not how people vote, but who counts the votes’ (Wei and Geng, 2008). In 
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China, the votes are counted by the large shareholder (state-owned ownership). It means 
that if the state will not relinquish its shareholdings to the public, the lack of rights of 
minority shareholders remains a concern.  
 
2.3.6 Chinese corporatism 
Neo-corporatism refers to a social mechanism which involved strong labour unions, 
employers' unions, and governments that cooperated as “social partners” to negotiate and 
manage a national economy (Barry Jones, 2001:243). Such an agreement is for a more 
“equitable” division of economic production profits to members of society.  
Regard to Chinese corporatism, Unger and Chan (1994) described that “at the national 
level the state recognises one and only one organisation (say, a national labour union, a 
business association, a farmers' association) as the sole representative of the sectoral 
interests of the individuals, enterprises or institutions that comprise that organisation's 
assigned constituency. The state determines which organisations will be recognised as 
legitimate and forms an unequal partnership of sorts with such organisations. The 
associations sometimes even get channelled into the policy-making processes and often 
help implement state policy on the government's behalf.” (p.30)     
By establishing itself as the arbitrator of legitimacy, the state assigns one sole 
organisation to take responsibility for a particular constituency, it effectively reduces and 
controls the number of the challengers and players with which it have to negotiate its 
policies. In addition, the state even appointed the leadership of organisations into 
policing their own members. It reflects that neo-corporatism is generated to achieve an 
agreement for a more “equitable” division of economic production profits to members of 
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society, but the Chinese government utilises the corporatism to consolidate its own status 
and power. It means that the development of Chinese corporatism and the original 
intention of neo-corporatism are totally in the different ways. In China, this arrangement 
is in effect for economic organisations, social organisations, and business groups.  
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter described the uniqueness of China in corporate governance through 
analysing the background of China and comparing corporate governance between China 
and Western countries. In comparison with the UK and the US, the differences of 
China’s characteristic corporate governance were found in five aspects: corporate 
governance model, development of Corporate Governance Codes, ownership structure, 
board structure, and agency problem (see Table 2.3).  
To sum up, China combined the Anglo-American and continental European models to 
form a mixed model with Chinese characteristic dual boards, which are controlled by a 
highly concentrated state-owned ownership structure. A large proportion of shares in the 
hand of the state are untradeable which leads to ‘a high level of ownership concentration 
and a low level of marketability’ (Ma et al., 2010). The corporate governance model in 
Chinese listed companies is described as a control-based model (Zhao, 2014), in which 
the controlling shareholders ‘tightly control the listed companies through concentrated 
ownership and management friendly boards’ (Liu, 2006). In the term of board 
composition, ineffective dual boards and overlapped role between supervisory board and 
independent directors are big issues in the development of the Chinese corporate 
governance. At present, the conflict between minority shareholders and controlling 
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shareholders is the most significant agency problem in China. Due to the privileges of the 
controlling shareholders (state ownership), the right of the minority shareholders are 
always overlooked.  
Therefore, in the empirical parts, ownership structure and board composition, which are 
two main characteristic mechanisms in the Chinese corporate governance, will be 
employed as representatives of the unique corporate governance to explored the 
relationship with environmental disclosure. The research will find the role of controlling 
shareholder (state ownership) and Chinese dual board on disclosure practice, and find 
problems of these two characteristic mechanisms in the development of Chinese 
corporate governance model.  
Although Chinese corporate governance has immature mechanisms and many problems 
at the moment, the government has been making efforts to develop a more effective 
corporate governance system and a mature market. It is deemed that Chinese corporate 
governance will be better in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
47	  
Table 2.3 
Differences of Corporate Governance in Three countries: China, the UK, and the 
US 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND QUANTITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CHINESE FIRMS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Environmental issues in China are attracting increasing attention from scholars. Tansey 
et al. (2004) investigated environmental disclosure in the emerging market and 
concluded that increasing environmental disclosure would help to reduce concern about 
organisational environmental issues. In China, the development of corporate 
environmental reporting (CER) is still at an initial level and ‘any form of CER to the 
public is predominantly non-mandatory’ (Rowe et al., 2009). Although there has been a 
series of regulations and standards on environmental disclosure published by the Chinese 
government recently, Chen (2013) asserts that Chinese companies are still in the early 
stages of revealing voluntary disclosure because of the large costs of implementation and 
the difficulty of supervision. Rowe et al. (2009) researched public CER in China 
focusing on Shanghai. The study investigated the perception of senior managers and 
executives on the value of CER in corporations and their attitude on the development of 
CER in their companies through interviews in fifteen Shanghai enterprises between 2001 
and 2005. They pointed out that empirical studies in English on CER in China are 
lacking. In addition, they asserted that China’s CER is still at its embryonic stage. Some 
studies in Chinese (e.g., Li and Zou, 2001; Zhang and Su, 2002) similarly claimed that 
China is short of voluntary environmental disclosure (VED). However, there is an 
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increase in Chinese listed companies with CER from 34 per cent in 2002 (Li and Xiao, 
2002) to approximately 60 per cent in 2006 (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009). These studies 
indicated that CER in Chinese listed companies is still lacking to date, but that it has an 
expectant increasing tendency.  
In previous studies of investigating what factors could impact on environmental 
disclosure, the almost	  consistent finding as noted by Gray et al. (2001, p.328), is that 
larger firms ‘in more ‘socially-’ and ‘environmentally-sensitive’ industries can be 
expected to make greater use of the disclosure of information about their social and 
environmental activities’. It accords with the finding of Beck et al. (2010), that size and 
industry are known to impact significantly on disclosure behaviours. Liu and Anbumozhi 
(2009) similarly found that firms’ environmental sensitivity and size have a significant 
correlation with corporate environmental information disclosure. In their paper, the 
impact of government pressure, level of shareholder concentration, and creditor pressure 
on environmental disclosure was tested by the annual reports from 175 Chinese listed 
companies in 2006. The result indicated that the pressures from shareholder 
concentration and creditor are still weak at present, but that government pressure is 
among the determinant factors of environmental disclosure. The research on the effect of 
corporate governance on corporate social responsibility / environmental disclosure were 
mainly focused on developed countries: the UK (e.g.,	  Aguilera et al., 2006; Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2008), the US (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2006;	  Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Cong 
and Freedman, 2011), Australia (e.g.,	  Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007; Rao et al., 2012) 
and European countries (e.g., Dam and Scholtens, 2012).	  Gibson and O’Donovan (2007) 
indicated that an increase in environmental information could be obtained by effective 
corporate governance, because it contains environmental information provision for 
legitimate stakeholders. Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) tested the effect of corporate 
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governance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a developed country and found 
that strong corporate governance has a symmetric influence on CSR and that it decreases 
both positive and negative CSR. Rao et al. (2012) proved that strong corporate 
governance mechanisms have an effect on the quantitative environmental disclosure in 
the annual reports through the evidence of 100 Australian listed companies. However, 
these studies examined less the impacts from the characteristics of corporate governance 
on voluntary environmental disclosure in developing countries. This research would 
contribute to this area. First, it explores the current status of environmental disclosure in 
the annual reports during recent years through a manual data process. Then, the 
monitoring role played by corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure and 
board composition) on the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosure is examined by 
evidence from Chinese listed companies. At the same time, the relationship between firm 
performance and environmental disclosure is investigated. Finally, in this chapter, the 
uniqueness of Chinese case would be identified.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, it presents the 
literature review that includes the voluntary disclosure part: environmental disclosure is 
the main object. The relationship between corporate governance and disclosure is 
reviewed and evaluated in the next part to look for gaps in the previous research. 
Particularly, the relevant previous studies on the effect of corporate governance on CSR / 
environmental disclosure are reviewed in this part. Section 3.3 discusses correlative 
theories about corporate governance and environmental disclosure. After that, research 
hypotheses of the relationship are discussed and put forward. Section 3.4 explains 
samples, variables and methodology. The empirical results are provided in Section 3.5. 
The final section concludes with the findings and contribution of this research. 
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1 Voluntary Disclosure 
Kanda (1999) mentioned that disclosure is conducive to enhanced transparency, helps 
stakeholders of the firm and other market participants to act properly and might prevent 
fraud. There are two theories of disclosures: voluntary disclosure and mandatory 
disclosure. The former and its determinants have been identified as an important research 
area which has attracted many scholars in accounting and finance since the 1970s (Ho 
and Wong, 2001). Li and Qi (2008) stated the effect of voluntary disclosure: it 
‘replenishes and deepens (mandatory) disclosure, and it has an important impact on 
improving the quality of disclosed information and demonstrates the prospective and 
truthful value of (a) company’. It decreases the information asymmetry between insiders 
(managers and directors) and outsiders (shareholders and investors) of the company (Lo, 
2009) and increases the investors’ awareness of the firm. The development of voluntary 
disclosure is influenced by many factors. Einhorn (2005) noted that voluntary disclosure 
would increase when regulation regarding disclosures increases. In the US, SOX is a 
stringent act which strengthens corporate governance under the penalty of law. It could 
improve voluntary disclosure in US companies, directly or indirectly. Compared with 
mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure is commonly chosen to investigate its 
relationship with firm-specific characteristics (e.g., Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; Hossain et al., 1994), culture (e.g., Gray, 1988; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), and 
corporate governance (e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003).  
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3.2.1.1 Categories of Voluntary Disclosure 
Within voluntary disclosure, non-mandatory accounting and non-accounting information 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.318), are divided into different types under theirs content 
and functions in the annual report. Four categories of them are generally selected to 
examine its relationship with corporate governance. They are general disclosure, 
financial disclosure, corporate governance disclosure, and social and environmental 
disclosure. The rest are market disclosure, risk management disclosure, human resources 
disclosure, and research and development disclosure (Iskander, 2008). 
3.2.1.1.1 General Disclosure 
General disclosure mainly shows general and strategic information of a firm in the 
annual report. Barako et al., (2006) listed some items in this category: brief history of the 
firm, organisational structure, major goods and/or services, current business strategy, and 
the company's contribution to the national economy. In short, general disclosure could 
assist the users of an annual report to know the basic information and situation of the 
company. 
3.2.1.1.2 Financial Disclosure 
Financial disclosure is defined by Gibbins et al. (1990) as ‘any deliberate release of 
financial information, whether numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, or via 
formal or informal channels’ (p.122). Mandatory financial disclosure is dictated to show 
financial statements and other financial information under the array of laws, regulations, 
and standards (such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and 
International Accounting Standards (IASs)). Voluntary financial disclosure gives more 
financial data than mandatory disclosure. For example, a historical summary of financial 
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data for last 6 years or more, a supplementary inflation adjusted financial statement, or 
some financial ratios (Barako et al., 2006). Iskander (2008) noticed that it discloses a 
more comprehensive presentation of the financial information and about the performance 
of the corporations. 
3.2.1.1.3 Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Corporate governance issues are very important for a corporation. They continue to get a 
high level of attention (United Nations, 2006). Thus, it is important to disclose corporate 
governance information in order to improve corporate transparency. The United Nations 
(2006) issued “Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure” to help 
‘the preparers of enterprise reporting in producing disclosures on corporate governance 
which will address the major concerns of investors and other stakeholders’. 
3.2.1.1.4 Social and Environmental Disclosure 
Voluntary social and environmental disclosure (VSED) is defined as a category of 
disclosure which reflects how the corporation deals with its social responsibility and 
environmental influence (Iskander, 2008). Its contents include information about 
employees’ safety and morale; a statement of corporate social responsibility; a statement 
of environmental policy; and information about environmental projects (Barako et al., 
2006). Companies, especially in environmentally sensitive industries, disclose 
environmental information which could add information content to investors and trigger 
their reactions (Freedman and Jaggi, 1982; 1988). Deegan and Rankin (1999) stated that 
‘environmental information could be used for determining a number of issues such as 
whether to invest or lend funds to an organisation; whether to consume an organisation’s 
products; whether to use an organisation’s products in the production process; and 
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whether to supply labour or other resources to the entity’. The Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No.1: Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business 
Enterprises (FASB, 1978) points out there are a variety of potential users of 
environmental disclosure, comprising ‘owners, lenders, suppliers, potential investors and 
creditors, employees, management, directors, customers, financial analysts and advisors, 
brokers, underwriters, stock exchanges, lawyers, economists, taxing authorities, 
regulatory authorities, legislators, financial press and reporting agencies, labour unions, 
trade associations, business researchers, teachers and students, and the public’ (p.11, 
paragraph 24). In this research, it mainly focuses on environmental disclosure.  
 
3.2.1.2 Prior research of voluntary disclosure 
As mentioned above, voluntary disclosure and its determinants have attracted much 
attention from both analytical and empirical researchers since the 1970s. In analytical 
research, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Hughes (1986) analysed the importance of 
(voluntary) disclosure based on agency theory and signalling theory respectively. In 
empirical research, research has mainly focused on the US and the UK (e.g., Firth, 1979; 
Leftwich et al., 1981; Meek and Gray, 1989; Gray et al., 1990; Cooke, 1992). In the 
1990s, researchers started to examine the relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
corporate governance (e.g. McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Raffournier, 1995; Chen 
and Jaggi, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Barako et al., 2006; Xiao and Yuan, 2007; Li and Qi, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Liu 
and Sun, 2010). There are	   generally five elements of corporate governance to be 
examined in reference to the impact on voluntary disclosure. They are ownership 
structure, board composition, family control, auditing committee, and Chairman/CEO 
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duality. To sum up, the previous empirical research received almost consistent results 
from family control, auditing committee, and Chairman/CEO duality related to voluntary 
disclosure. However, there are mixed empirical results in two mechanisms of corporate 
governance, which are ownership structure (especially, managerial ownership and 
blockholder ownership) and board composition.  
 
3.2.1.3 Research on voluntary environmental disclosure   
There has already been a large amount of research due to increasing concerns about 
environmental issues over the last two decades. The research mainly focuses on 
developed countries: the UK (e.g., Harte and Owen, 1991; Gray et al., 1995; Toms, 
2002), the US (e.g., Rockness, 1985; Hughes et al., 2000), New Zealand (e.g., Hackston 
and Milne, 1996), and Australia (e.g., Deegan and Rankin, 1999; Wilmshurst and Frost, 
2000). In recent years, scholars have started to explore the development of environmental 
disclosure in developing countries (e.g., Hossain et al., 2006; Murcia and Santos, 2010; 
Sen et al., 2010).  
The research of environmental disclosure is divided into four categories. The first type is 
to investigate the quality and/or quantity of environmental disclosure (e.g., Gray et al., 
1995a; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Rowe et al., 2009; Moroney 
et al., 2011). The study of Gray et al. (1995a) is recognised as a significant paper in this 
area. The paper reviewed the literature and a longitudinal study of the UK’s corporate 
social and environmental disclosure. It collected the data from the annual reports of UK 
companies over a 13-year period from 1979 to 1991 and found that environmental 
disclosure in the UK rose significantly from 1982. Tansey et al., (2004) investigated 
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environmental disclosure in the emerging market and concluded that increasing 
environmental disclosure would reduce the concern about organisational environmental 
issues. Rowe et al. (2009) researched public corporate environmental reporting (CER) in 
China focusing on Shanghai. The study investigated the perception of senior managers 
and executives on the value of CER in corporations and their attitude on the development 
of CER in their companies through interviewing senior managers and executives in 
fifteen Shanghai enterprises between 2001 and 2005. They pointed out that empirical 
studies in English on CER in China are lacking. In addition, they asserted that China’s 
CER is still at its embryonic stage.  
The second type is to examine the relationship between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance (e.g., Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Wiseman, 1982; Freedman 
and Jaggi, 1996; Neu et al., 1998; Magness, 2006; Dragomir, 2010; Kimbro and Melendy, 
2010). Wiseman (1982) measured the relationship between corporate environmental 
disclosure and the firm’s actual environmental performance through 26 environmentally 
sensitive firms. The result indicated that there is no relationship between them. It is 
consistent with the findings of Ingram and Frazier (1980) and Freedman and Jaggi (1982). 
In the paper of Neu et al. (1998), the role and function of environmental disclosure were 
found by examining the impact of external pressure and other “social” disclosures on 
environmental disclosure and the relationship between environmental disclosure and 
actual performance. 
The impact of environmental disclosure on firm value is the third type (e.g., Plumlee et 
al., 2008; 2010). In the study of Plumlee et al., (2008), they examined the relationship 
between VED quality and firm value (the cost of capital and the expected cash flow) 
through a sample of firms in both environmentally sensitive and non-sensitive industries. 
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They concluded that firms’ VED positively relates to the cash flow component in 
environmentally non-sensitive industries and negatively associates with the cost of 
capital component in environmentally sensitive industries. The study was expanded in 
both the number of samples and the length of the research period in the paper of Plumlee 
et al. (2010). They found the additional result as: there are both positive and negative 
relationships between some aspects of VED and the cost of equity capital component. 
The last one is to investigate what factors could affect environmental disclosure (e.g., 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Gray et al., 2001; García-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003; Kent 
and Chan, 2003; Elijido-Ten, 2004; Hossian et al., 2006; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; 
Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán, 2010; Murcia and 
Santos, 2010; Mahadeo et al., 2011; Moroney et al., 2011; Salama et al., 2012; Zeng et 
al., 2012). In previous studies, they focused on the relationship between firm size and 
VED (e.g., Adams et al., 1995; Cormier and Gordon, 2001), profit and VED (e.g., 
Freedman and Jaggi, 1988; Gray et al., 2001), and industry and VED (e.g., Halme and 
Huse, 1997). As noted by Gray et al. (2001), ‘larger, more profitable firms, and those in 
more ‘socially-’ and ‘environmentally-sensitive’ industries can be expected to make 
greater use of the disclosure of information about their social and environmental 
activities’ (p.328). It accords with the view of Beck et al. (2010), that size and industry 
are known to significantly impact on disclosure behaviours. 
Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) summarised 11 specific factors that influence or motivate 
the decision to reveal environmental information based on previous studies. Combined 
with legitimacy theory, they investigated the importance of these factors on corporate 
environmental reporting practices through the survey process and the regression test. 
They adopted content analysis approach to collect and measure environmental 
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information from the annual reports of 62 sample companies in 1995 to test the 
relationship between these factors and actual disclosure practice by the regression model. 
This research provides limited support for the applicability of legitimacy theory as an 
explanation for the decision to reveal environmental information. The empirical findings 
showed that the perceived importance of a number of factors (e.g., “to provide a ‘true and 
fair’ view”, “community concern with operations”, “shareholder/investor rights to 
information”, “customer concerns”, “supplier concerns”, and “financial institution 
concerns”) play a significant and positive role on environmental disclosure in the annual 
reports. These results reflected that the influence of concerns from customers, suppliers, 
and financial institutions on environmental reporting is much more effective than it is 
considered in the mind of CFOs.  
Gray et al. (2001) tested empirically the association between social and environmental 
disclosure (SED) and corporate characteristics using OLS regression. The Centre for 
Social and Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR) Database was adopted to 
collect disclosures in the annual reports of the top 100 UK companies, which were 
selected from the Times 1000, between 1988 and 1995. Statistics of turnover, capital 
employed, profit, and number of employees were engaged from corporate characteristics 
to test their influence on SED. They concluded that the results provide evidence which 
supports size, profit, and industry being determinant factors of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure, at least in the UK. However, they were ‘unable to claim that 
there is any unique and/or stable relationship between any measure of disclosure and any 
corporate characteristic’ based on the detailed functional models (p.349). 
García-Ayuso and Larrinaga (2003) examined the relationship between the amount of 
environmental information disclosed by firms and a number of corporate characteristics 
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(size, risk, profitability, environmental sensitivity, media exposure), based on a sample of 
560 firm-year observations from the Madrid Stock Market in Spain excluding financial 
firms between 1991 and 1995. Two measurements in the level of environmental 
disclosure were designed and employed in the research, which are LINE (as measured by 
the total number of lines of environmental disclosure) and SPACE (as measured by the 
number of lines of environmental disclosure relative to the total information disclosed in 
the annual report). They found that the development of the environmental reports was 
very fast in the early 1990s. In addition, they concluded that larger firms with higher 
systematic risk and which operated in more sensitive industries have a higher level of 
environmental disclosure. The potential environmental impact of the industry and the 
extent of media coverage of the firms are directly associated with environmental 
disclosure. 
Based on the stakeholder theory, Elijido-Ten (2004) adopted Ullmann’s (1985) three-
dimensional framework (stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance) 
to investigate the associations between voluntary environmental disclosure and its 
determinant factors in developing countries. Due to there being no compulsory 
environmental requirement in Malaysia, environmental disclosures provided by 
companies are their own voluntary activities, according to the Environmental Quality Act 
of 1874 and the Malaysian Companies Act of 1965. In this article, the content analysis 
approach was used to measure quality environmental information while the units of 
measurement (number of sentences) were applied for quantity, based on a sample of 40 
Malay companies from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) between 2000 and 
2001. Stakeholder power, the first dimension in Ullmann’s model, was measured by 
shareholder power (shareholder concentration), creditor power (debt/equity ratio), and 
Government power (environmentally sensitive industries); Strategic posture, the second 
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dimension, was measured by environmental concern and ISO 14001 Certification; and 
economic performance, the third dimension, was measured by ROA and change in firm 
value, which were employed as independent variables to test the effect on both the 
quality and quantity of environmental disclosure. Firm size and corporation age were 
engaged as the control variables in the study. The research found that the level of 
environmental concern and government power are the main factors affecting voluntary 
environmental disclosure. There was no evidence found to confirm the influence of 
economic performance on the level of environmental information. In addition, the author 
pointed out that general or vague descriptions are the main forms of environmental 
information disclosed by most Malay companies and quality environmental disclosure is 
expected to increase in the future. 
Hossian et al., (2006) also empirically tested environmental disclosure in a developing 
country. The authors pointed out that most environmental disclosure studies focused on 
developed countries (e.g., the US, the UK, and other European countries), with just a few 
papers about developing countries (e.g. Korea, India), and no such research in 
Bangladesh. Therefore, 107 companies from the Dhaka Stock Exchange excluding 
financial firms between 2002 and 2003 were chosen to examine the impacts of several 
corporate factors (size, profitability, subsidiaries of multinational companies, audit firm, 
industry type) on corporate social and environmental disclosure. The results indicated 
that industry type, presence of debentures in the annual report, and net profit margin 
significantly and positively relate to corporate social and environmental disclosure. In 
addition, manufacturing firms with higher profitability and debentures issued were found 
to disclose more social and environmental information. In the research, the time of 
observation is a single year between 2002 and 2003 which is a limitation. The authors 
suggested that future scholars could extend the period of observation. Furthermore, 
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future research could concentrate on a particular industry type to see if that industry 
differed from the results of the study. 
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) examined the factors related to the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure (CED). The variables included environmental fines, as 
measured by the fines companies received for environmental transgressions; size, as 
measured by the natural logarithm of the value of total assets; media exposure, as 
measured by the incidence of news media coverage of the company; ownership 
concentration, as measured by the total share of any ownership who owns in excess of 3% 
of shareholdings; profitability, as measured by return on total assets; firm leverage, as 
measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets; and non-executive directors, as 
measured by proportion of independent non-executive directors to the number of 
directors on the board. Logistic regression was employed in the study to test a sample of 
447 large UK firms in 2000. It found that a firm's size and its business activities are 
determinants of CED; that large firms operating in an industry which is environmentally 
sensitive have high CED; but that media exposure does not relate to CED. 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008) employed two mediums of social responsibility disclosure 
(SRD), the Internet (corporate Website) in 2004 and 2003 annual reports, to compare and 
analyse the factors impacting SRD. Although the annual reports are commonly adopted 
to collect information in most of the empirical studies on disclosure practise, the 
increasing importance of communication with stakeholders via the Internet, which has 
started to attract the attention of scholars, cannot be overlooked. In this article, SRD was 
divided into five categories for each medium: total SRD, environmental disclosure, 
human resources disclosure, products and customers disclosure, and community 
involvement disclosure. In other words, there were ten models, which integrated ten 
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different dependent variables with the same determinant factors (independent variables) 
respectively. Combined with legitimacy theory and a resource-based perspective, they 
developed a series of hypotheses to test the influence of international experience, 
company size, industry affiliation, consumer proximity, environmental sensitivity, and 
media exposure on SRD and its categories, both on the Internet and in the annual reports. 
Profitability and leverage were engaged as control variables to support multiple linear 
regression models. In regard to total SRD, they found that firm size and media exposure 
play a positive role in driving the revelation of more SRD in the annual reports. 
Moreover, SRD on the Internet was found to have a significant and positive relationship 
with firm size whereas it had a negative link with leverage. Furthermore, they suggested 
that firms with ‘higher visibility exhibit greater concern’ to advance their image through 
SRD by these two mediums (p.699). 
Alarussi et al. (2009) developed six hypotheses and used a multiple regression analysis to 
explore whether or not the six variables (namely ethnicity of executive officer (CEO), 
leverage, level of technology, listing status, profitability, and firm size) play an effective 
role on Internet financial and environmental disclosure by Malaysian companies. Three 
levels of financial disclosure was utilised to measure the extent of financial information 
from the websites of listed companies whereas a dummy variable was adopted for 
environmental disclosure. Based on 189 companies’ websites in 2006, they found 18 
firms without financial disclosure, 50 firms with disclosure of 1-2 financial items, and 
121 firms with disclosure of more than 2 items. In contrast, there were 108 companies 
that revealed environmental information in their websites whilst 81 companies did not. 
The empirical results indicated that large firms with high-level technology more likely 
disclose both financial and environmental information on the Internet. Moreover, it 
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observed that listing status and ethnicity of CED were significantly related to financial 
disclosure while profitability merely linked to environmental disclosure. 
Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) examined a number of determinant factors of corporate 
environmental information disclosure, based on the evidence from 127 Chinese listed 
companies in 2006. In the paper, they developed three hypotheses to examine the impact 
of government pressure, the level of shareholder concentration, and creditor pressure on 
environmental disclosure. In detail, government pressure was measured by a dummy 
variable representing whether a firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry, 
which includes ‘mining, thermal power, construction materials, pulp and paper products, 
metallurgy, petroleum, brewery, ferment, textile, pharmacy, tanning and chemical 
industries’ (p597); level of shareholder concentration was measured by the percentage of 
floating shares held by the top ten shareholders; and they applied the asset liability ratio 
as the proxy of the creditor pressure. For the measurement of the dependent variable, the 
authors used an index based upon the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the 
‘Environmental Information Disclosure Measurement’ issued by China's SEPA. Size of 
firms, location, age of listed companies, return of equity, and learning capacity were 
employed as control variables to support their multiple regression models. The authors 
found that firms’ environmental sensitivity and size have a significant association with 
corporate environmental disclosure. Regarding firms’ environmental sensitivity, as noted 
by Polonsky and Zeffane (1992), firms with large environmental problems would show 
the highest level of attention to the environment. The result of the study indicated that 
pressure from shareholder concentration and creditors is still weak at present, but that 
government pressure is a significant factor which influences environmental information 
disclosure. In addition, the authors pointed out an interesting finding that these sampled 
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Chinese firms are selectively revealing environmental information, based on their 
potential beneficial outcomes and favour. 
Buniamin (2010) examined the quantity and quality of environmental reporting in the 
annual reports of Malay companies and its determinant factors based on legitimacy 
theory, using a sample of 243 firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia in 2005. 
Content analysis approach was adopted to determine the level of environmental 
information in the annual report. The quantity of information was measured by the 
number of sentences whereas the quality information was based on the disclosure index, 
which had 100 disclosure items and was grouped into 14 categories. A score of one is 
given when any item was reported, while a score of zero was assigned for non-disclosure. 
The findings indicated that just 28% of the companies reveal such information and 3.24% 
is the average quality of environmental reporting disclosed per firm. Using linear 
regression, the empirical results revealed that firm size and environmental sensitive 
industry play an effective role in encouraging both the extent and the level of 
environmental disclosure. Additionally, the study found that firms with a large volume of 
environmental reporting also have a high level of environmental reporting quality. 
da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán (2010) investigated the development of VED in 
Portugal and the extent of impact from the determinants of VED. In the study, the 
authors indicated that the legitimacy theory and the stakeholder theory are the major 
theories in most studies to explain the differences in VED among companies. They used 
the annual reports of 109 large companies between 2002 and 2004 to test the influence of 
corporate characteristics (firm size, industry member, profitability, quotation on the stock 
market, foreign ownership, environmental certification) to VED. This research adopted 
the content analysis approach to measure environmental information and the multiple 
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regressions to examine the relationship between VED (dependent variable) and its 
determinant factors (independent variables). They found that VED were still low in 
Portuguese companies between 2002 and 2004, but that it has increased. Unsurprisingly, 
firm size positively relates to VED. 
Based on previous environmental disclosure studies, Huang and Kung (2010) 
summarised that firms need to fulfil their social responsibility and meet the demands of 
stakeholders (p.437). Drawing on stakeholder theory, they examined the influence of 
external stakeholders (e.g., government, creditors, suppliers and customers, and 
competitors), internal stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and employees), and intermediary 
stakeholders (environmental protection organisations and accounting firms) on the 
quality of environmental disclosure, using data from 759 firms listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2005. In this study, the authors indicated that most of 
the data are hand-collected and that the content analysis approach (a disclosure-scoring 
technique) was employed to measure qualitative disclosure. A score of 1 was given if a 
company’s disclosure referred to one of 36 environmental information items provided by 
the auditors whereas a score of 0 was given for non-disclosure. The score range of 
dependent variables (environmental disclosure) was 0 – 36 for each firm. The results 
showed that stakeholder groups’ demands are proved to be effective drivers in improving 
levels of environmental disclosure. In detail, external stakeholder groups ‘exert a strong 
influence over management intentions regarding the extent of environmental disclosure’; 
internal stakeholder groups ‘impose additional pressures on firms to disclose 
environmental information’; and intermediate stakeholder groups ‘can greatly influence 
managerial choices regarding their environmental disclosure strategies’ (p.437). 
According to the results of this study, Huang and Kung (2010) concluded that transparent 
environmental disclosures provided by firms would not only satisfy the needs of various 
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stakeholder groups, but that they will also increase companies’ image, obtain added value, 
and achieve more sustainable development. 
Murcia and Santos (2010) employed Panel data model to examine the associations 
between social-environmental disclosure (SED) (49 voluntary items), economic 
disclosure (43 voluntary items), their total disclosure (92 voluntary items) and their 
determinants based on 100 Brazilian companies from the largest non-financial sector 
during 2006-2008. The discretionary-based disclosure (Verrecchia, 2001) was employed as 
the theory underpinning the study. The main empirical results relating to social-
environmental disclosure indicated that (1) Tobin's Q, sector, and origin of control are 
statistically significant in SED; (2) in contrast, size, governance, stock issuing, growth 
opportunities and concentration of control are not statistically significant in SED. 
Mahadeo et al. (2011) did a longitudinal study on corporate social disclosures (CSD) in 
an African developing economy. This research explored the development of CSD and its 
determinant factors (size, profitability, leverage, and industry differences), using a total 
of 165 annual reports of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) 
during a three-year period between 2004-2007, based on legitimacy theory. As most prior 
studies, content analysis was engaged to measure CSD, which is divided into five classes 
as dependent variables in this article: Ethics information, Social information, 
Environmental information, Health and Safety information, and total CSD. The 
importance of this research was given as follows: first, many previous studies have 
depended on a short window of observation (normally, 1 year data), which may have 
resulted in a biased conclusion on the effect of determinant factors of CSD; second, in 
contrast with developed countries, especially Western, ‘the context of developing 
countries reflects a multitude of social, political, economic and cultural factors which 
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translate into different ‘arrangements’ such as, for instance, the patterns of corporate 
ownership, business law and regulation, state intervention in commercial activities, the 
influence of religious or ethnic considerations, the degree of public concern about the 
environment, the prominence of civil society and attitudes to philanthropy or social 
responsibility’ (pp545-546), which motivate the investigation on the CSD and its 
determinant factors in a developing economy. In this article, a significant enhancement in 
both volume and variety of CSD was found, which supported well their first hypothesis 
based on analysis of the changing political and economic context. According to a pooled 
regression, the findings indicated that size positively impacts on overall CSD and social 
disclosures, whilst leverage is positively related to particular CSD (environmental and 
health and safety); there is no evidence to prove the relationship between profitability 
and CSD; the effects of industry affiliation on CSD are different depending on the 
category of CSD and Industry. 
According to the stakeholder-agency theoretical perspective, Moroney et al. (2011) 
examined whether assurance (as measured by a dummy variable, coded 1 if a company 
has environmental assurance and 0 otherwise) enhances the quality of VED through 
surveying 74 Australian companies from the top 500 firms between 2003 and 2007. It 
also measured the difference in VED when companies are assured by either professional 
accountant assurers or private consultants. Stock price volatility, Tobin's Q, J-F 
coefficient, return of assets, leverage ratio, asset newness, and capital intensity were 
employed as the control variables in the study to support a linear regression model. An 
index based upon the GRI as a measurement of the dependent variable was applied in the 
content analysis. The result indicated that the quality of VED significantly and positively 
relates to assured companies compared to non-assured companies; the quality of VED is 
	  
	  
68	  
no different in assured companies by professional accountant assurers or private 
consultants; and experience improves the quality of VED. 
Salama et al. (2012) employed stakeholder-agency theory to observe the determinant 
factors of environmental disclosures in annual reports, based on 169 UK firms using a 
single year (1999). In the paper, they engaged both TOBIT and LOGIT formulation as 
supplements to OLS regressions in order to minimise the limitation of OLS regression 
testing dependent variables that are not less than zero. Environmental disclosure, 
measured by content analysis, is employed as the dependent variable while (high-profile 
and low-profile) industry, profitability, and firm size are utilised as independent variables. 
The findings indicated that firm size and industry influence environmental disclosures 
significantly and positively. However, this paper did not find any evidence to support a 
relationship between profitability and environmental disclosure.  
Zeng et al. (2012) examined factors that drive Chinese listed companies in voluntary 
environmental information disclosure based on institutional theory. This theory 
‘considers the processes by which structures, rules, norms, and routines become 
established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour’ (Scott, 2007, p.460). It 
provided a useful framework to estimate how environmental disclosure ‘could become a 
dominant practice among firms’ (Zeng et al., 2012, p.310). The sample companies, from 
the manufacturing industry, were selected from those listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2006 and 2008. There were 792 firms, 785 firms, 
and 784 firms in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. The data of environmental 
disclosure and the financial data were collected from the annual reports and the CSMAR 
database (2009). In this article, the measurement of environmental information employed 
the score ranges between 0 and 3 to denote the level of disclosure, which was based on 
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the empirical study of Wiseman (1982). The findings indicated that the factors of being a 
state-owned enterprise and the greater size of the firm played an active role in driving 
environmental reporting practice in the annual report. Moreover, firms belonging to 
environmentally sensitive industries and firms with a better reputation also motivate 
other companies to reveal more environmental information.  
Juhamni (2014) investigated the determinants of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure on Websites through the case of Bahrain. Content analysis by word count was 
employed to measure the level of social and environmental disclosure on Websites of 
Bahraini listed companies. Then, they used multiple regression analysis to examine the 
effect of firm size, profitability, financial leverage, firm age and audit firm size on the 
level of social and environmental information based on legitimacy theory. The valid data 
included 33 Bahraini companies covering sectors of commercial banks, investment, 
insurance, services, hotels and tourism, industrial. The finding indicated that the level of 
social and environmental disclosure is significantly and positively impacted by financial 
leverage and audit firm size. However, they did not find any evidence to support the 
influence of firm size, profitability, and firm age on the level of social and environmental 
disclosure on Websites. 
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Table 3.1 
Empirical studies on determinant factors of environmental disclosures 
Author(s) & 
Date 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Sample Size 
& Type, Time 
of Observation 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Measure 
Analysis & General 
Results 
            
Wilmshurst 
and Frost 
(2000) 
Corporate 
Environmental 
Reporting 
11 specific 
factors that 
influence or 
motivate the 
decision to 
reveal 
environmental 
disclosure 
62 Australian 
companies in 
1995 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Regression model 
RESULT: to provide 
a ‘true and fair’ view, 
community concern 
with operations, 
shareholder/investor 
rights to information, 
customer concerns, 
supplier concerns, 
and financial 
institution concerns 
play a significant and 
positive role on 
environmental 
disclosure in the 
annual reports. 
Gray et al. 
(2001) 
Social and 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
(SED) 
Turnover, 
Capital 
employed, 
Profit, and 
Number of 
employees 
The top 100 
UK 
companies, 
which were 
selected from 
the Times 
1000, between 
1988 and 1995 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
OLS regression 
RESULT: size, profit, 
and industry are 
determinant factors of 
corporate social and 
environmental 
disclosure, at least, in 
the UK. 
García-
Ayuso and 
Larrinaga 
(2003) 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Size, Risk, 
Profitability, 
Environmental 
Sensitivity, 
Media exposure 
112 Spanish 
companies 
from the 
Madrid Stock 
Market 
excluding 
financial firms 
between 1991 
and 1995 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Regression model 
RESULT: firms with 
higher systematic risk 
and which operate in 
more sensitive 
industries have higher 
environmental 
disclosure (ED); The 
potential 
environmental impact 
of the industry and 
the extent of media 
coverage of the firms 
associate with ED. 
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Elijido-Ten 
(2004) 
The quality 
and quantity of 
Voluntary 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
(VED) 
Shareholder 
power, Creditor 
power, 
Government 
power, 
Environmental 
concern, ISO 
14001 
certification, 
Average return 
on assets, 
Change in firm 
value，Average 
sales revenue of 
firm, and Age 
40 Malaysian 
companies 
from the 
Kuala Lumpur 
Stock 
Exchange 
(KLSE) in the 
year 2000 (40 
observations) 
and 2001 (39 
observations-
one company 
was delisted) 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Regression model 
RESULT: the level of 
environmental 
concern and 
government power 
are the main 
determinants of VED; 
economic 
performance does not 
impact on the level of 
environmental 
disclosure 
significantly. 
Hossian et 
al. (2006) 
Corporate 
Social and 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
(CSED) 
Size, 
Profitability, 
Subsidiaries of 
multinational 
company, Audit 
firm, Industry 
type, Age 
107 
Bangladeshi 
companies 
from the 
Dhaka Stock 
Exchange 
excluding 
financial firms 
between 2002 
and 2003 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Multiple linear 
regression               
RESULT: industry 
type, presence of 
debentures in the 
annual report, and net 
profit margin 
significantly and 
positively related to 
CSED. 
Brammer 
and Pavelin 
(2008) 
The quality of 
Corporate 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
(CED) 
Environmental 
fines, Size, 
Media exposure, 
Ownership 
concentration, 
Profitability, 
Firm leverage, 
Non-executive 
directors 
447 UK 
companies 
from large 
firms in 2000 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Logistic regression 
analyses                     
RESULT: firm's size 
and its business 
activities are 
determinants of CED; 
Large firms with 
environmental 
sensitivity have high 
CED; media exposure 
does not relate to 
CED. 
Branco and 
Rodrigues 
(2008) 
Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure 
(SRD) 
International 
experience, 
Company size, 
Industry 
affiliation, 
Consumer 
proximity, 
Environmental 
sensitivity, 
Media exposure, 
Profitability and 
Leverage 
49 Portuguese 
companies in 
2003 and 2004 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Multiple linear 
regression models 
RESULT: firm size 
and media exposure 
play a positive role to 
drive revealing more 
SRD. Moreover, SRD 
on the Internet was 
found to have a 
significant and 
positive relationship 
with firm size but a 
negative link with 
leverage. 
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Alarussi et 
al. (2009) 
Internet 
Financial 
Disclosure, 
Internet 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Ethnicity of 
executive 
officer (CEO), 
Leverage, Level 
of technology, 
Listing status, 
Profitability, 
and Firm size 
189 Malaysian 
companies in 
2006 
The scoring 
index 
Multiple regression 
RESULT: large firms 
with high-level 
technology are more 
likely to disclose both 
financial and 
environmental 
information on the 
Internet. Moreover, it 
observed that listing 
status and ethnicity of 
CED were 
significantly related 
with financial 
disclosure while 
profitability merely 
linked to 
environmental 
disclosure. 
Liu and 
Anbumozhi 
(2009) 
Corporate 
Environmental 
Information 
(CEI) 
Government 
Pressure, 
Shareholder 
Pressure, and 
Creditor 
Pressure, Size, 
Location, Age 
of listed 
companies, 
Economic 
performance, 
Learning 
capacity 
175 Chinese 
companies 
excluding 
special 
treatment 
firms in 2006 
Content 
analysis 
approach               
An index 
based upon the 
Global 
Reporting 
Initiative 
(GRI) and the 
'Environmenta
l Information 
Disclosure 
Measurement' 
issued by 
China's SEPA 
Multiple regression 
RESULT: firms' 
environmental 
sensitivity and size 
have a significant 
association with CEI; 
The economic 
performance does not 
significantly associate 
to CEI; the pressure 
from shareholder 
concentration and 
creditors are still 
weak at present, but 
government pressure 
among the 
determinant factors of 
CEI. 
Buniamin 
(2010) 
Quantity and 
Quality of 
Environmental 
Reporting 
Firm size and 
Environmental 
sensitive 
industry 
243 firms 
listed on the 
Main Board of 
Bursa 
Malaysia in 
2005 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Linear regression 
RESULT: firm size 
and environmentally 
sensitive industry 
play an effective role 
to encourage both the 
extent and the level 
of environmental 
disclosure. 
Additionally, the 
study found that firms 
with a large volume 
of environmental 
reporting also have a 
high level of 
environmental 
reporting quality. 
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da Silva 
Monteiro 
and Aibar-
Guzmán 
(2010) 
Voluntary 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
(VED) 
Firm size, 
Industry 
member, 
Profitability, 
Quotation on 
the stock 
market, Foreign 
ownership, 
Environmental 
Certification 
109 
Portuguese 
companies 
from large 
firms between 
2002 and 2004 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Multiple regression 
RESULT: VED was 
low in Portugal 
between 2002 and 
2004, but it has 
increased; Firm size 
positively relates to 
VED. 
Huang and 
Kung (2010) 
Quality of 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Fines, Size, 
Leverage, 
Advertising 
fees, Inventory 
turnover, 
Market share, 
Blockholder 
ownership, 
Number of 
employees, 
Environmental 
sensitivity of the 
industry, and 
Type of auditing 
firm, ROA 
759 firms 
listed on the 
Taiwan Stock 
Exchange 
from 2003 and 
2005 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Regression model 
RESULT: 
stakeholder groups’ 
demands are proved 
as effective drivers to 
improve level of 
environmental 
disclosure.  
Murcia and 
Santos 
(2010) 
Social-
Environmental 
Disclosure 
(SED), 
Economic 
Disclosure 
Auditing firm, 
Profitability, 
Tobin's Q, 
Internationalis-
ation, Size, 
Corporate 
governance, 
Financial 
leverage, 
Concentration 
of control, Stock 
issuing, Growth 
opportunity, 
Sector, Origin 
of control 
100 Brazilian 
companies 
from largest 
non-financial 
sector between 
2006 and 2008 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Panel data model 
RESULT: Tobin's Q 
relates to SED; Sector 
and origin of control 
are statistically 
significant in SED; In 
contrast, size, 
governance, stock 
issuing, growth 
opportunities and 
concentration of 
control are not 
statistically 
significant in SED. 
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Mahadeo et 
al. (2011) 
Corporate 
Social 
Disclosures 
(CSD) 
Size, Profit, 
Leverage, 
Industry, 
165 annual 
reports from 
an African 
developing 
economy 
(Mauritius) 
between 2004 
and 2007 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Pooled regression 
analysis                       
RESULT: size 
positively impacts on 
overall CSD and 
social disclosures, 
whilst leverage is 
positively related to 
particular CSD 
(environmental and 
health and safety); 
there is no 
relationship between 
profit and CSD; the 
effects of industry 
affiliation on CSD are 
different depending 
on the category of 
CSD and industry. 
Moroney et 
al. (2011) 
The quality of 
Voluntary 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Environmental 
Assurance, 
Professional 
accountant 
assurer, Stock 
price volatility, 
Tobin's Q, J-F 
coefficient, 
Return of assets, 
Leverage ratio, 
Asset newness, 
Capital intensity 
74 Australian 
companies 
from top 500 
firms between 
2003 and 2007 
Content 
analysis 
approach              
An index 
based upon the 
Global 
Reporting 
Initiative 
(GRI) 
Linear regression 
model                             
RESULT: the quality 
of VED significantly 
and positively relates 
to environmental 
assured companies 
compared to 
unassured companies; 
the quality is no 
different in assured 
companies when 
assured by 
accountants or 
consultants; 
Experience improves 
the quality of VED. 
Salama et al. 
(2012) 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Industry, 
Profitability and 
Size 
169 UK 
companies 
using a single 
year (1999) 
Content 
analysis 
approach    
OLS regression, 
TOBIT and LOGIT 
formulations                        
RESULTS: size and 
industry have a 
significant positive 
impact upon 
environmental 
disclosures whilst 
profitability has a 
negative impact upon 
disclosures. 
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Zeng et al. 
(2012) 
Voluntary 
Environmental 
Information 
Disclosure 
SOE, Industry, 
Industrial Peers, 
Corporate 
governance, 
Brand, Firm 
size, Loans, 
Market, EPS, 
Age, Foreign-
owned shares 
792, 785, and 
784 Chinese 
manufacturing 
firms in 2006, 
2007, and 
2008 
Content 
analysis 
approach            
Linear specification 
and OLS regression   
RESULT: state-
owned enterprise and 
larger size of firm 
played an active role 
to drive 
environmental 
practice in the annual 
report; firms 
belonging to 
environmentally 
sensitive industries 
and firms with a 
better reputation also 
motivate companies 
to reveal more 
environmental 
information. 
Juhmani 
(2014) 
Corporate 
Social and 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Firm size, 
Profitability, 
Financial 
leverage, Firm 
age, and audit 
firm size 
33 Bahraini 
companies 
covering 
sectors of 
commercial 
banks, 
investment, 
insurance, 
services, 
hotels and 
tourism, 
industrial 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Multiple regression 
analysis 
RESULTS: the 
level of social and 
environmental 
disclosure is 
significantly and 
positively 
impacted by 
financial leverage 
and audit firm 
size. 
In summary, the recent empirical studies on determinant factors of environmental 
disclosures tend to focus on developing countries. Table 3.1 shows the previous studies 
on the relationship between environmental disclosure and corporate characteristics 
between 2003 and 2014. There are some common factors existing in these previous 
studies: first, most studies employed the content analysis approach to measure 
environmental disclosures. Second, most of them indicated that size and sensitive 
industry positively effect environmental disclosures, which is consistent with the results 
of the previous studies. Furthermore, profitability and leverage was widely employed as 
an independent/control variable in many studies.  
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3.2.2 The relationship between Corporate Governance and Quantity of 
Environmental Disclosure 
Aguilera et al. (2006) argued that differences between institutional investors (the 
mechanism of corporate governance) in the UK and the US affect a company’s social 
responsibilities (CSR). They concluded that in contrast to the US, more institutional 
investors are acting to emphasise CSR issues in the UK, because of the significant 
distinction between the corporate governance arrangement in these two countries which 
includes the attitude and behaviour of the institutional investor community. The authors 
suggested that CSR is more likely to be incorporated into “core” corporate governance in 
the UK than in the US. 
Naser et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between corporate social disclosure and 
its influencing factors, which include different ownership structures (individual investors, 
governmental ownership, institutional investors, and majority shareholders) and 
corporate characteristics (growth in assets, dividends paid, gearing ratio, and market 
capitalisation) in Qatar. Based on content analysis approach, they developed a checklist 
that consisted of 15 content categories within the annual report with testable dimensions, 
namely: theme, evidence, amount, and location in the report. The score of corporate 
social disclosure was equal to the sum of environmental information, energy information, 
human resources information, product information, and community involvement 
information. Multiple regressions were employed in this article to test data from the 
annual report of 21 firms listed on the Doha Stock Exchange for the year 1999/2000. The 
results indicated that variations in corporate social disclosure are found to be impacted by 
the business risk measured by growth in assets and gearing ratio, and firm size measured 
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by the market capitalisation. However, they did not find evidence to support any 
association between corporate social disclosure and ownership variables.  
Gibson and O’Donovan (2007) employed 752 firm-year observations to investigate the 
associations between corporate governance and environmental reporting. This 
longitudinal study applied the content analysis approach to measure environmental 
reporting based on a sample of 41 listed Australian companies covering the 21-year 
period between 1983 and 2003. The research found that an increasing number of listed 
companies in Australia are revealing environmental information, and that the quantity of 
environmental disclosure in annual reports is improving. The authors indicated that an 
increase in environmental information could be obtained by effective corporate 
governance, because it contains environmental information provision for legitimate 
stakeholders. 
Mohd Ghazali (2007) indicated that ownership structure had been overlooked in previous 
research on determinant factors of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure, and 
they employed evidence from a developing country to fill this research gap. In the article, 
they examined the influence of ownership concentration, director ownership, and 
government ownership on CSR information in the 2001 annual reports of 87 non-
financial Malaysian firms based on a multiple regression analysis. Ownership 
concentration was measured by percentage of shares held by substantial shareholders 
(top 10 largest shareholders); direct ownership was measured by percentage of shares 
held by directors; government ownership was the dummy variable, coded as 1 for a 
company with the government as the substantial shareholder and 0 otherwise. In addition, 
company size, profitability, and industry, three common and popular corporate 
characteristics engaged by previous studies on factors influencing disclosure practice, 
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were also employed as independent variables in this empirical paper. A CSR disclosure 
checklist and scoring method were adopted to measure the extent of disclosure. In detail, 
there were 22 items selected, which were founded on the prior studies (e.g., Hossain et 
al., 1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and the adjudication criteria issued by the Bursa 
Malaysia. When a company revealed information which was included in the 22 items, a 
score of 1 was awarded; and 0 was given if there was no disclosure related to the 
checklist. The range of scores for each company was 0 – 22. The regression results 
showed that government ownership and company size play an effective role on the extent 
of CSR disclosure whereas director ownership relates to lower CSR information in the 
annual report. 
Since the late 1980s, environmental reporting has become widespread in Western Europe 
(Gray et al., 1996). Compared with other European countries, the development of 
environmental disclosure in Germany increased to a high level (Roberts, 1991). In the 
developing countries, lack of regulation was one of the main problems for authorities, 
who made less effort to encourage firms in revealing social and environmental 
information (Abu Shiraz, 1998). Ku Ismail and Ibrahim (2008) asserted that there is only 
a handful studies on social and environmental disclosure in developing companies in 
contrast with relatively mature research on this area in developed countries. Thus, they 
provided an empirical analysis to discover the determinant factors of social and 
environmental disclosure (SED) quantity in Jordan. In the article, the monitoring role of 
government ownership, firm size, and industry type on the extent of SED was examined 
by looking at 60 Jordanian companies in the manufacturing and service sectors for the 
year 2006. SED was measured by the number of sentences based on content analysis 
approach. Using ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis, the empirical findings 
indicated that firm size played a significantly positive role to encourage firm in revealing 
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vast quantities of SED. In contrast to firms with a high level of government ownership, 
low government ownership in firms is more effective in influencing the amount of SED. 
However, there was no evidence found to support any significant relationship between 
SED and industry type. In addition, the paper found that 85 percent of the firms reveal 
SED somehow. Human resource is the most popular item disclosed in the annual report 
among these companies whilst environmental information is the least popular.  
Rizk et al. (2008) surveyed corporate social and environmental reporting practices in the 
context of developing economies. Using a 34-item disclosure index, which covers 
environmental, energy, human resources, customer and community involvement issues, 
they measured the extent of disclosure practices. The influence of industry membership 
and ownership on each type of disclosure (employee-related disclosures; customer-
related disclosures; general/public stakeholder-related disclosures; environmental-related 
disclosures) was examined through a random sample of 60 annual reports from Egyptian 
firms involved in nine high polluting industries for the 2002 financial year. The findings 
indicated that the extent of corporate social and environmental information revealed in 
the annual report is low in Egypt. In addition, the study found that the relationship 
between ownership structure and each type of disclosure (including environmental-
related disclosures) is significant. The limitation of the article focused on the annual 
reports in the industrial sector only, therefore the authors suggested that future studies 
should look at the non-industrial sector for further research.  
Kolk and Pinkse (2010) observed the association between corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure through evidence from Fortune Global 
250 companies during a period between September 2004 and January 2005. Differing 
from many previous studies, they adopted corporate governance as the dependent 
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variable to investigate the integration of corporate governance in CSR disclosure for 
multinational enterprises. In this article, binary indicators were employed to measure 
corporate governance issues and CSR disclosure. There were two measurements of 
dependent variables, which were 1) the corporate governance section in the report and 2) 
corporate governance linked to environmental/social issues. Then, a 20-item scale, 
involving four separate types of CSR: employee conditions, business ethics, community 
issues, and climate change, were selected to measure the CSR disclosure. In addition, 
they applied a number of control variables: country of origin, environmental sector, firm 
performance, and firm size to test logistic regression in this paper. The findings indicated 
that a significantly positive relationship between CSR disclosure and corporate 
governance is supported, especially for two categories of CSR activities: employee 
conditions and business ethics. 
Cong and Freedman (2011) investigated the associations between corporate governance, 
environmental performance and the extent of environmental disclosure. They also 
explored whether the development of corporate governance in the SOX era has an 
influence on the extent of pollution information. To collect and measure environmental 
disclosure, they adopted a manual data process to compile information from the 
companies’ environmental reports and websites and relied on the methodology of 
pollution disclosure score employed by Freedman and Stagliano (2008). In this article, 
there were five criteria summarised to develop the scoring index: 1) ‘Provide the TRI 
amount for each reporting year of 2003-2005’; 2) ‘Report releases by specific 
chemical/compound for each reporting year’; 3) ‘Disclose emissions data by plant for 
each reporting year’; 4) ‘State the TRI amount for the recent three years’; and 5) 
‘Categorise releases by method (i.e., via air, water, or land)’ (p.227).  A score of “1” was 
given when they found environmental information disclosed by the firm, which refer to 
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one of five criteria. The maximum aggregate of the scores given to each company was 
“5”. OLS regression was employed to measure the associations, using a sample 
consisting of 50 firms, which are the top volume metric releasers of toxins from 1,897 
firms with Gov-Scores, during 2003-2005 in the United States. Consistent with 
legitimacy theory, the main empirical results indicated that (1) there is no evidence to 
support the relationship between good corporate governance and good pollution 
performance; but (2) good corporate governance improved environmental disclosure in 
the early years after SOX. 
Rouf (2011) pointed out that the objective of business has evolved from “profit 
maximising” to “social responsibility” during the last few decades, especially in the 
developing countries. They tested the corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures in 
corporate annual reports of listed companies in Bangladesh. Specifically, the impact of 
corporate attributes and firm characteristics on social responsibility disclosures was 
explored, using data from Dhaka Stock Exchanges in 2007. The ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression model was adopted in their article. Based on content analysis method, 
the extent of CSR disclosure was measured by 39 items of information consisting of five 
categories: 1) environmental information; 2) employee information; 3) community and 
others; 4) energy; and 5) products (p.23). When disclosure in the annual report referred to 
an item of information (39 items), a score of 1 was given. The aggregate disclosures 
score (minimum: 0 and maximum: 39) was the final value of CSR disclosure for each 
company. They found that the monitoring role of corporate governance attributes, which 
contain independent directors, board leadership structure, and board audit committee, 
significantly and positively relate with the level of CSR disclosure. However, they did 
not find evidence to support a relationship between firm size and CSR disclosure practice.  
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Esa and Mohd Ghazali (2012) investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure in the annual reports of 
Malaysian Government-linked companies (GLCs) based on multiple regression analysis. 
They employed content analysis to collect CSR disclosure from the annual reports of 27 
GLCs in 2005 and 2007. GLCs, defined as companies that are either directly controlled 
by the Malaysian Government or where their major ownership is the Malaysian 
Government, are the main influence in the Malaysian economy, and they contributed 
nearly 49 percent of the market capitalisation of Bursa Malaysia. Due to the launch of the 
Silver Book (the guidelines related to the role of the Board) which took place in 2006, 
the authors chose two years data, 1 year before and 1 year after, to examine CSR 
disclosure practice in relation to board composition (Board size and Independent 
directors). Consistent with expectations, there was an increase in CSR disclosure in the 
annual report. The empirical findings indicated that board size plays a positive 
monitoring effect on the extent of CSR disclosure.  
Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) empirically tested the influence of board composition, 
leadership and structure on sustainability disclosures (including environmental 
information) based on stakeholder theory. They discussed that ‘good corporate 
governance and sustainability disclosure can be seen as complementary mechanisms of 
legitimacy that companies may use to dialogue with stakeholders’ (p.478). Sustainability 
disclosure was measured through 178 sustainability disclosure indicators based on the 
content analysis methodology. The sentence was chosen as the recording unit. Each 
sentence was matched with all the information indicators and awarded a score of 0 if it 
provided no information and 1 if it disclosed information related to the study. 
Independent directors, CEO duality, influential community members, and corporate 
social responsibility committees were employed as independent variables while size, 
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profitability, leverage, market risk, age, board of directors, reputation, listing status, 
country of origin and industry type were utilised as control variables to do multivariate 
analysis. There was a final sample of 114 companies in 2003, which involved 57 Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) companies and 57 match companies among US and 
European companies, engaged in this article. The findings related to environmental 
disclosure indicated that influential community members play a positive role on the 
extent of environmental information. However, they did not find any evidence to support 
a significant effect from independent directors, CEO duality, and corporate social 
responsibility committees on environmental disclosure. 
Rao et al. (2012) provided a description of the advantages of environmental reporting, 
which would assist companies to obtain support from stakeholders and reduce firms’ 
negative operations on the environment through assessing possible risks. They then 
indicated the importance of there being some control mechanisms in the firm to ensure 
that environmental disclosure is revealed properly. In this article, they examined the 
relationship between the amount of environmental disclosure and a number of corporate 
governance characteristics (independent directors, institutional investors, firm 
independence, board size, and female directors) based on 96 Australian companies listed 
on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 2008. The measurements of quantitative 
environmental disclosure were designed as total number of words referring to 
environmental issues in the annual report and the proportion those words to total words 
in the annual report. They found that the proportion of independent directors on a board 
has a positive regression coefficient which is significant at the 0.1 level to influence the 
amount of environmental reporting. In addition, the proportion of female directors on a 
board, institutional investors, and board size were found as significantly determinant 
factors at the 0.05 level which impact on environmental disclosure positively, although 
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the latter two were expected to have negative effects on the extent of environmental 
information. To sum up, this study proved that corporate governance mechanisms in 
Australian listed companies play an effective role on quantitative environmental 
disclosure in the annual reports. Furthermore, this article suggested that regulators (such 
as the ASX) and company strategists should consider corporate social responsibility 
(environmental disclosure) more and its relationship with board composition and board 
responsibility. 
Wang et al. (2012) employed Taiwanese evidence to measure the effect of ownership 
structure on environmental disclosure (quantity and quality) based on an advanced panel 
regression model. They adopted content analysis approach to collect environmental 
information in the annual reports of 942 listed companies between 2006 and 2009. In 
their article, quantitative environmental disclosure was measured by the word count 
whereas qualitative environmental disclosure was measured by the scoring index. 
Corporate governance, the independent variable, was tested in three aspects: a) ‘the 
discrepancy between the voting rights and cash flow rights possessed by controlling 
shareholders’; b) ‘the pledge ration of director holdings’; c) ‘the holdings of institutional 
investors’ (p.137). As in many previous studies, firm size, liability ratio, and industry 
were engaged to control the regression. This paper found that enterprises paid attention to 
environmental disclosures increasingly during the period 2006-2009. Additionally, the 
empirical finding indicated that the monitoring role of some ownership structures on 
corporate disclosure of environmental information is proved, especially for firms in 
environmentally sensitive industries. The results agreed in the main with the above 
conclusions mentioned by Wang et al. (2012), ‘corporate governance is the most 
influential variable in explaining the level of disclosure of environmental information’ (p. 
134), although no significant relationship was found between these three corporate 
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governance mechanisms and environmental disclosure in the annual reports of firms in 
non-sensitive industries. 
Akrout and Othman (2013) researched the role played by ownership structure and some 
other corporate characteristics on corporate environmental disclosure in Arab Middle 
Eastern and North African (MENA) emerging markets. Differing from many previous 
studies on disclosure practice which looked at the annual reports, this article employed a 
sample of 153 websites of listed companies in December 2010 to collect environmental 
information. Based on the environmental indicators developed by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (the last version “G3.1” was issued in 2011), 33 scoring items were defined to 
measure dependent variables. Each item was scored one if revealed and zero if it was not. 
The aggregated scores were the final scores of environmental disclosure for each firm. In 
this article, business culture (whether firms tied with the Anglo-American countries), 
family ownership, government ownership, and Internet penetration were employed as 
independent variables to seek for association with disclosure practice. Additionally it 
controlled for firm size, leverage, and profitability. Under multivariate analysis, they 
found a negative relationship between family ownership and environmental disclosure. 
Consistent with prior studies, firm size and firm performance were found have significant 
influences on environmental information sharing on the listed companies’ websites. 
Drawing on legitimacy theory framework, Khan et al. (2013) investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosure in the annual reports using evidence from an Asian emerging economy. 
Specifically, the impact of managerial ownership, public ownership, foreign ownership, 
the proportion of independent directors on board, CEO duality, and audit committee on 
the extent of CSR disclosure was explored by regression analysis based on 116 
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manufacturing listed companies in Bangladesh during a 5-year period 2005-2009. In 
addition, they employed firm size, firm age, leverage, and return on assets as control 
variables to develop the regression. In the article, Khan et al. (2013) emphasised that 
ownership structure and board composition are significant determinants which influence 
CSR disclosure ‘by the choices, motives and values of those who are involved in 
formulating and taking decisions in the organisation’ (p.207). Based on empirical testing, 
they found a negative influence from managerial ownership on CSR disclosure. However, 
with regard to export-oriented industries, the effect of managerial ownership to CSR 
information became significant and positive. The findings also indicated that public 
ownership, foreign ownership, board independence, and audit committee play an active 
role in encouraging firms to improve CSR information in the annual report. An 
association between CEO duality and CSR disclosure was not found in this study. The 
authors summarised that corporate governance attributes, in general, have an important 
effect in ensuring organisational legitimacy through disclosure practice of CSR. This 
empirical research and its findings contributed knowledge and information to regulators 
and policy makers.  
In summary, the relationship between corporate governance and CSR / environmental 
disclosures is well proved through evidence from developed markets. However, these 
studies have examined the impacts from the characteristics of corporate governance on 
voluntary environmental disclosure in developing countries to a much lesser extent.  
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Table 3.2 
Empirical Studies on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and 
Quantity of Environmental Disclosure 
Author(s) & 
Date 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Sample Size & 
Type, and Time 
of Observation 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Measure 
Analysis & General 
Results 
            
Naser et al. 
(2006) 
Corporate 
social 
disclosure 
Growth in 
assets, 
dividends paid, 
gearing ratio, 
individual 
investors, 
governmental 
ownership, 
institutional 
investors, and 
majority 
shareholders, 
Market 
capitalisation 
21 firms listed 
on the Doha 
Stock 
Exchange for 
the year 
1999/2000 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Multiple regression 
analyses                     
RESULT: variations in 
corporate social 
disclosure are found to 
be impacted by the 
business risk (growth 
in assets and gearing 
ratio) and firm size. 
They did not find any 
evidence to support the 
association between 
corporate social 
disclosure and 
ownership variables. 
Mohd 
Ghazali 
(2007) 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
(CSR) 
disclosure 
Ownership 
concentration, 
director 
ownership, and 
government 
ownership, 
company size, 
profitability, 
industry 
87 non-
financial 
Malaysian 
firms in 2001 
The scoring 
index 
Multiple regression 
analyses                     
RESULT: government 
ownership and firm 
size play an effective 
role on the quality of 
CSR disclosure 
whereas the director 
ownership with a 
higher proportion of 
shares relates with 
lower CSR 
information. 
Ku Ismail 
and Ibrahim 
(2008) 
Social and 
environmental 
disclosure 
(SED) 
quantity 
Government 
ownership, 
firm size, and 
industry type 
60 Jordanian 
companies in 
the 
manufacturing 
and service 
sectors for the 
year 2006 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
OLS regression 
analyses                     
RESULT: firm size 
played a positive role 
in encouraging firms to 
reveal vast SED. Firms 
with low government 
ownership is more 
effective in influencing 
the amount of SED. 
There was no evidence 
found to support a 
significant relationship 
between SED and 
industry type. 
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Rizk et al. 
(2008) 
Corporate 
social and 
environmental 
reporting 
Industry 
membership 
and ownership 
60 Egyptian 
companies in 
the industrial 
sector for the 
financial year 
2002 
The scoring 
index 
ANOVA tests                  
RESULT: the 
relationship between 
ownership structure 
and each type of 
disclosure (included 
environmentally-
related disclosures) are 
significant. 
Kolk and 
Pinkse 
(2010)  
Corporate 
governance: 1) 
corporate 
governance 
section in 
report and 2) 
corporate 
governance 
linked to 
environmental
/social issues 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
(CSR) 
disclosure, 
country of 
origin, 
environment-al 
sector, firm 
performance, 
and firm size  
Fortune Global 
250 companies 
during a period 
between 
September 
2004 and 
January 2005 
The scoring 
index: binary 
indicators 
Logistic regression 
analyses                     
RESULT: a 
significantly positive 
relationship between 
CSR disclosure and 
corporate governance 
is supported, especially 
for two categories of 
CSR activities: 
employee conditions 
and business ethics. 
Cong and 
Freedman 
(2011) 
Environmental 
performance 
and disclosure 
Corporate 
governance, 
environmental 
performance  
50 firms which 
are top volume 
metric releasers 
of toxins from 
1,897 firms 
with Gov-
Scores during 
2003-2005 in 
the United 
States 
The scoring 
index 
OLS regression         
RESULT: there is no 
evidence to support the 
relationship between 
good corporate 
governance and good 
pollution performance; 
good corporate 
governance improves 
environmental 
disclosure in the early 
years after SOX. 
Rouf (2011) Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
(CSR) 
disclosure 
Independent 
directors, firm 
size, Board 
leadership 
structure, 
profitability 
and audit 
committee 
176 listed 
companies in 
Bangladesh in 
2007 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression 
model                         
RESULT: the 
monitoring role of 
independent directors, 
board leadership 
structure, and board 
audit committee 
positively relate with 
the level of CSR 
disclosure. They did 
not find evidence to 
support the relationship 
between firm size and 
CSR disclosure. 
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Esa and 
Mohd 
Ghazali 
(2012) 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
(CSR) 
disclosure 
Board size, 
Independent 
directors, 
Company size, 
Profitability, 
Leverage 
27 Malaysian 
Government-
linked 
companies in 
2005 and 2007 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Multiple regression 
analysis                     
RESULT: board size 
plays a positive 
monitoring effect on 
the extent of CSR 
disclosure. 
Michelon 
and 
Parbonetti 
(2012) 
Sustainability 
disclosure 
(including 
environmental 
information)  
Independent 
directors, CEO 
duality, 
influential 
community 
members, 
corporate social 
responsibility 
committee, 
Size, 
profitability, 
leverage, 
market risk, 
age, board of 
directors, 
reputation, 
listing status, 
country of 
origin and 
industry type  
114 companies 
in 2003, which 
involved 57 
Dow Jones 
Sustainability 
Index (DJSI) 
companies and 
57 match 
companies 
among US and 
European 
companies 
Content 
analysis 
approach               
integrating the 
Global 
Reporting 
Initiative  
Multivariate analysis    
RESULT: 
environmental 
disclosure indicated 
that influential 
community members 
played a positive role 
on the extent of 
environmental 
information. However, 
they did not find any 
evidence to support a 
significant effect from 
independent directors, 
CEO duality, and 
corporate social 
responsibility 
committees on 
environmental 
disclosure. 
Rao et al. 
(2012) 
Environmental 
disclosure 
Independent 
directors, 
institutional 
investors, firm 
independence, 
board size, and 
female 
directors, firm 
size, 
profitability, 
and industry 
96 Australian 
companies 
listed on the 
Australian 
Stock 
Exchange 
(ASX) in 2008 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Linear regression   
OLS analysis                     
RESULT: the 
proportion of 
independent directors 
on a board positively 
influences the amount 
of environmental 
reporting. In addition, 
the proportion of 
female directors on a 
board, institutional 
investors, and board 
size were found as 
significantly 
determinant factors 
which impact on 
environmental 
disclosure positively. 
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Wang et al. 
(2012) 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
(quantity and 
quality) 
The 
discrepancy 
between the 
voting rights 
and cash flow 
rights 
possessed by 
controlling 
shareholders; 
the pledge 
ration of 
director 
holdings; the 
holdings of 
institutional 
investors, Firm 
size, liability 
ratio, and 
industry 
942 Taiwanese 
listed 
companies 
between 2006 
and 2009 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Advanced panel 
regression model      
RESULT: increasingly 
attention to 
environmental 
disclosures is paid by 
enterprises during the 
sample period. 
Additionally the 
empirical finding 
indicated that the 
monitoring role of 
some ownership 
structures on corporate 
disclosure of 
environmental 
information is proved, 
especially for firms in 
environmentally 
sensitive industries. 
Akrout and 
Othman 
(2013) 
Corporate 
environmental 
disclosure 
Business 
culture, family 
ownership, 
government 
ownership, and 
Internet 
penetration, 
firm size, 
leverage, and 
profitability 
153 web sites 
of listed 
companies in 
December 2010 
The scoring 
index 
Multivariate analyses 
RESULT: a negative 
relationship between 
family ownership and 
environmental 
disclosure. Consistent 
with prior studies, a 
significant influence 
was found from firm 
size and performance 
on environmental 
information of listed 
companies’ websites. 
Khan et al. 
(2013)  
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
Managerial 
ownership, 
public 
ownership, 
foreign 
ownership, 
proportion of 
independent 
directors on 
board, CEO 
duality, and 
audit 
committee, 
Firm size, firm 
age, leverage, 
and return on 
assets 
116 manu-
facturing listed 
companies in 
Bangladesh 
during a 5-year 
period 2005-
2009 
The scoring 
index with a 
checklist 
containing 20 
items. It is 
awarded 1 if 
an item 
included in the 
checklist is 
disclosed and 
0 if it is not 
disclosed. 
Regression analyses 
RESULT: There is a 
negative influence 
from managerial 
ownership on CSR 
disclosure. However, 
regarding export-
oriented industries, the 
effect of managerial 
ownership to CSR 
information became 
significant and 
positive. Public 
ownership, foreign 
ownership, board 
independence, and 
audit committee 
positively impact on 
quality of CSR 
information. 
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3.2.3 The gap in previous research  
Firstly, the mixed results of previous empirical research mainly occur in the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and two mechanisms of corporate governance: ownership 
structure and board composition. These problems are produced because of two broad 
reasons: data selection and method application. Beck et al. (2010) developed a new 
method “consolidated narrative interrogation” (CONI) to examine environmental 
reporting (social and environmental disclosures). This analysis method integrates 
mechanistic content analysis approach (disclosure volumes and/or frequencies) (e.g., 
Ness and Mirza, 1991; Unerman, 2000; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Campbell, 2003; 
Hasseldine et al., 2005) and interpretative approach (meaning and understanding of 
disclosure) (e.g., Buhr and Reiter, 2006; Coupland, 2006) to reduce the errors of the 
research results. Beck et al. (2010) pointed out that there are some limitations if only 
mechanistic content analysis instrument is employed, although it is commonly applied in 
the prior research. The mechanistic content analysis approach is regarded as form 
oriented which involves ‘routine counting of words or concrete references’, but it 
overlooks meaning orientation which ‘focuses on the underlying themes in the texts 
under investigation’ (Smith and Taffler, 2000, p.627). The interpretative approach 
attempts ‘to capture meaning by disaggregating narrative into its constituent parts and 
then describing the contents of each disaggregated component’ (Beck et al., 2010, p.208). 
It aims to seek greater understanding of what communication the firms need to express 
by disclosing information in the annual report. To some extent, interpretative analysis 
effectively offsets the limitation of mechanistic studies in the research of environmental 
disclosure. Therefore, this study engages both the mechanistic content analysis and the 
interpretative approach to measure environmental disclosure in order to minimise the 
errors.   
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Secondly, Xiao and Yuan (2007) investigated the impact of ownership structure and 
board composition on voluntary disclosure based on 559 Chinese listed companies in 
2002, and then suggested that a future researcher should undertake a longitudinal study in 
this area. This research employs data from 1,230 Chinese listed companies during a 3-
year period between 2009 and 2011.  
Thirdly, several researchers have investigated the relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and corporate governance in China (e.g., Qiao, 2003; Xiao and 
Yuan, 2007; Li and Qi, 2008；Cheung et al., 2010; Fu, 2010). Most of them examined 
corporate disclosure or financial disclosure. Research is lacking on environmental 
disclosure that relates to the mechanisms of corporate governance in China. Although 
Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) tested the effect of the pressure from blockholder ownership 
on the extent of VED, they only touched on a few of the corporate governance 
mechanisms. It overlooked examining the impact from other ownership structures and 
board component on the extent of VED.  
In light of the above, this research mainly examines the role of ownership structure and 
board composition on the extent and quality of environmental disclosure in annual 
reports using evidence from the Chinese market, and applies the mechanistic content 
analysis approach together with the interpretative approach to collect and measure 
dependent variables. This research would enhance awareness of determinant factors 
(different mechanisms of corporate governance) on environmental disclosure. 
Furthermore, it would contribute to the existing literature on accounting and finance with 
relation to environmental disclosure of Chinese listed companies in English. 
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3.3 THEORY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
3.3.1 Theory Framework 
Reviewing related previous literature reveals that four different theory frameworks have 
been applied frequently to explain and analyse each of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure practice (including environmental disclosure) and corporate governance 
mechanisms and the relationship between them. They are legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory, agency theory, and stakeholder-agency theory. Stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory are two prominent theories, which have dominated the explanations of social and 
environmental disclosure practice (AbuRaya, 2012). Agency theory and stakeholder 
theory are the leading theories in corporate governance research. In addition, stakeholder-
agency theory, an	   important contribution to literature, supplies the explanation of the 
explicit and implicit contracts between a corporation’s stakeholders and environmental 
disclosure practice. 
3.3.1.1 Legitimacy Theory 
‘Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definition’ (Suchman, 1995, p574). In firms, Mathews (1993, p31) 
argued that management seeks congruence between the outside perceptions of its own 
social values, and what is deemed by society to be appropriate social conduct. This 
congruence is viewed as organisation legitimacy. Legitimacy theory is defined as ‘a 
condition or a status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the 
value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, 
actual or potential, exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s 
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legitimacy’ (Lindblom, 1994, p.2). Chen and Roberts (2010) asserted that legitimacy 
theory focuses on seeking the accordance between the value system of the firm and the 
value system of society, and attempting to make the objective of firms be to meet social 
expectations. ‘Legitimacy theory was integrated into the accounting literature as a means 
of explaining what, why, when, and how certain items are addressed by corporate 
management in their communication with outside audiences’ (Magness, 2006). It ‘rests 
on the concept that organisations have contracts with society and fulfilling these 
contracts legitimates the organisations and their actions’ (Cormier and Gordon, 2001). As 
stated by Mathews (1993, p31), ‘the social contract would exist between corporations 
(usually limited companies) and individual members of society. Society (as a collection 
of individuals) provides corporations with their legal standing and attributes and the 
authority to own and use natural resources and to hire employees. Organisations depend 
on community resources and output both goods and services and waste products to the 
general environment. The organisation has no inherent rights to these benefits, and in 
order to allow their existence, society would expect the benefits to exceed the costs to 
society’. It ‘implies that firms will take measures to ensure their activities and 
performances are acceptable to the community’ (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000).  
Some authors gave positive views about the impact of legitimacy (theory) on the 
relationship between the corporation and society. ‘Because legitimacy is conferred and 
controlled by those outside the organisation, it is necessary for the corporation to 
communicate its activities to the public’ (Buhr, 1998, p164). Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) 
mentioned that legitimacy theory assumed that the operation of the firm had to be 
congruent with society for its survival. Moreover, ‘Legitimacy theory suggests that 
companies should aim to achieve congruence between their financial objectives and the 
accepted social norms. This entails having to incorporate social and environmental issues 
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in their decision-making process’ (Elijido-Ten, 2004). 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, pp126-7) pointed out that firms may become legitimate or 
maintain their legitimacy by three certain actions: ‘First, the organisation can adapt its 
output, goals and methods of operation to conform to prevailing definitions of legitimacy. 
Second, the organisation can attempt, through communication, to alter the definition of 
social legitimacy so that it conforms to the organisation’s present practices, output, and 
values. Finally, the organisation can attempt, again through communication, to become 
identified with symbols, values, or institutions which have a strong base of social 
legitimacy’. These actions relate to the four strategies of communication of Lindblom 
(1994), which are (1) the firm attempts to inform and educate the relevant stakeholder 
about actual changes in its actions (this relates to the first certain action of Dowling and 
Pfeffer); (2) and (4) it seeks to alter society’s expectations (this relates the second action 
of Dowling Pfeffer), the difference between these two strategies is that the second one is 
without any changes in the firm’s behaviour; (3) the firm attempts to focus on some 
positive activities and deflect society’s attention away the issues of concern (this relates 
to the third action of Dowling and Pferffer). 
O’Donovan (2002) mentioned that repairing legitimacy is one of the main factors which 
influences disclosure decision; because Neu et al. (1998) indicated that corporate social 
responsibility disclosure would help to mitigate issues of organisational legitimacy. Neu 
et al. (1998) also stated that voluntary environmental disclosure (usually in the annual 
report) would maintain firm-specific and system-wide legitimacy. To sum up, it implies a 
close relationship between organisation legitimacy and disclosure. In the social and 
environmental accounting area, legitimacy theory is recognised as an explanatory theory 
of environmental disclosure. Brown and Deegan (1998) pointed out that legitimacy 
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theory has been the basis for several environmental disclosure studies. Patten (1992) 
tested legitimacy theory in the study of “Intra-industry environmental disclosures in 
response to the Alaskan oil spill” and concluded that ‘it appears that at least for 
environmental disclosure, threats to a firm’s legitimacy do entice the firms to include 
more social responsibility information in its annual reports’ (Patten, 1992, p475). Under 
the legitimacy perspective, a firm may choose to disclose certain social information to 
justify its existence within society. Compared with private ownership, state/government 
ownership (i.e. public) would be more affected by legitimacy theory. As indicated by 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p133), ‘(w)hile legitimacy is a constraint on all organisations, 
it is likely that it affects some organisations more than others. This is because … some 
organisations depend relatively more heavily on social and political support’. Thus, 
legitimacy theory is vital in some countries, which have a high proportion of 
state/government owned enterprises such as China. 
 
3.3.1.2 Stakeholder Theory 
The principle of a firm is to maximise the wealth of shareholders (one group of 
stakeholders). Stakeholder theory rejects that the principle is the only aim of the firm 
(Wijnberg, 2000). The interests of other groups of stakeholders, such as employees, 
customers, suppliers, creditors, competitors, public interest groups, governmental bodies, 
and communities, also need to be given as much value as possible by executives. In 
addition, corporate management needs to evaluate the importance of meeting stakeholder 
demands and balancing the conflicts of the demands of different stakeholders, because 
the stakeholders effectively impact the sustainable development of the firm. As identified 
by Elijido-Ten (2004), ‘the basic proposition of the stakeholder theory is that the firm’s 
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success is dependent upon the successful management of all the relationships that a firm 
has with its stakeholders’.  
According to Deegan and Unerman (2006) and Gray et al. (1996), there are two variants 
which are subdivided in stakeholder theory. The first is the accountability variant, which 
is similar to the ethical or normative perspective of this theory (Orij, 2010, p.2). Gray et 
al. (1996, p.38) identifies this variant as ‘the duty to provide and account (by no means 
necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held 
responsible’. Stakeholder theory assumes that the firm has the ability to affect both its 
particular stakeholders and general society (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009) and hence it has a 
responsibility to explain its actions through disclosure to stakeholders and to society in 
terms of ethics (fairness). As Deegan (2000) argued, all stakeholders have a right to be 
provided with information about how the firm is impacting on them, such as pollution, 
even though they do not use this information and/or the impact does not directly 
influence these stakeholders (Salama et al., 2006). The second is the organisational and 
managerial variant. It argues that the firm would satisfy information demands of 
stakeholders who are powerful and that is crucial for managers’ positions (Deegan, 2000). 
The term “stakeholder theory” was first used by Ansoff (1965) to define the objectives of 
the business. Freeman (1984) introduced the stakeholder theory in his book of “Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach” and identified the significance of stakeholders in 
the business. The author defines a stakeholder as ‘any group or individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objective’. The applications of stakeholder 
theory have occurred in both ‘analytical and empirical analyses of the firm and the 
environment in which the firm operates’ (Roberts, 1992, p.598). Wilmshurst and Frost 
(2000) suggested that corporate management should be responsive to the (environmental) 
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information demands of stakeholders. Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) asserted that 
environmental information disclosure could be seen as a kind of dialogue between the 
firm and its stakeholders. As outlined by Gilkinson (1994, p.57), it ‘can enhance relations 
with a variety of stakeholders, including shareholders, lenders, insurers, underwriters, 
suppliers, customers, environmental activists and employees’. In addition, ‘Greater 
transparency and better environmental disclosure will keep stakeholders better informed 
about the way a company is being environmentally responsible and this will lead to 
stakeholders’ satisfaction.’ (Salama et al., 2006, p.252). 
 
3.3.1.3 Agency Theory 
Agency theory identifies the agency relationship between one party, the principal, and 
another party, the agent (Mallin, 2004). Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined this 
relationship as ‘a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent’ (p.308). In a company, the 
shareholders, who own the company, are the principal; the directors and managers are the 
agents who control the business’s running. Generally, managers should make decisions 
that are consistent with the aim of maximising the wealth of shareholders, but sometimes 
managers do not act in the best interests of the shareholders (Yu, 2007), because they 
believe that maximising their own wealth is more important than maximising the wealth 
of shareholders.  
Managers dominate the company’s running and get more information from the 
company’s day-to-day performance, management accounting data, and financial reports 
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than the shareholders who just get information through the annual report and general 
meeting. Thus, in the agency relationship, asymmetry of information is a significant 
problem between shareholders and managers. As the agent has an information advantage, 
shareholders need to increase their monitoring of the actions of management to deal this 
problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Barako et al., 2006). It means that some agency 
costs arise from the misalignment of the interests between these two parties (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). They defined the agency costs as below: 1) the monitoring costs by the 
principal to limit the agent’s aberrant activities; 2) the bonding costs to guarantee that the 
agent does not undertake certain actions which harm the interest of the principal; and 3) 
the residual loss due to divergence in the agent’s decisions. When the agency costs are 
too high, it could scare away the existing shareholders and potential investors. At the 
same time, high monitoring could threaten the position of the agent. Agency theory 
suggests that voluntary disclosure reduces the conflict of interests between shareholders 
and managers (Sun et al., 2010). In addition, providing voluntary disclosure is a useful 
way to reduce agency costs (Hossain et al., 1994). Thus, directors and managers may 
voluntarily disclose more information to mitigate the asymmetry of information and the 
agency problem in order to protect their position and increase investment. Wang and 
Coffey (1992) and Graves and Waddock (1994) mentioned that with regard to agents 
(managers) and principals (stockholders) under an agency theory framework, the former 
are more likely to emphasise environmental concerns, because they do not need to spend 
their own money in pursuing non-profit goals for their positions. Tricker (2009) noted 
that most scholars use agency theory to test the hypothesis about corporate governance 
because of a causal link between this theoretical approach and governance systems. 
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3.3.1.4 Stakeholder-agency Theory 
Agency theory identifies the agency relationship between one party, the principal, and 
another party, the agent (Mallin, 2004). Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) defined this 
relationship as ‘a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent’. Tricker (2009) noted that most 
scholars use agency theory to test the hypothesis about corporate governance because of 
a causal link between this theoretical approach and governance systems. Considering 
environmental information disclosure is seen as a kind of dialogue between the firm and 
its stakeholders (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Salama et al., 2012), stakeholder-agency 
theory (Hill and Jones, 1992) is regarded as a proper framework to examine the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the extent of environmental disclosure. This theory 
integrates the stakeholder concept into agency theory to define explicit and implicit 
contract(s) between a corporation’s stakeholders, who can affect and/or are affected by 
the firm’s success and failure (Freeman, 1984; Hill and Jones, 1992; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Salama et al., 2012). Gray et al. (1996) define a stakeholder as ‘any 
human agency that can be influenced by, or can itself influence, the activities of the 
organisation in question’ (p.33). Stakeholders include shareholders, employees, 
customers, suppliers, creditors, competitors, public interest groups, governmental bodies, 
and communities. Managers are recognised as unique stakeholders who control the 
business’s running as the agents and are contracted to relate to all other stakeholders. 
Based on KPMG (1997), Kolk (1999) summarised stakeholders’ environmental 
information needs as follows: suppliers and customers demand environmental messages 
about ‘selling environmentally sound products, willingness to contribute to consumer 
safety, disclosure of environmental problem[s]’; financiers desire environmental 
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information related to ‘risk management, cost savings through improved environmental 
management’; employees need to know ‘environmental policy, targets and results’; 
communities require ‘pollution limitation, responsible waste management’; authorities 
want information on ‘environmentally responsible activities, overview of costs and 
benefits of environmental actions’; and environmental organisations would like 
environmental disclosure concerning ‘improvement of environmental performance, 
interest in cooperation to improve matters’ (p.227). Corporate management needs to 
evaluate the importance of meeting stakeholder demands and balancing the conflicts of 
different stakeholders’ demands, because the stakeholders effectively impact on the 
sustainable development of the firm. 
Applications of stakeholder theory have occurred in both ‘analytical and empirical 
analyses of the firm and the environment in which the firm operates’ (Roberts, 1992, 
p.598). Environmental disclosure ‘can enhance relations with a variety of stakeholders’ 
(Gilkinson, 1994, p.57). Corporate management should be responsible for the 
(environmental) information demands of stakeholders (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). 
‘Greater transparency and better environmental disclosure will keep stakeholders better 
informed about the way a company is being environmentally responsible and this will 
lead to stakeholders’ satisfaction.’ (Salama et al., 2006, p.252). According to Deegan and 
Unerman (2006) and Gray et al. (1996), there are two main perspectives which have 
evolved from stakeholder theory (Salama et al., 2006). The first is the accountability 
perspective, which is similar to the ethical or normative perspective of this theory (Orij, 
2010, p.2). Gray et al. (1996, p.38) identifies this perspective as ‘the duty to provide an 
account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for 
which one is held responsible’. Stakeholder theory assumes that the firm has the ability 
to affect both its particular stakeholders and general society (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009) 
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and hence it has the ethical responsibility to explain its actions through disclosure to 
stakeholders and society (fairness). Deegan (2000) argued that all stakeholders have a 
right to be provided with information about how the firm is impacting on them, such as 
pollution, even if they do not use this information and/or the impact does not directly 
influence these stakeholders. The second is the organisational and managerial perspective. 
It argues that the firm would satisfy the information demands of stakeholders who are 
powerful and where it is important for the managers’ positions (Deegan, 2000). 
 
3.3.1.5 Discussion, Analysis, and	  Estimation 
The relevant theories of voluntary environmental disclosure are stakeholder theory 
(Ullmann, 1985; Roberts, 1992; Salama et al., 2006) and legitimacy theory (Deegan and 
Rankin, 1996; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Magness, 2006). 
Gray et al. (1996) indicated that these theories focus on the role of environmental 
disclosure in the relationship between firms, stakeholders and the environment. To some 
extent, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory provide alternative explanations about 
why a firm needs to disclose environmental information. However, there are many 
similarities between stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. That is, Gray et al. (1995a, 
p52) stated that ‘it seems to us that the essential problem in the literature arises from 
treating each as competing theories of reporting behaviour, when stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory are better seen as two overlapping perspectives of the issue which are 
set within a framework of assumptions about political economy’. Although many studies 
adopted legitimacy theory as their framework in social and environmental disclosure 
literature and supported its explanatory power (e.g., Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan 
and Rankin, 1996; Patten, 1992), some scholars failed to find evidence that support the 
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theory’s explanatory ability in research on CSR disclosure practice (AbuRaya, 2012). As 
Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) asserted, legitimacy theory provides only a limited 
explanation on environmental disclosure decision. Moreover, Guthrie and Parker (1989) 
indicated that ‘a relationship between legitimacy theory and disclosure was only 
marginally supported for environmental issues, unconfirmed for energy and community 
issues and subject to contradictory evidence for human resources issues’ (p.351) and 
concluded that legitimacy theory is inadequate to fully evaluate CSR disclosure practice. 
In contrast with legitimacy theory focused on the whole society, stakeholder theory is 
directed rather towards particular groups who possess more power in affecting the firm’s 
future (Deegan, 2002). AbuRaya (2012) indicated that ‘the advantage of stakeholder 
theory is providing a means of dealing with multiple stakeholders with multiple 
conflicting interests’ (p.141). Stakeholder theory is deemed as a useful framework to 
explain and analyse social and environmental disclosure practice (Snider et al., 2003). As 
alluded to above, agency theory has been generally employed to test the hypothesis about 
corporate governance because of a causal link between this theoretical approach and 
governance systems. It mainly concentrates on the primary goal of the firm (maximising 
profit of shareholders) and overlooks the other organisational objectives (such as, 
corporate social responsibility). For this reason, agency theory is regarded as a 
framework that provides a limited explanation on the association with society and other 
organisations. In study on the relationship between corporate governance and 
environmental disclosure, stakeholder-agency theory, which integrates the stakeholder 
concept into agency theory to define explicit and implicit contract(s) between a 
corporation’s stakeholders, is deemed as an appropriate framework to explain and 
analyse the decisions on environmental disclosure which are affected by different 
corporate governance mechanisms. Based on stakeholder-agency theory, the main 
	  
	  
104	  
explanation and analysis centre on the explicit and implicit contract(s) between a 
corporation’s stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, 
competitors, public interest groups, governmental bodies, and communities) and unique 
stakeholders (e.g., managers). Under increasing environmental concern from the public, 
the latter responds to the rights and needs of the corporation’s stakeholders and manages 
their relationship through revealing environmental information in the annual report. 
Therefore, in this empirical chapter, stakeholder-agency theory is adopted as the 
framework in which to explore the monitoring roles played by ownership structure and 
board composition on the quantity of environmental disclosure in Chinese listed 
companies. 
 
3.3.2 Research Hypotheses 
3.3.2.1 Ownership structure 
Ownership is quite dispersed among a large number of individuals and institutional 
investors in the UK and the US (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Chew and Gillan, 2005). In 
contrast with the UK and the US, the unique characteristic of ownership structure in 
Chinese listed companies is ‘a high level of ownership concentration’ (Ma et al., 2010). 
Shareholdings of Chinese listed companies are heavily concentrated in the hand of the 
state. In other words, in China, the state is the controlling shareholder in the listed 
companies. Another difference between the US and China is the duties and power of the 
shareholders. In the US, American Corporate Law gives a larger power to the board of 
directors, but less authority to the meeting of shareholders (Wei, 2003). In China, 
shareholders are required to vote on major business decisions such as merger or sale. 
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They also need to make other business decisions such as issuing bonds, and increasing or 
decreasing registered capital (Liu, 2009). The appointment of managers and directors is 
influenced by the government (largest shareholder) in Chinese listed companies. 
Moreover, a lot of former government officials are appointed in listed companies as 
managers by the government (Chen et al., 2010). Therefore, the large shareholder (state 
ownership) has enough power to control managers and directors.  
Under the organisational and managerial perspective evolved from stakeholder theory 
and the unique characteristic of ownership in Chinese listed companies, management 
would satisfy the information demands of state ownership (the powerful stakeholder) 
because state ownership has sufficient power to decide on managers’ positions. The main 
aim of state ownership is to fulfil the social objectives of the state (Khongmalai et al., 
2010) and to give consideration to the demands of other stakeholders, which includes 
employees, customers, local communities, and the general public. These stakeholders 
demand more VED due to increasing of public concern about social and environmental 
issues. Therefore, to safeguard their position, managers need to supply environmental 
information to satisfy influential stakeholders, both the state ownership and the other 
stakeholders who are cared for by the state. Moreover, green energy and green industries 
are a developing trend for the future. Good environmental practice could bring business 
opportunities and market benefits to the companies through having a strong reputation 
for environmental care and through improving their public relations (KPMG, 1997). The 
state ownership would like more VED to build the reputation of Chinese business and to 
attract more domestic and foreign investors in order to further develop the Chinese 
economy. It is hypothesised that: 
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Hypothesis 1(a) State ownership and quantity of voluntary environmental disclosure are 
positively related. 
Blockholder ownership is the substantial shareholders who hold 5 per cent or more 
ordinary shares. In China, the shareholdings are heavily concentrated in the hand of the 
state. On average, the state-owned shares equated to more than 35 per cent between 2001 
and 2007. In addition, the five largest shareholders own more than half of the total shares 
in 2007. In other words, blockholder ownership is one of the main forms in China’s 
ownership structure. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) mentioned that substantial shareholders 
are expected to possess both an incentive and a greater power to monitor management 
because of their wealth being tied to the financial performance of the firm. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argued that diffusion in ownership enhances the potential conflicts 
between the agent and the principal. When firms involve substantial shareholders in 
monitoring, the agency problem can be mitigated. However, it would incur more agency 
costs to monitor the actions of management. Xiao and Yuan (2007) predict that managers 
will enhance voluntary disclosure in annual reports to reduce agency costs entailed in 
monitoring activities. Empirical evidence on the association between blockholder 
ownership and environmental disclosure is limited. Mixed results were found in 
developing countries (Samaha et al., 2012). In emerging markets, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) found that a positive role was played by blockholder ownership on voluntary 
disclosure based on the Malaysian context, while Hossain et al. (1994) found a negative 
impact. Following the argument that blockholder ownerships hold sufficient incentive 
and power to monitor management; and in consequence, managers would like to reveal 
more information to reduce such monitoring activities, it is hypothesised that: 
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Hypothesis 1(b) Blockholder ownership and quantity of voluntary environmental 
disclosure are positively related. 
Managerial ownership means that the CEO, senior managers, and executive directors 
hold a significant proportion of ordinary shares. In this situation, these managers are not 
only regarded as agent-stakeholders, but they are also recognised as principal-
stakeholders. Agency problems arise when there is a separation of the principal and the 
agent. When managerial ownership as principal-stakeholder is high, the agency problem 
may be reduced, because the managerial ownerships’ interest aligns with the other 
principal-stakeholders. Under low managerial ownership, outside principal-stakeholders 
need to increase the agency cost to deal with the problem by monitoring the actions of 
the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this situation, managers choose to increase 
voluntary disclosure in order to decrease monitoring and the agency cost. In addition, 
voluntary environmental disclosure helps to enhance the firm’s reputation. It is a good 
way to improve the managers’ performance to satisfy the shareholders and other 
stakeholders’ need. It is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 1(c) Managerial ownership and quantity of voluntary environmental 
disclosure are negatively related. 
Legal person ownership, which is the second largest ownership identity in China’s public 
listed companies, was created by China’s policy makers to assist the transition of China’s 
companies from state-owned to private-owned (Delios and Wu, 2005, p.151).  Xu and 
Wang (1999) pointed out that legal-person ownership, like the institutional investors, has 
a great initiative and the professional expertise to monitor and supervise management. 
Compared with state shareholders, legal-person shareholders are more economically 
orientated and geared towards profit maximisation (Tan and Wang, 2004). As mentioned 
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by Qu et al (2013), legal-person shareholders, who hold industry expertise and 
management skills, urge companies to maximise profits in order to add to the 
shareholders’ wealth (p.269). Currently, sustainable (green) development is the main 
trend in economic development. Companies could improve their image and attract more 
investment through environmental disclosure practice. Legal person shareholders should 
have the initiative to drive managers to engage in revealing environmental information in 
order to achieve shareholder wealth maximisation. On the other hand, in Chinese listed 
companies, generally, legal person ownership is composed of institutional promoters and 
other legal entities, most of which are state-owned or controlled through state-owned 
enterprises or other state-owned institutions (Yuan et al., 2009, p.565). To some extent, 
the aim and the power legal person ownership holds is therefore influenced by state 
ownership or/and the State. Based on the organisational and managerial perspective and 
social objective of the State, a high level of legal person ownership is expected to relate 
to a high level of environmental disclosure quantity, because legal person ownership	  
possesses a large power enough to potentially decide managers’ positions and therefore 
managers would like to satisfy the legal person ownership’s requirements. It is 
hypothesised that:  
Hypothesis 1(d) Legal-person ownership and quantity of voluntary environmental 
disclosure are positively related. 
Foreign share ownership means a higher level of information asymmetry due to different 
cultures, languages, and attitudes of risk (Broberg et al., 2010). Managers may disclose 
more information to mitigate potential conflicts and misunderstandings between the kind 
of foreign stakeholders and themselves. In addition, some Chinese companies are not just 
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges; they are also listed on the Hong 
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Kong and/or the US stock exchanges. These companies are required to follow the 
accounting standards in those countries where they are listed (Xiao and Yuan, 2007). 
Thus, these companies may reveal more information to satisfy existing stakeholders and 
to gain new foreign investors. It is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 1(e) Foreign shares ownership and quantity of voluntary environmental 
disclosure are positively related. 
3.3.2.2 Board composition  
Where the UK and the US listed companies have a single board (the Anglo-American 
model), and Germany has two-tier supervisory and management boards (the continental 
European model) (Charkham, 1994), the listed companies in China have a combined 
Anglo-American model and German board style (continental European model) which 
forms a mixed model containing Chinese characteristics which has dual boards: the board 
of directors and the supervisory board. Compared with those in the UK and the US, the 
board of directors in Chinese listed companies has less power in its role. In China, 
concentrated shareholdings are owned by the state in most companies. As a result, the 
board of directors is in the hands of the state. The development of independent directors 
in Chinese listed companies is relatively new. In 2001, the CSRC produced “Guidelines 
for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies”. 
Later, Corporate Law (2006 version) mandatorily required a board of directors to have 
independent directors. Due to the development of corporate governance in China having 
borrowed many rules and experiences from the UK and the US, the Cadbury Report 
(1992) is one important reference to develop the roles of independent directors in China. 
It stated that IND ‘should be independent of management and free from any business or 
other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent 
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judgement’. The non-official position of IND in the firm and their lack of material 
interest should determine that they can better monitor management and encourage board 
members to reveal information in order to satisfy the demands of stakeholders (Donnelly 
and Mulcahy, 2008; Rao et al., 2012). As mentioned by Fama and Jensen (1983), a high 
level of IND could enhance board effectiveness in monitoring managerial opportunism 
and increase voluntary disclosure. Consequently, a higher proportion of IND should be 
more inclined to encourage the firms to increase disclosure for stakeholders. It is 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2(a) The proportion of independent directors and quantity of voluntary 
environmental disclosure are positively related. 
 
The board of supervisors in Chinese listed companies is elected by shareholders. Liu 
(2009) found that the duties of the Chinese supervisory board are similar to the functions 
of outside counsel in US corporate governance. Numerous scholars have deemed that the 
supervisory board in Chinese companies merely looks like an ineffective ornament (e.g., 
Dahya et al., 2003; Mallin, 2006; Wei and Geng, 2008; Tricker, 2009). Dahya et al. 
(2003) pointed out five essential items lacking in the Chinese supervisory board: legal 
power, independence, technical expertise, information, and incentives. Wei and Geng 
(2008) satirised that they are merely holding a rubber stamp without virtually any rights. 
The Chinese supervisory board does not have the right to appoint or dismiss executive 
board directors (Mallin, 2006). However, Ding et al. (2010) mentioned that the rights of 
the supervisory board have been improved a lot due to the amendment of Corporation 
Law in 2005. The supervisory board currently has the power to propose dismissal of 
directors and top management, and sue managers who commit frauds. They can also 
raise questions and make suggestions in board meetings, and curb executive 
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compensation. The expanded right of the supervisory board effectively influences the 
monitoring of managerial opportunism. Compared to the board of supervisors less 
aligned with management, they are more inclined to the firms. The stakeholder-agency 
theory contends that firms tend to disclose more information to reduce information 
asymmetry (Hill and Jones, 1992, Huang and Kung, 2010). In addition, under the 
accountability perspective evolved from stakeholder theory, the firm has the ethical (fair) 
responsibility to supply disclosures explaining its actions to stakeholders and society. 
The companies can be expected to reveal more voluntary environmental information with 
a larger size of supervisory board. It is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2(b) The number of members in the supervisory board and quantity of 
voluntary environmental disclosure are positively related. 
 
3.3.2.3 Control variables 
Previous research provides several control variables which relate to voluntary disclosure. 
Firm size (FSIZE), which is measured by total revenue, total book value of assets, or 
total market value of the firm, is one recognised factor affecting voluntary disclosure 
(e.g., Meek et al., 1995; Broberg et al., 2010). Foster (1986, p.44) noted that ‘the variable 
most consistently reported as significant in studies examining differences across firms in 
their disclosure policy is firm size’. Large FSIZE, rather than small FSIZE, is expected to 
disclose more information for enhancing their reputation and increasing capital (Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987).  
Leverage (DEBT) is measured by total liabilities divided by total asset. It has been 
hypothesised to be significantly related to disclosure level (e.g., Malone et al., 1993; 
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Hossain et al., 1994; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Ismail and Chandler, 2005; Broberg et 
al., 2010). A firm with a high level of debt may incur more monitoring from shareholders 
and less confidence from the potential investors. That is: managers may utilise more 
disclosure to mitigate these problems (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). In other words, the 
high-debt firm has more voluntary disclosure.    
For profitability (ROE), Meek et al. (1995) mentioned that the well-run profitable firms 
have an incentive to reveal information to distinguish themselves from the less profitable 
firms. Profitability was found to markedly affect the disclosure level in annual reports in 
the study of Singhvi and Desai (1971).   
Age of firm (AGE) is employed as an important variable in many studies of disclosure 
practices (e.g. Elijido-Ten, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006; Hossain et al., 2006; Rettab et al., 
2009). However, there are mixed results in the association between the age of the firm 
and the level of disclosure. Alsaeed (2006) tested the effect of the variable AGE on the 
level of disclosure and found that there is no significant relationship between them. 
Delaney and Huselid (1996) revealed that the relationship between the firm’s age and the 
level of corporate social responsible disclosure is positive, whereas, a negative 
association between them was found by the studies of Rettab et al. (2009).  
Environmentally sensitive industries (INDUSTRY) also impacts on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure as a control variable (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Halme and Huse, 
1997; Mock et al., 2007; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Liu and Sun, 2010; Kuo et al., 
2012). Moroney et al. (2011) pointed out that companies are classified into high, medium 
and low environmental impact sectors by the socially responsible investment indices of 
FTSE 2007. Following the classification, industries of mining, manufacturing, water, 
electricity, and gas (resource and energy), and construction are considered as 
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environmentally sensitive industries in this study. In the research of Broberg et al. (2010), 
corporations in the manufacturing industry were found to have more voluntary disclosure. 
To sum up, FSIZE, DEBT, ROE, AGE, and INDUSTRY are chosen as control variables 
to examine the relationship between corporate governance and VED. 
 
3.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1 Sample  
The sample of this research is collected from both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
and the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). There were 1,230 consecutive valid firms 
listed on these two stock exchanges between 2009 and 2011 (3,690 firm-year 
observations). It excludes the firms in the financial sector (such as banks and other 
financial firms). Xiao and Yuan (2007) stated that these firms are subject to different 
disclosure requirements in China. In addition, ST/*ST/S*ST firms with problems in 
finance are not considered in the study either. The valid sample covers 12 industry 
sectors as shown on table 3.3. It is apparent from the table that the industry of 
manufacturing reaches at 57.32% of the market share. The second highest percentages of 
industry sectors (retail/trade and real estate) are just 6.75%, respectively. It presents that 
the manufacture is the largest industry sector in Chinese market and an awfully 
imbalance development of industries in China. In this research, the CCER database and 
the CSMAR database are utilised for financial data collection and annual reports from 
both SZSE and SHSE are adopted for environmental disclosure data collection. 
The research period in this study was selected to start from 2009	  on account of the 
Environmental Information Disclosure Decree (Trial Edition), which was promulgated 
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by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in 2007 and which took 
effect on May 2008 (Zhang et al., 2010). In addition, in the same year, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange published the “Guide on Environmental Information Disclosure for 
Companies Listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange” to launch firms’ initiatives (Lin, 
2010). To some extent, these regulations and guides more or less promote the 
development of environmental disclosure in the annual report in the following years. Due 
to such a large data set, the manual data collection for single year needs to take 3-4 
months to complete. Therefore, 3-year research period from 2009 to 2011 is decided in 
the research. 
Table 3.3 
Descriptive Statistics of Industry sectors 
 
TYPE Name of Industry sector Freq. Percent Cum.
A Agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fisheries 27 2.20 2.20
B Mining 31 2.52 4.72
C Manufacturing 705 57.32 62.03
D Water, electricity, and gas 52 4.23 66.26
E Construction 25 2.03 68.29
F Transport and storage 57 4.63 72.93
G Communication 77 6.26 79.19
H Retail/trade 83 6.75 85.93
J Real estate 83 6.75 92.68
K Services sectors 41 3.33 96.02
L Media and culture 10 0.81 96.83
M Comprehensive industry 39 3.17 100.00
Total 1230 100.00
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3.4.2 Annual report 
In previous empirical studies, most of them have tended to focus on disclosure in annual 
reports, although a wide range of media is employed to disclose environmental 
information by the corporations, which includes advertisements, booklets, annual reports, 
focus groups, press releases, and employee councils (Gray et al., 2001). Compared with 
other media, the annual report is more publicised and is a more visible document (Halme 
and Huse, 1997) which can be easily accessed (Wilmshurst, and Frost, 2000). As 
mentioned by Neu et al. (1998) and Gibson and O’Donovan (2007), the annual report is a 
primary information source for the communication between corporations and its 
stakeholders who include creditors, investors, employees, customers, environmental 
groups and the government. They also indicated that ‘the annual report possesses a 
degree of credibility not associated with other forms of advertising’ (Neu et al., 1998, 
p.269). Lynch (2010) highlighted the reasons to employ the annual report in that it is a 
consistent source document for data gathered and compared because of a relatively 
homogenous format. Wiseman (1982, p.55) suggested that ‘it is widely recognised as the 
principal means for corporate communications of activities and intentions to shareholders 
and is the primary source of environmental reporting by corporations. The annual report 
has been the source for virtually all previous corporate research’. Tilt (1994) found that 
the annual report is a common medium employed for corporate social information.  
In China, there are a series of rules and standards required by the securities authority in 
China, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which is beneficial to the 
collection of manual data of information disclosure from annual reports. In 1999, the 
CSRC decided that firms should publish annual reports in both forms: publications and 
the Internet concurrently. This change not only provides key information to investors in a 
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timely fashion, but also, it satisfies the needs of the public in a convenient way. Scholars, 
for example, could expediently access the 10 most recent years’ annual reports through 
the Internet. Bouten et al. (2011) deemed that the annual report being directly available 
on the Internet is one important element in the annual report being the widely favoured 
information resource. In addition, according to the CSRC, “the annual report should be 
prepared and disclosed to the public within 4 months subsequent to the end of financial 
year ... For those companies that float A & B shares concurrently, or list in domestic and 
foreign stock exchanges, then, the annual and interim reports must be made available to 
both foreign and domestic investors at the same time”. These requirements, to some 
extent, have determined the timeliness and the convenience of the annual report in China. 
Ane (2012) asserts that the annual report is the most dominant form for revealing 
environmental information by Chinese companies. Thus, like most other studies, this 
research employs the annual report disclosure.  
 
3.4.3 Quantity of environmental disclosure index 
As to the quantity of environmental disclosure, prior studies commonly employed a “unit 
of analysis” to measure the amount of information. Gray et al. (1995) mentioned that 
three kinds of “unit” (number of words, sentences and pages) are have been preferred in 
this area. Many previous studies used these three paths to measure the quantity of 
environmental disclosure in annual reports: number of words (e.g., Zeghal and Ahmed, 
1990; Neu et al., 1998; Campbell, 2003; Eljayash et al., 2012；Rao et al., 2012; Wang et 
al., 2012); sentences (e.g., Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; 
Elijido-Ten, 2004; Ku Ismail and Ibrahim, 2008); and pages (e.g., Patten, 1992; Gray et 
al., 1995a; Unerman, 2000). In addition, the number of lines is one alternative way, 
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which was used in the study of Wiseman (1982) to test the volume of environmental 
information in the annual reports of 26 US firms. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2003) pointed out 
that each type of “unit” has its limitations. For example, when environmental information 
is included in pictures and/or graphs, it cannot be measured by number of words, lines 
and sentences. Different font, column or page sizes used in the annual reports influence 
the measurement of disclosure by utilising a “unit” of page (Elijido-Ten, 2004). For “unit” 
of word measuring, a problem arises when scholars collect the quantity of disclosure in 
different languages, in that some languages use more words than others to express the 
same meaning. For example, voluntary environmental disclosure in English is expressed 
in just 3 words, but the same meaning in Chinese (zi yuan xing huang jing jie lu) requires 
7 words. Although this study merely collects environmental information from the annual 
report in Chinese, the larger number of words used in Chinese would increase the 
workload involved in counting the volume of disclosure. Thus, considering the above 
limitations of each of the four “units of analysis” and, bearing in mind that there are few 
pictures used to demonstrate environmental information in the annual reports of Chinese 
listed companies, for this empirical chapter, the number of sentences has been chosen as 
the “unit of analysis” (Gray et al., 1995) to measure the quantity of environmental 
disclosure. The main reason is that it avoids inaccurate measurement from different font, 
column or page sizes used in the annual reports by measuring the “unit” of pages 
(Elijido-Ten, 2004) and avoids the additionally high workload of counting individual 
words in Chinese.  
In the evaluation of the quantitative environmental disclosure, 27 environmental 
keywords are defined to look for the sentences of environmental information in the 
annual reports, base upon the “Sustainability Reporting Guidelines” of the Global 
reporting initiative and the environmental words appeared in 50 randomly chosen 
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Chinese annual reports. The 27 keywords include environment, green, conservation, 
protection, efficiency, cycle, control, pollution, emission, effluent, waste, resource, 
energy, material, biology, oil, coal, soil, water, gas, air, carbon, forestry, forest, land, 
park and mine. Base on the research function of PDF document, the sentences involving 
the above keywords are found out. Then, the number of the sentences are counted after 
read, estimated and confirmed. 
 
3.4.4 Model specification 
In previous empirical research, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression has been 
commonly employed in examining the relationship between the extent of social and 
environmental disclosure and its determinants. However, there is a limitation in OLS 
when the dependent variable is measured by content analysis to generate a part of the 
sample without any disclosure and which hence is scored as a zero value (Salama et al., 
2012) and where the other parts are more than zero. TOBIT formulation supplies a 
powerful check on the model where the value of the dependent variable is not less than 
zero. Therefore, TOBIT is also employed to examine the relationship between quantity of 
voluntary environmental disclosure and characteristics of corporate governance for 
minimizing any loopholes in regressions. The following model is estimated: 
 
DISCQuantity = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1SOE + 𝛽2BLOCK + 𝛽3MOWN + 𝛽4LEGAL + 𝛽5FOWN + 𝛽6IND +𝛽7SUPVR + 𝛽 8FSIZE + 𝛽 9DEBT + 𝛽 10ROE +𝛽 11AGE 
+  𝛽12INDUSTRY+ ε 
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Where DISCQuantity, is the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosure score; SOE, 
is the dummy variable for state ownership, coded as 1 for where the ultimate ownership 
is the state and 0 otherwise; BLOCK, percentage of ordinary shares held by substantial 
shareholders (with 5 per cent or more of the shareholding); MOWN, the percentage of 
ordinary shares held by the CEO, senior managers, and directors;	  LEGAL, the percentage 
of ordinary shares held by legal persons; FOWN, the dummy variable for foreign share 
ownership, coded as 1 for the firm had issued B shares and/or H shares and 0 otherwise; 
IND, the proportion of independent non-executive directors to the number of directors on 
the board; SUPVR, the amount of members in the supervisory board; FSIZE, the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB; DEBT, the leverage ratio: total liabilities 
divided by total asset; ROE, profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; AGE, age of the 
firm (since it set up); INDUSTRY, the dummy variable for environmentally sensitive 
firms, coded as 1 for the firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 
otherwise. 
 
3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Table 3.4 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables based on 3,690 firm 
observations during the period 2009-2011. The dependent variable: the quantity of 
environmental disclosure (SQDISCQuantity) is measured by the square root in order that 
the dependent variable might tend towards a normal distribution as shown in the table 3.5. 
Table 3.4 displays the minimum scores of SQDISCQuantity as 0.00, which indicates 
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some listed companies in China without any environmental disclosure. The maximum 
scores (8.00) and mean values (2.75) express that quantitative environmental disclosure 
is quite insufficient in the annual reports of most Chinese listed companies. The 
skewness value of 0.62 in SQDISCQuantity implies that some but few companies 
disclose comparatively sufficient quantitative environmental information in the annual 
report. In the table, a decrease is shown in quantitative environmental information from 
2.86 in 2009 to 2.66 in 2010. The main reason could be that item 7 of “Announcement on 
fulfilling the annual reports of listed companies in 2009 and relevant work” encourages 
firms to take social responsibility which includes environmental protection and the 
disclosure of this kind of information in the annual report. It impelled companies to 
disclosure more environmental information in 2009. It is worth mentioning that, in this 
study, there are just 172 firm observations without any environmental disclosure out of 
3,690 valid firm observations in total. In contrast with 34 per cent of Chinese listed 
companies with CER in 2002 and approximately 60 per cent in 2006, it shows that 95 per 
cent of Chinese listed companies have undertaken some environmental disclosure 
between 2009 and 2011. However, in the process of the manual data collection, this 
research found that these selected Chinese companies merely supply ‘good news’ in the 
annual reports and hide ‘bad news’. As indicated by Clarkson et al. (2008) and Iatridis 
(2013), voluntary environmental information is disclosed by companies which tend to 
use less environmentally harmful practices. In China, this situation is more serious. The 
possible reasons of almost all companies only reporting favourable environmental 
information are that these firms believe just positive environmental disclosure assisting 
them to build firms’ reputation, reduce shareholders’ concern, and obtain economic 
benefit.  
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From table 3.4 we note that the maximum value for state ownership (SOE) is 1 and the 
mean is 0.59. It suggests that state ownership is the dominant form of ownership 
structure in more than half of Chinese listed companies. The mean value of SOE 
decreased from 0.61 in 2008 to 0.55 in 2010, which reveals that the Chinese government 
is reducing its own holding of non-negotiable shares and transferring them to negotiable 
shares in the market. Similarly, the percentage of ordinary shares held by legal persons 
(LEGAL) also shows a decreasing trend from 2008 to 2010. One possible explanation is 
that it is a developing trend, with more and more negotiable shares in the market being 
transferred from non-negotiable shares. Managerial ownership (MOWN) has a minimum 
of 0.00% and a mean of 1%, which indicates very low managerial ownership in most 
Chinese listed companies. The IND is more than 36% on average, although some 
companies just have 9% (the minimum value). It means that all of the Chinese listed 
companies comply with the Corporate Law (2006 version), which mandatorily requires a 
board of directors to have independent directors. At the same time, the majority are 
following the “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China” issued on 
30th June 2003, which recommends that the board should be made up of at least one-
third independent directors. The amount of members in the supervisory board (SUPVR) 
shows a minimum score of 1 and a maximum of 12 with a mean value of 3.90. It 
indicates that there is at least one member in the supervisory boards of Chinese listed 
companies and nearly four members in the supervisory boards on average. The mean 
value of INDUSTRY (0.66) and the median value (1) indicate that Chinese listed 
companies tend to operate in mainly environmentally sensitive industries. 
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Table 3.4 
Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
 
 
 
All Mean Mean 2009 Mean 2010 Mean 2011
Std.Dev. Std.Dev. Std.Dev. Std.Dev.
Min. Min. Min. Min.
Max. Max. Max. Max.
Skewness Skewness Skewness Skewness
Variables Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis
SQDISCQuantity 2.75 2.86 2.66 2.73
1.52 1.72 1.47 1.35
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8.00 8.00 7.75 7.55
0.62 0.57 0.65 0.55
3.26 2.87 3.34 3.39
lagSOE 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.55
0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
-0.36 -0.46 -0.41 -0.22
1.13 1.21 1.17 1.05
lagBLOCK 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.45
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
0.05 0.00 0.05 0.11
2.55 2.52 2.54 2.61
lagMOWN 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.08
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.69 0.69 0.54 0.56
5.96 7.81 5.95 4.61
42.86 71.25 43.48 25.18
Panel A: Dependent
Panel B: Independent 
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All Mean Mean 2009 Mean 2010 Mean 2011
Std.Dev. Std.Dev. Std.Dev. Std.Dev.
Min. Min. Min. Min.
Max. Max. Max. Max.
Skewness Skewness Skewness Skewness
Variables Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis
lagLEGAL 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.06
0.18 0.20 0.18 0.15
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.85 0.81 0.85 0.81
1.99 1.39 2.07 2.96
6.10 3.88 6.46 11.53
lagFOWN 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2.97 2.99 2.99 2.95
9.84 9.92 9.92 9.70
lagIND 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.09 0.14 0.09 0.13
0.71 0.63 0.71 0.63
1.53 1.53 1.55 1.49
7.28 7.37 8.12 6.38
lagSUPVR 3.90 3.93 3.90 3.88
1.26 1.29 1.25 1.24
1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
12.00 12.00 12.00 11.00
1.31 1.36 1.31 1.24
5.17 5.58 5.17 4.67
Panel B: Independent 
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All Mean Mean 2009 Mean 2010 Mean 2011
Std.Dev. Std.Dev. Std.Dev. Std.Dev.
Min. Min. Min. Min.
Max. Max. Max. Max.
Skewness Skewness Skewness Skewness
Variables Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis
lagLogFSIZE 21.77 21.60 21.76 21.95
1.21 1.16 1.20 1.22
18.27 18.98 18.27 19.08
27.62 27.35 27.49 27.62
0.80 0.86 0.80 0.76
4.07 4.32 4.08 3.92
lagDEBT 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.49
0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95
-0.21 -0.18 -0.20 -0.24
2.35 2.38 2.30 2.36
lagROE 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10
0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
-0.44 -0.35 -0.44 -0.44
0.44 0.44 0.44 0.42
-0.39 -0.57 -0.47 0.13
6.51 6.15 6.96 5.78
lagAGE 12.52 11.52 12.52 13.52
4.41 4.34 4.34 4.34
1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
29.00 27.00 28.00 29.00
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
2.85 2.84 2.84 2.84
lagINDUSTRY 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
-0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68
1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46
Panel B: Independent 
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Figure 3.1 
Dependent variable distributions 
 
 
Table 3.5 describes the mean values of dependent and independent variables in twelve 
industries. According to the table, the top three mean values of high volume 
environmental disclosures are found in the Mining industry (SQDISCQuantity = 4.091), 
the Water, electricity and gas industry (SQDISCQuantity = 3.734), and the 
Manufacturing industry (SQDISCQuantity = 3.001). This table also indicated that the 
industries of Media and culture (SQDISCQuantity = 1.434), Retail/trade 
(SQDISCQuantity = 1.638), and Communication (SQDISCQuantity = 1.710) reveal a 
low volume of environmental information in the research years. To some extent, they 
reflect that firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries are more inclined to 
publish a large quantity of environmental disclosure in their annual report. In the Chinese 
market, Mining is the youngest industry (lagAGE = 9.516), which has been growing 
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rapidly and it holds the largest firm size on average (lagLogFSIZE = 23.206). In other 
words, this kind of heavy industry has been the focus of economic development in China 
in recent years. At the same time,	  a number of environmental issues have been produced 
by the rapid development of this heavy industry.  
 
3.5.2 Multicollinearity 
This research employs Pearson's Correlation to explore the relationship between the 
structure of corporate governance, characteristics of the company, and quantity of 
environmental disclosure. The results are shown in Table 3.6. The highest correlation 
coefficient is -0.4396 between SOE and LEGAL in this study. Harmful levels of 
multicollinearity could present when the correlation coefficient reached ±0.8 or ±0.9 
(Farrar and Glauber, 1967). It accords with the view of Hossain et al. (1995), which 
claimed collinearity does not occur when the correlation coefficient is less than 0.8. Thus, 
there is no unacceptable level of multicollinearity between the independent and control 
variables. Moreover, Moroney et al. (2011) and Leng and Ding (2011) mentioned that 
very low tolerance levels (approaching zero) or very high variance inflation factors (VIF) 
would suggest that multicollinearity might be a concern. When the VIF value exceeds 10, 
it would indicate a threat of multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1983; Pallant, 2007; Wang, et 
al., 2012). In this research, VIF scores ranged from 1.02 for IND to 1.59 for logFSIZE as 
showed in Table 3.7, which is well below the VIF value of 10. Therefore, 
multicollinearity is not a concern in this research. 
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Table 3.5 
Variable mean values by industry 
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Table 3.6 
Correlation coefficients of key variables 
DSCORE voluntary environmental disclosure score; SOE dummy variable for state ownership, coded as 1 where the ultimate ownership is the state and 0 otherwise; BLOCK percentage of 
ordinary shares held by substantial shareholders (with 5 per cent or more shareholding); MOWN percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO, senior managers, and directors;	  LEGAL 
percentage of ordinary shares held by legal person; FOWN dummy variable for foreign share ownership, coded as 1 for if the firm had issued B shares or/and H shares and 0 otherwise; IND 
proportion of independent non-executive directors to the number of directors on the board; SUPVR the amount of members in supervisory board; FSIZE natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets in RMB; DEBT leverage ratio: total liabilities divided by total assets; ROE profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; AGE age of the firm (since it set up); INDUSTRY dummy variable 
for environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for a firm operating in an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise 
SQDISCQuantity lagSOE lagBLOCK lagMOWN lagLEGAL lagFOWN lagIND lagSUPVR lagLogFSIZE lagDEBT lagROE lagAGE lagINDUSTRY
SQDISCQuantity 1
lagSOE 0.1477 1
lagBLOCK 0.1173 0.0369 1
lagMOWN -­‐0.0068 -­‐0.2470 0.0548 1
lagLEGAL -­‐0.0822 -­‐0.4396 0.2379 -­‐0.0319 1
lagFOWN 0.0441 0.1326 0.1335 -­‐0.0660 -­‐0.0753 1
lagIND 0.0087 -­‐0.0282 0.0475 0.0449 -­‐0.0151 0.0278 1
lagSUPVR 0.1765 0.2680 0.0439 -­‐0.1151 -­‐0.1609 0.0666 -­‐0.0756 1
lagLogFSIZE 0.3215 0.2764 0.1780 -­‐0.1481 -­‐0.1134 0.2965 0.0665 0.2159 1
lagDEBT 0.1311 0.1473 -­‐0.0472 -­‐0.1073 -­‐0.0614 0.0469 -­‐0.0068 0.1177 0.4352 1
lagROE 0.0063 -­‐0.0792 0.1494 0.0522 0.0575 -­‐0.0076 -­‐0.0219 0.0066 0.1685 0.0070 1
lagAGE -­‐0.0999 0.1305 -­‐0.3619 -­‐0.2270 -­‐0.0914 0.1463 -­‐0.0297 0.0714 0.1339 0.1777 -­‐0.0263 1
lagINDUSTRY 0.3063 -­‐0.0275 0.0325 0.0449 0.0242 -­‐0.0032 0.0074 0.0264 -­‐0.0392 -­‐0.0279 -­‐0.0334 -­‐0.1931 1
Note:	   N=3690	  observations
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3.5.3 Endogeneity test 
The endogeneity problem was first identified and introduced by Tobin (1958). Jo and 
Harjoto (2011) asserted that an OLS would produce biased parameter estimates if the 
endogeneity problems were not taken into consideration in the estimation procedure 
(p.357). Similarly, Core et al. (2006) and Ntim et al. (2012) deemed that endogeneity 
problems existing in empirical regressions would impact on their results significantly. 
Brown et al. (2011) addressed analysis and research on endogeneity in their study of 
“Corporate governance, accounting and finance: a review”. They asserted that 
endogeneity is regarded as a real and fearful issue in a lot of the CG literature. Fixed-
effects estimation and an instrumental variables (IV) approach are two general methods 
to deal with endogeneity problems in most studies. In the research on disclosure practice, 
Cheung et al. (2010) employed the panel regression model with fixed effect in order to 
minimise endogeneity problems. In addition, they also engaged a comprehensive set of 
control variables to avoid the omitted-variable bias, and to mitigate the effect of 
endogeneity (Cheung et al., 2010).  
In terms of an instrumental variables (IV) approach, Ronnie Lo (2009) mentioned that 
standard econometric procedures suggest addressing endogeneity issues by the use of an 
instrument variable for the potentially endogenous variable (p.356). However, an ideal 
instrument variable is difficult to find based on its criteria that require an exogenous 
variable which should be correlated with the endogenous variable and which would not 
be impacted by the dependable variable of interest. Borsch-Supan and Koke (2002) 
pointed out that even if such an instrument variable were found, it would possibly be a 
weak instrument. Therefore, lagged value and industrial average have usually been 
adopted as instrumental variables in prior studies. For example, state ownership (SOE) is 
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identified as an endogenous variable, and thus the lagged value of SOE needs to be found 
to replace the original value in order to avoid any impact by the endogeneity. 
In the endogeneity test, firstly, scholars need to distinguish between endogenous and 
exogenous variables based on a literature review of previous research. The second step is 
to conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test (Hausman Test). In this process, additional 
variables (such as instrumental variables) are employed to replace the identified 
endogenous variable. In this study, the independent and control variables are lagged from 
the dependents so as to reduce potential problems with endogeneity (Dam and Scholtens, 
2012). Then it uses single-equation instrumental-variables regression with the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimator and assumes H0 that variables are exogenous to do the 
Hausman Test. The assumption (H0) is accepted when p value is insignificant (p>0.05) 
whereas it is rejected if p value is significant (p<0.05 or p<0.01). In other words, 
insignificant F value suggests that the regression do not have an endogeneity problem 
and vice versa. The result of Hausman test in this study shows that F value is equal to 
1.51516 with p=0.1573, which is insignificant. Therefore, the endogeneity problem is not 
considered in this research. 
 
3.5.4 Results of empirical testing 
The empirical results on the relationship between the dependent variable (quantity of 
environmental disclosure) and independent variables (characteristics of corporate 
governance) are tested by STATA 10.0, which is shown in table 3.7 and table 3.8. The 
independent and control variables are lagged from the dependents so as to reduce 
potential problems with endogeneity (Dam and Scholtens, 2012). It employs OLS 
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regression and TOBIT formulation to test the association of corporate governance with 
quantitative environmental disclosure. Compared with the results of TOBIT, there are 
similar outcomes from OLS regression in this study. The table reveals adjusted R-
squared of 0.230, which explains about 23 per cent of the variation in the quantity of 
environmental disclosure level. The F value of OLS regression is 90.69 with significance 
at p = 0.000, lower than 0.001, which means that the regression model is statistically 
significant (Leng and Ding, 2011).  
In both the OLS and TOBIT regressions, there are seven independent and control 
variables which are identical, SOE, FOWN, SUPVR, LogFSIZE, ROE, AGE, and 
INDUSTRY, with a regression coefficient which is significant at a 0.01 level. In addition, 
the independent variables BLOCK and LEGAL are significant at a 0.05 level and 
MOWN is significant at a 0.1 level. The empirical findings reveal that the associations 
between environmental disclosure and two control variables (LogFSIZE and 
INDUSTRY) are significant and positive. The result accords with the findings of Gray et 
al. (2001, p.328) and Beck et al. (2010), the (larger) size of firms in ‘environmentally-
sensitive’ industry is known to impact on disclosure behaviours significantly and 
positively. In addition, it is consistent with the findings of Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) 
and Zeng et al. (2012). They researched the influence of factors on the extent of 
environmental disclosure using evidence from Chinese listed companies and concluded 
that environmentally sensitive industries and size are significant factors that positively 
affect environmental disclosure. Thus, the results in this research concerning these two 
control variables (LogFSIZE and INDUSTRY) are well confirmed. 
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Table 3.7 
Regression results 
 
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
DSCORE voluntary environmental disclosure score; SOE dummy variable for state ownership, coded as 1 where the 
ultimate ownership is the state and 0 otherwise; BLOCK percentage of ordinary shares held by substantial shareholders 
(with 5 per cent or more shareholding); MOWN percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO, senior managers, and 
directors;	   LEGAL percentage of ordinary shares held by legal persons; FOWN dummy variable for foreign share 
ownership, coded as 1 for if the firm had issued B shares or/and H shares and 0 otherwise; IND proportion of 
independent non-executive directors to the number of directors on the board; SUPVR the amount of members in 
supervisory board; FSIZE natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB; DEBT leverage ratio: total liabilities 
divided by total assets; ROE profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; AGE age of the firm (since it set up); 
INDUSTRY dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for a firm operating in an environmentally 
sensitive industry and 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted	  
sign VIF
Variable Coeff. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Coeff.INTERCEPT -­‐7.101 *** (0.507) -­‐7.104 *** (0.507)lagSOE + 0.138 *** (0.053) 0.138 *** (0.053) 1.52lagBLOCK + 0.345 ** (0.152) 0.346 ** (0.151) 1.42lagMOWN -­‐ 0.695 * (0.365) 0.694 * (0.365) 1.16lagLEGAL + -­‐0.292 ** (0.139) -­‐0.292 ** (0.138) 1.42lagFOWN + -­‐0.329 *** (0.087) -­‐0.329 *** (0.087) 1.16lagIND + -­‐0.366 (0.432) -­‐0.367 (0.432) 1.02lagSUPVR + 0.109 *** (0.020) 0.109 *** (0.020) 1.12lagLogFSIZE 0.419 *** (0.025) 0.419 *** (0.025) 1.59lagDEBT -­‐0.029 (0.132) -­‐0.028 (0.131) 1.29lagROE -­‐0.789 *** (0.265) -­‐0.789 *** (0.264) 1.08lagAGE -­‐0.025 *** (0.006) -­‐0.025 *** (0.006) 1.36
lagINDUSTRY 0.965 *** (0.048) 0.965 *** (0.048) 1.05Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.230 Pseudo	  R2 0.072N 3690 3690
Robust	  Std.	  Err.
OLS	  Regression Tobit	  RegressionQuantity	  of	  VED	   Quantity	  of	  VED
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Table 3.8 
Fixed or Random: Hausman test 
 
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
DSCORE voluntary environmental disclosure score; SOE dummy variable for state ownership, coded as 1 where the 
ultimate ownership is the state and 0 otherwise; BLOCK percentage of ordinary shares held by substantial shareholders 
(with 5 per cent or more shareholding); MOWN percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO, senior managers, and 
directors; LEGAL percentage of ordinary shares held by legal persons; FOWN dummy variable for foreign share 
ownership, coded as 1 for if the firm had issued B shares or/and H shares and 0 otherwise; IND proportion of 
independent non-executive directors to the number of directors on the board; SUPVR the amount of members in 
supervisory board; FSIZE natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB; DEBT leverage ratio: total liabilities 
divided by total assets; ROE profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; AGE age of the firm (since it set up); 
INDUSTRY dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for if the firm operates in an 
environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise 
 
For profitability (ROE), Singhvi and Desai (1971) found that profitability was 
significantly positive in affecting the corporate financial disclosure level in the annual 
report. It denotes that firms with high returns like to disclose their financial advantages 
with the aim of satisfying shareholders and attracting new investors. In contrast, firm 
with a lower level of profit like to reveal more environmental information to appease 
stakeholders. This is consistent with the result in this paper: a negative connection 
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.INTERCEPT 5.710 *** (1.708) -­‐5.372 *** (0.715) -­‐4.399 *** (0.748)lagSOE -­‐0.072 (0.091) 0.142 ** (0.057) 0.138 ** (0.057)lagBLOCK 0.191 (0.381) 0.227 (0.193) 0.175 (0.192)lagMOWN 1.205 *** (0.286) 0.606 ** (0.300) 0.694 ** (0.298)lagLEGAL -­‐0.432 *** (0.154) -­‐0.273 ** (0.126) -­‐0.234 * (0.126)lagFOWN 0.130 (0.368) -­‐0.201 (0.136) -­‐0.203 (0.134)lagIND -­‐0.581 (0.735) -­‐0.535 (0.497) -­‐0.454 (0.492)lagSUPVR -­‐0.031 (0.057) 0.107 *** (0.027) 0.092 *** (0.027)lagLogFSIZE -­‐0.067 (0.088) 0.352 *** (0.036) 0.348 *** (0.036)lagDEBT -­‐0.623 ** (0.315) -­‐0.152 (0.171) -­‐0.033 (0.173)lagROE 0.736 ** (0.314) -­‐0.023 (0.261) 0.068 (0.265)lagAGE -­‐0.077 *** (0.027) -­‐0.037 *** (0.008) -­‐0.037 *** (0.008)lagINDUSTRY 0.943 *** (0.073) -­‐0.602 * (0.344)Industry	  effect No No
Hausman	   101.07 *** 102.34 ***
Number	  of	  observations 3690 3690 3690
Quantity	  of	  VED	  
Fixed Random Random
Robust	  Std.	  Err. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Robust	  Std.	  Err.
Yes***
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between ROE and quantity of environmental disclosure. The empirical result of leverage 
in table 3.7 is supported by previous studies (e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 
2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Mohamad et al., 2010), which did not find any 
significant effect of leverage on voluntary disclosure / corporate social disclosure. In 
previous research, there are mixed results on the relationship between the age of the firm 
and the level of disclosure. The regression result shows a negative association between 
them in this research, which accords with the study of Rettab et al. (2009). It indicates 
that new companies promote themselves in the market and attract the attention of 
stakeholders by using environmental disclosure. 
This research also employs panel data from 2009 to 2011 by a fixed and random effect 
model (with and without industry effects) to conduct a hausman test. Wang et al. (2012) 
explained that purpose of the Hausman test is to find whether the intercept item should 
be conducted using the fixed or random effect model. The figures in parentheses are 
standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. The significant values (101.07 with p = 
0.000, 102.34 with p = 0.000) for the Hausmen test indicate that the random effect 
estimators are inconsistent and the fixed effect estimates are more appropriate. In Table 
3.8, the results of the fixed effect model show that the relationship of environmental 
disclosure with MOWN and LEGAL is significant, no impact is found on environmental 
disclosure from IND, and AGE affects the quantity of environmental information 
negatively, which is almost consistent with the outcomes from OLS regression and 
TOBIT regression. Contrasted with pooled data, however, there are many differing 
results. It displays that SOE, BLOCK, FOWN, SUPVR and FSIZE are not significantly 
associated with quantity of environmental disclosure. The great discrepancy in the 
outcomes between the pooled data and the panel data is probably caused by a 3-year 
observation period being too short to do the Hausman test by panel data. 
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In this research, the empirical results in Table 3.7 confirm Hypothesis 1(a) and 
Hypothesis 2(b) in both regressions. State ownership and size of the supervisory board 
significantly and positively relate to quantitative environmental disclosure. For OLS 
regression, it shows that voluntary environmental disclosure increases with state 
ownership (𝛽1= 0.138, p = 0.009), and larger size of the supervisory board (𝛽6 = 0.109, p 
= 0.000). Results for state ownership negate the previous prejudice that the ‘dominating 
state-owned share monopolizes under internal control’ (Xu and Wang, 1997) is one of 
main factors leading to asymmetric information. On the contrary, ultimate state 
ownership in the company could increase voluntary disclosure, at least for environmental 
disclosure. It accords with the study of Zeng et al. (2012); they examined what factors 
drive voluntary disclosure of environmental information (EID) using evidence from 
Chinese listed companies and found that state-owned firms have been more engaged in 
EID. The result relating to the size of the supervisory board endorses this paper’s 
differing view from that of many other scholars (e.g., Dahya et al., 2003; Mallin, 2006; 
Wei and Geng, 2008; Tricker, 2009) who deemed that the supervisory board in Chinese 
companies was an ineffective ornament. The result indicates that the role of the 
supervisory board in Chinese listed companies is effective in improving quantitative 
environmental disclosure. It could be explained by two aspects. Firstly, the supervisory 
board holds sufficient power to monitor that managers meet the demands of stakeholders 
(such as, disclosure requirement) since its rights and powers have been much improved 
under the amendment of Corporation Law in 2005. Secondly, the members of the 
supervisory board are elected by the shareholders’ meeting. They serve for a maximum 
term of three years, but can be re-appointed. The shareholders urge these members to 
work actively on behalf of their interest. The stakeholder-agency theory mentions that 
firms tend to disclose more information in order to reduce information asymmetry (Hill 
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and Jones, 1992, Huang and Kung, 2010). That is why the amount of members in the 
supervisory board and the extent of VED are positively related. 
Hypothesis 1(b) in this research is also supported. A positive regression coefficient 
which is significant at the 0.05 level is found with blockholder ownership, which means 
that it positively influenced environmental disclosure. It accords with the mention of 
Laidroo (2009), that in contrast with small investors with pooled control rights, 
blockholder ownership has enough power and incentives to collect information and to 
monitor management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Although, under the agency theory, 
managers may enhance voluntary disclosure to mitigate the agency problem and reduce 
agency costs incurred by the diffusive shareholders, Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) and 
Barako et al. (2006) indicated an alternative perspective in that dispersed ownership may 
not be a formidable enough force to affect a firm’s reporting practice because of the low 
ownership stake of individual shareholders and a lack of monitoring capacity. This 
perspective is consistent with the situation in China facing the new agency problem of 
the principal and the principal (P&P). In China, the main blockholder ownership is the 
state (the principal) that holds the absolute right to dominate managers’ actions. The	  
attitude and interest of diffusive shareholders (the principal) are almost overlooked. The 
state would like more environmental disclosure, due to increasing public concerns about 
environmental issues, for their political aim and social goals, which results in more 
environmental information being revealed by managers. Consequently, there is a positive 
effect of blockholder ownership in Chinese listed companies on the extent of voluntary 
environmental disclosure in the annual report. Similarly, Xiao and Yuan (2007) and Li 
and Qi (2008) also found a significant and positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure based on 559 Chinese listed firms in 2002 and 
100 non-financial Chinese listed companies for the period 2003-2005, respectively.  
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The findings, which refer to state ownership, blockholder ownership and size of the 
supervisory board, meet the explanation of the relationship between corporate 
governance and environmental disclosure practice by two variants of stakeholder theory 
that the accountability perspective and the organisational and managerial perspective. In 
detail, state ownership, which is the main form of blockholder ownership, holds 
dominant right that it is important for the managers’ positions. Therefore, satisfied the 
demands of state ownership are the most significant duties to managers. In regard to the 
supervisory board, it requires the firm to supply disclosures explaining firm’s actions to 
stakeholders and society, which is accordant with the stakeholder-agency theory and the 
accountability perspective. The fit between the theories and the findings identifies the 
uniqueness of Chinese case that a high level of ownership concentration with a high level 
of (political) right and the large power distance between state ownership and managers 
result managers in the hand of blockholder ownership in China, which drives the 
development of environmental disclosure practice. 
From table 3.7 we note that a significantly positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and quantitative environmental disclosure, which is contrary to Hypothesis 
1(c). However, this result is in accordance with the principal finding of the study of Li 
and Qi (2008), which also collected samples from the Chinese stock market. It describes 
that firm with high managerial ownership would disclose a high level of voluntary 
information. Where a firm has high managerial ownership, it means the benefit of 
shareholders concerns managers to a greater extent. They would therefore be more likely 
to choose voluntary disclosure to contribute to the firm. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) 
deemed that if the balance of additional managerial ownership leans toward shareholders, 
voluntary disclosure might be expected to increase; but where additional managerial 
ownership tips the balance toward management, voluntary information would be reduced. 
	  	  
	  
138	  
Up to a certain range, the incentives and interests of managerial ownership and 
shareholders are aligned. They will be therefore expected to disclose more information. 
As the finding of Minow and Bingham (1995, p.497), ‘nothing makes directors think like 
shareholders more than being shareholders’. However, when managerial ownership gets 
so large and is over a certain level, it can become entrenched and immune from 
monitoring, and then there is a lack of incentives for management to disclose information 
voluntarily (Morck et al., 1988; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). In the Chinese market, as 
mentioned above, there is a very low level of managerial ownership in the majority of 
Chinese listed companies. It means Chinese managerial ownership is in the range 
whereby a higher proportion of managerial ownership relates with a greater quantity of 
voluntary disclosure.  
Legal person ownership is found to negatively impact on the extent of environmental 
disclosure in this study. It is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1(d). One of the possible 
explanations is that the costs created from the operation of environmental disclosure 
practices which are against profit maximisation. Tan and Wang (2004) mentioned that 
legal-person shareholders are more economically orientated and geared towards profit 
compared with state shareholders. In other words, legal person ownership would like to 
pay more attention to cost reduction and profit enhancement rather than social objectives. 
The result also reflects the possibility that current profit holds more attraction for legal 
person ownership than long-term benefit that can be brought by green development (such 
as environmental disclosure practice). Furthermore, with a high level of legal person 
ownership in the firm it is easier to hide bad environmental information in order to 
protect a company’s image and profit, which also explains why legal person ownership 
plays a negative role on the extent of environmental disclosure. 
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Hypothesis 1(e) outlines that foreign share ownership is expected to influence more 
disclosure in order to reduce the high level of information asymmetry that can arise due 
to different cultures, languages, and attitudes of risk (Broberg et al., 2010). However, the 
failure to find a significantly positive association between foreign share ownership and 
quantity of voluntary disclosure does not support the H1(d). In the study of Singhvi 
(1968), it found a significant effect of foreign ownership on companies’ corporate 
reporting practices. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reported a similar result in that the level of 
voluntary disclosure is impacted by foreign ownership positively. However, in the study 
of Bokpin and Isshaq (2009), they argued against Mangena and Tauringana (2007)’s 
finding of a positive relationship between disclosure and foreign ownership. They 
employed panel regression to investigate the reciprocity effect between corporate 
disclosure and foreign ownership based on evidence from the Ghana Stock Exchange 
during the period from 2002 and 2007, and then demonstrated a significantly negative 
relationship between them at the level of 1 per cent. They suggest that foreign ownership 
in a firm means less corporate disclosure. The result in this research is consistent with the 
finding of Bokpin and Isshaq (2009), although it contradicts the target of foreign 
investors being that they are far from their home country and invest in overseas 
companies for more transparency. In the Chinese market, a firm which has issued B 
shares and/or H shares is required to issue its annual report in both Chinese and English. 
‘Relatively high levels of collectivism and power distance, and strong uncertainty 
avoidance’ are typical characteristics in this socialist country (Ronnie Lo, 2009, p.7).	  
Based on this property of their society, Chinese companies would tend to reduce 
transparency and disclose less voluntary information about their environmental practices 
in the annual reports to foreign stakeholders in order to refrain from risk-taking because 
of uncertainties. In addition, under the organisation and managerial perspective evolved 
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from stakeholder theory, the firm would not need to meet the information demands of 
foreign ownership who are not powerful and that is not important for managers’ position. 
It may explain why foreign shares ownership and quantity of VED are negatively related 
in Chinese listed companies. 
With regard to the association between independent directors and voluntary disclosure, 
there is a great deal of literature proving that more independent directors in a directors’ 
board means more voluntary disclosure information in the annual report (e.g., Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Forker, 1992; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; McConomy and Bujaki, 2002; Cheng 
and Courtenay, 2006; Donnelly and Mulcany, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Rouf, 
2011). However, Erer and Dalgic (2011) and Esa and Mohd Ghazali (2012) argued that 
the relationship between independent directors and voluntary disclosure is unclear. For 
instance, some studies found a negative relationship between them (e.g. Eng and Mak, 
2003; Barako et al., 2006); and some studies did not find any significant association (e.g. 
Ho and Wong, 2001; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Mohamad et al., 2010; 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012). The “managerial hegemony theory” 
pointed out a passive board reliance on top executives for information, may explain why 
no positive relationship was found (Kosnik, 1987); or possibly the reason, as in the view 
of Lin et al. (2003), that directors are too busy to perform their obligations effectively. In 
China, the development of independent directors in the listed companies is relatively new 
and immature. Zhang (1999) and Wei (2002) argued that many independent directors in 
China are too busy to care about the companies or they lack the knowledge and 
experience needed to exert any substantial influence on the board. In detail, the 
independent non-executive directors in Chinese listed companies are composed of social 
celebrities and important government officials. Few of them hold the qualification of 
accountant or solicitor. The rest of the members are mainly technical experts and scholars 
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who are busy engaging in academic research, which means they have less energy and 
time to perform their obligations effectively in companies. The situation has resulted in 
useless independent directors in Chinese corporate governance. These reasons explain 
why Hypothesis 2(a) is not confirmed.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this empirical chapter, it developed the stakeholder-agency framework and explored 
the monitoring role played by ownership structure and board composition on the quantity 
of voluntary environmental disclosure using evidence from Chinese listed companies 
between 2009 and 2011. The empirical results indicated that quantity of environmental 
disclosure positively relates to state ownership, blockholder ownership, managerial 
ownership, and size of the supervisory board; negatively relates to legal person 
ownership and foreign share ownership; and does not significantly relate with the 
proportion of independent directors on the board of directors (IND). These results proved 
that differences in corporate governance relating to ownership structure and board 
composition influence the quantity of environmental disclosure. They could improve 
upon the relevant preceding views regarding Chinese corporate governance, especially 
state ownership structure and the supervisory board. State ownership and a larger size of 
the supervisory board where it has an effective monitoring role in the company urge the 
firm to be engaged in voluntary environmental disclosure. However, there was no 
empirical evidence to support that IND effectively acts on environmental disclosure. It 
reflects an immature mechanism and some problems which remain in Chinese corporate 
governance at the moment. The code of corporate governance and corporate law should 
strengthen requirements for independent non-executive directors. In addition, enhanced 
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power and initiatives of IND are also vital in order to set up an effective corporate 
governance system and a mature market. Furthermore, this study denoted that there is 
much less environmental information disclosed in the annual report of most Chinese 
listed companies and that the market is in a budding stage of development in disclosure 
practice. Environmental disclosures in Chinese listed companies are mainly revealed by 
scattered modality in the reports of Directors Boards, reports of Supervisory Boards, and 
notes attached to the financial reports. In contrast with environmental disclosure in US 
and UK, environmental information disclosed in China is more scattered, unsystematic, 
and incomplete. This study suggests that, with regard to the stakeholder-agency 
framework, firms should reveal more environmental information, in the future for a win-
win situation between themselves and their stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND QUALITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CHINESE FIRMS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporations are the basic cells of the activities of a social economy and also the source 
of industrial pollution. They play a very important role in both economic development 
and environmental issues. For the process of production, corporations require resources 
from nature and give in return a number of contaminants (see appendix). According to 
British Petroleum (BP)’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, the proportion of 
energy consumption in China is 20.3% of the global total, which is more than the U.S.’s 
19%. However, energy efficiency in China is just 33% of the global average. The amount 
of energy consumed in China increased from 1,504.06 million tons in 2001 to 3,480.02 
million tons in 2011. The consumption of coal is 68.4% of the total energy consumed in 
China. With Chinese companies using so many resources from nature, a large number of 
contaminants are given back to the environment which thus threaten people’s health. 
This phenomenon is attracting increasing attention from both the government and the 
public. 
Environmental disclosure, which is regarded as a dialogue between the firm and the 
public, is now being given a lot of attention from governors, corporations, and 
communities. Research on environmental disclosure is very limited in the context of 
China as information disclosure practice has just started in Chinese listed companies 
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relative to that of western countries. Chen (2013) outlined some characteristics of current 
environmental disclosure in the Chinese market: the proportion of firms that reveal 
environmental information is not high and these firms are mainly limited to listed 
environmentally sensitive companies; there is an increasing trend of firms choosing to 
disclose environmental information and the content of disclosure produced varies from 
simple to complex; however, environmental disclosure revealed by companies tends to 
still be incomplete, incomparable and with a lack of continuity; and it is not yet the norm 
to disclose information. 
In China, the quality of environmental disclosure is always despised or overlooked by the 
public because of dissatisfaction with the information environment in the Chinese market. 
Recently, its development has attracted some scholars to start investigating this area. Ane 
(2012) researched qualitative environmental information disclosure based on Chinese 
data from 2007 to 2009 and found that there is an increasing trend in the improvement of 
qualitative environmental disclosure, although the disclosure content is still limited and 
incomplete. In May 2008, the regulation of environmental information disclosure took 
effect. It would be expected to have impacted on the environmental practice and 
activities of listed companies in the following years, which indicates the importance of 
observing the development of qualitative environmental disclosure and its determinants 
from 2009. Moreover, previous studies on environmental disclosure based on Chinese 
data have tended to focus on a small sample size, short research period, and quantity 
information and have not looked at the investigation of the monitoring roles and effects 
of various ownership structures and board composition upon environmental information 
quality. Therefore, in this empirical chapter, the effect of five typical ownership 
structures (state ownership, blockholder ownership, managerial ownership, legal-person 
ownership and foreign ownership) and two characters of the board composition (the 
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proportion of independent directors and the board of supervisors) on the quality of 
environmental disclosure is examined in the context of China based on 3,690 firm-year 
observations during a consecutive period between 2009 and 2011. 
The remainder of this chapter is designed as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of 
environmental disclosure quality and reviews the literature background of the 
relationship between corporate governance and quality of environmental disclosure. In 
the next sections, theory and research hypotheses are discussed and developed. Section 
4.4 explains the sample, the variables and the methodology employed in this chapter. 
After that, the empirical results are provided and analysed. The last section sums up the 
findings and contribution. 
 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1 Quality of Environmental disclosure: An Overview 
According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Concepts Statement No. 2, the 
quality of environmental disclosure means whether environmental information is useful 
to the stakeholders. With regard to the concept of usefulness of environmental 
information to users, Ane (2012) put forward four points, which are Relevance, Reliance, 
Comparability, and Clarity. In detail, Ane (2012) indicated that ‘environmental 
information is deemed relevant if it assists stakeholders in understanding’ (p.421) a 
firm’s environmental protection policies, for example, or their strategies, aims, and 
achievement, resource consumption, environmental investment and cost of pollution 
control, or their environmental facilities; reliance expresses that environmental 
information needs to focus on accuracy, reliability and verifiability; comparability refers 
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to ‘accounting for similar events in the same way, as well as accounting differently for 
dissimilar events’ (p.421), that information could display a competitive advantage or/and 
disadvantage; clarity means the information is understandable, organised and 
comprehensible.  
 
4.2.2 The relationship between Corporate Governance and Quality of 
Environmental disclosure 
Cormier et al. (2005) investigated environmental disclosure quality in large German 
companies and identified its determinant factors through a multi-tiered conceptual 
framework that depends on economic incentives, public pressures and institutional theory. 
German evidence was chosen because of a distinct legal and regulatory context and acute 
environmental concerns in this continental European country. In the measurement of 
environmental disclosure, there were thirty-nine items that were divided into six 
categories: environmental expenditure and risks, laws and regulations, pollution 
abatement, sustainable development, land remediation and contamination, and 
environmental management. The score system for information quality was based on a 
score of one to three: a score of “3” for an item described explicitly with either monetary 
or quantitative terms, “2” if an item is described specifically, and “1” when an item is 
mentioned in general. Using a sample of 55 large German firms during the period 1992-
1998, they found that risk and ownership are potentially significant determinants of 
environmental disclosure strategy. In addition, environmental disclosure quality was 
found to be associated with fixed assets, age and firm size. Media pressure determined 
the level of environmental information by large German companies, but there was no link 
between environmental disclosure and financial condition. Finally, findings suggested 
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that disclosure by German firms is converging over time, which is consistent with 
institutional theory predictions. Results strongly claimed that environmental disclosure is 
multi-dimensional and is influenced by complementary forces. 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006) examined the patterns in voluntary environmental 
disclosures (VED) made by looking at a sample of large UK firms. The study 
distinguished between the decisions to make a VED and decisions concerning the quality 
of such disclosures, and examined how each type of decision is determined by firm and 
industry characteristics. Based on the FTSE All-Share Index, the data of this paper 
comprised that of 447 UK firms for the year 2000. VED data were acquired from the 
“PIRC Environmental Reporting 2000” survey. There were six indicators identified to 
measure the quality of corporate VED, which included 1) disclosure of an environmental 
policy; 2) existence of board-level responsibility for environmental matters; 3) the 
description of environmental initiatives; 4) reporting on environmental improvements; 5) 
setting of environmental targets; and 6) the presence of an environmental audit or 
assessment. Two dependent variables were constructed in the study. The first, 
DISCLOSE, was measured by a dummy variable, which is coded as 1 if a company 
participates in any of the six components of environmental disclosure identified in the 
PIRC’s report, and 0 otherwise. The second, QUALITY, is the number of the aspects 
identified by the PIRC apparent in the disclosure of each company. Based on Probit and 
Ordered Probit regression, they found that larger, less indebted firms with a dispersed 
ownership structure are significantly more likely to reveal VED, and that the VED 
quality is positively linked with firm size and corporate environmental impact. 
Concerning the characteristics of corporate governance and VED quality, they found a 
significantly negative impact from the size of the largest shareholding in a firm on 
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quality disclosure; and no evidence to prove a relationship between the number of non-
executive directors and environmental disclosure quality.  
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) empirically tested the factors relating to the quality of 
corporate environmental disclosure (CED). It is worth mentioning that company 
ownership, board composition and other corporate characteristics were employed as 
independent variables to measure the influence on CED. Ownership concentration, as 
measured by the total share of any ownership which owns in excess of 3% shareholdings; 
and non-executive directors, as measured by the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors to the number of directors on the board. The other independent variables 
included environmental fines, as measured by the fines that companies received for 
environmental transgressions; size, as measured by the natural logarithm of the value of 
total assets; media exposure, as measured by the incidence of news media coverage of 
the company; profitability, as measured by return on total assets; and firm leverage, as 
measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Logistic regression was utilised in this 
study based on a sample of 447 large UK firms in 2000. The result indicated that an 
increase in non-executive directors means a decrease in the number of firms that describe 
environmental initiatives. In addition, they found there is a significantly negative 
connection between ownership concentration and firms with a group-wide environmental 
policy disclosed. Furthermore, it found that a firm's size and its business activities are 
determinants of CED; large firms operating in an industry with environmental sensitivity 
have high CED; but media exposure does not relate to CED. 
Jamali et al. (2008) explored the synergies and interrelationships between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. They drew on in-depth interviews with 
top managers in eight	  Lebanese companies and adopted a qualitative interpretive research 
	  	  
	  
149	  
methodology, and found that most managers deemed corporate governance as ‘a 
necessary pillar for sustainable corporate social responsibility’ (p.443). Additionally it 
indicated that the link between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
is an undoubtedly salient two-way association and the interrelationship between them is 
increasing. One of the important theoretical propositions in the paper mentioned is that 
‘good CG is increasingly considered in developing country contexts as a necessary 
foundational pillar for a genuine and sustainable CSR orientation’ (p.455). 
Based on Ullmann’s conceptual framework (1985), Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) tested a 
stakeholder theory approach to analysing corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure 
and investigated the monitoring role played by shareholder power and dispersed 
ownership structure on CSR information in the annual report. In the context of Spain, the 
presence of financial institutions in the ownership structure, the presence of a physical 
person who represents a dominant shareholder in the ownership structure, and the 
percentage of independent board members in the board were employed as independent 
variables to find their relationships with CSR disclosure. In addition, in the OLS 
regression, Government power (size, transport and communications sector, industry 
sector, energy sector, and construction sector), Creditors power (debt-to-equity ratio), 
Strategic posture (ISO14001 environmental certification, OHSAS 18001 certification), 
and Economic performance (the return on asset) were adopted as control variables. This 
article measured the level of CSR information contents, their quality and objectivity 
founded on the rules for preparation of the GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) model. It 
also took into account whether the fulfillment of these rules had been certified by the 
GRI organisation, and whether the data reflected had been verified or audited by entities 
independent of the firm (p.104). They used five dummy dependent variables, which 
include information disclosure; informal preparation, preparation for GRI; GRI 
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Certification; and verification information, to identify the content and quality of CSR 
information. The empirical findings indicated that the effect of certain stakeholders 
(government and creditors) upon the strategic posture on the decision to reveal CSR 
information is confirmed. However, there was no evidence found to prove a relationship 
between economic performance and CSR disclosure. 
Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) tested the effect of corporate governance on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) in the context of a developed economy based on time series 
and cross-sectional regression analysis. They drew out a sample of 518 firms from the 
S&P 500 and the KLD Domini 400 Universe between 2001 and 2005. In this article, the 
archival ratings of CSR obtained from the firm Kinder, Lyndenberg, and Domini (KLD) 
Inc. were adopted as the dependent variable. Ownership concentration, managerial 
ownership and the proportion of independent directors were selected as independent 
variables to measure the association between corporate governance and CSR. A number 
of control variables were employed as followed: industry, firm size, research and 
development intensity, product differentiation, market growth, demand instability, 
industry structure concentration, capital intensity, dividend pay-outs, CEO age and CEO 
tenure. The results indicated that strong corporate governance symmetrically impacts on 
CSR and that it decreases both positive and negative CSR. Additionally it found that the 
link between effective governance and positive/negative depends on positive attainment 
discrepancy and the level of organisation slack. At the end, the authors emphasised that 
‘good governance reduces negative CSR are unique in that respect and focused on an 
ignored aspect of governance – preventing bad things from happening’ (p.148).  
Cormier et al. (2011) investigated the informational contribution of social and 
environmental disclosures (SEDs) for investors. The main purpose of the article is to 
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explore whether the quality of SEDs have a substitutionary or a complementary influence 
in lessening information asymmetry between managers and stock market participants. 
Based on Wiseman (1982), a coding instrument was adopted to measure environmental 
disclosure. The quality information rate was set a score from one to three. A score of 
three is given for an item described in monetary or quantitative terms, two is given when 
an item is described specifically, and one is given for an item discussed in general. In this 
paper, environmental disclosure items were divided into two broad dimensions: 1) there 
is disclosure about environmental debts, risks and litigations, which were captured to 
make up components of the content grid as follows: expenditure and risk, compliance 
with laws and regulations, pollution abatement, and land remediation and contamination; 
2) there is disclosure about environmental management practices that relates to 
sustainable development and environmental management grid captions. Using a sample 
of 137 large Canadian firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange for the year 2005, the 
effect of environmental performance, free float (ownership dispersion), analyst following, 
leverage, profitability, firm size, board independence, board size, board size squared, 
audit committee size, and environmental news exposure on SEDs were tested by 
regression analysis. The findings indicated that environmental performance, 
environmental news exposure, and firm size are key determinant factors of SEDs. 
Moreover, analyst following, leverage, and board size were proved to significantly relate 
with environmental disclosure. However, there was no evidence found to confirm any 
association between environmental disclosure quality and each of free float, profitability, 
board independence, and audit committee size.  
Dincer (2011) researched whether or not the shareholders really care about corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) reporting. On the basis of Ullmann’s framework, they 
investigated whether the CSR reporting of firms can be explained by stakeholder power, 
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strategy and economic performance based on multiple regression models. A sample of 92 
companies listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange was employed. In measurement of CSR 
reporting, three principal components of analysis (after Varimax rotation) were defined 
to weigh economic, social and environmental disclosure: informal reports, formal reports, 
GRI style reports, and GRI and verified reports. The study found a significant effect from 
certain stakeholders (government and creditors) on the publication of a CSR report. 
However, a relationship between economic performance and CSR practice was not found 
in this study. In addition, financial institutions, investors, and dispersed shareholders do 
not seem to be interested in a firm’s sustainable strategies or activities.  
AbuRaya (2012) explored the relationship between corporate governance and 
environmental disclosure (CED), using UK evidence. The objective of the study was to 
empirically test the influence of corporate governance on both the quantity and the 
quality of environmental disclosure using a sample of 229 UK companies during the 
period 2004-2007. At the same time, they controlled for some corporate characteristics, 
as well as conducting an in-depth exploration of quality identification and assessment 
issues. Environmental disclosure quantity was measured by an un-weighted index. A 
score of 1 was awarded when there was the presence or disclosure of an item in the 
annual report and 0 otherwise. Disclosure quantity indices were computed as the 
percentage of the sum of quantity score awarded to maximum applicable quantity scores. 
Environmental disclosure quality was measured according to four parameters, which 
named type, direction, outlook and verifiability based on the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). The rating for CED Type was based on a score of 1 to 3. Three 
points were given if an item was monetary quantitative, 2 if an item was non-monetary 
quantitative, and 1 if an item was declarative. The score rate for CED Direction was set 
at 2 levels of marks: a score of 2 if an item was good or bad and 1 if an item was neutral. 
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For CED Outlook, a score of 2 was given to forward-looking information and 1 to 
historical information. Similarly, for CED Verifiability, 2 if an item was verifiable and 1 
if an item was non-verifiable. CED Quality Index for each firm was computed as the sum 
score of CED Type, CED Direction, CED Outlook and CED Verifiability, and then 
divided by 4. In this research, board independence, role duality, board size, board 
meetings, education, community influence, cross-directorships, CER committee presence, 
audit committee independence, remuneration committee independence, nomination 
committee independence, ownership structure and institution ownership were employed 
as independent variables to research the role of corporate governance on each CER 
quantity and quality. In addition, they controlled for size, industry, profitability, leverage, 
liquidity, systematic risk and cross-listing in OLS regression analysis. The empirical 
findings indicated that role duality, board size, board meetings, education, corporate 
environmental responsibility (CER) committee presence, audit committee independence, 
ownership concentration, size, and industry play a significant role on VED quantity while 
board meetings, cross-directorships, CER committee presence, audit committee 
independence, remuneration committee independence, size, industry, liquidity, and 
systematic risk effectively influence VED quality. 
Dam and Scholtens (2012) examined whether ownership type matters for CSR looking at 
a sample of 690 multinational firms from 16 European countries covering 35 industries 
in 2005. They collected data of corporate social performance based on the Ethical 
Investment Research Service (EIRIS) dataset instead of the well-known KLD dataset, 
because the latter one merely covers US companies while EIRIS involves 2,600 firms 
globally. Specifically, there were 20 different indicators from the dataset and then three 
factor scores were summarised by the authors based on various aspects of CSR, which 
were labelled “stakeholders”, “ethics”, and “environment”. Five score levels were 
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defined as follows: score of “-1” for inadequate; “0” for weak; “1” for moderate; “2” for 
good; and “3” for exceptional. They controlled for size, ROA, industry type, country of 
origin, leverage, and liquidity ratio. The result indicated that the holdings by employees, 
individuals, and firms play a negative role on CSR performance. However, this research 
failed to prove a significant relationship between CSR and ownership by the state, banks 
and institutional investors. The authors suggested that companies should take the 
information of their ownership structure into consideration when they establish and 
implement CSR strategy. 
Iatridis (2013) focused on common-law Malaysia to explore the environmental disclosure 
quality evidence with relation to corporate governance, environmental performance and 
value relevance. With regard to the relationship between quality of environmental 
disclosure and corporate governance, the author used 3,703 firm-year observations 
between 2005 and 2011. The research period was chosen because of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) applied by Malay listed companies from January 
2012. Environmental disclosure quality was measured by the scoring index based on the 
GRI Guidelines. The score for all firms ranged between 0% and 100%. The findings 
indicated that the quality of environmental disclosures is significantly impacted by the 
percentage of independent directors in the board and the audit committee, big 4 auditors, 
audit committee, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, change in management, 
cross-listed company, ROA, and firm size. 
Top executive’s turnover is a normal in corporate operations (Shen and Cho, 2005) and 
the average frequency of top executives’ turnover rates reached 25.5 percent in Chinese 
listed companies (Chang and Wong, 2009). Meng et al. (2013) asserted that top 
executives play a vital role in taking on corporate environmental responsibility, and thus 
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they explored whether top executives’ turnover impacts on environmental disclosure 
practice, using a sample of 782 Chinese manufacturing firms listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during a 3-year period from 2006 to 2008. In the Chinese 
context, the chairman was chosen to represent the top executive in this article. The main 
reason was that the chairman is an executive position with supreme power and it ranks 
higher than the CEO (p.342). The authors applied content analysis to score the quality of 
environmental information in the annual report awarding a score of between 0 and 3 for 
each company. A score of 3 means a company with monetary and quantitative 
environmental information; 2 means specific description is given; 1 means some general 
environmental information is mentioned, and 0 is awarded for no information. They 
found that a negative link exists between environmental disclosure and involuntary, 
negative turnover, such as having a chairman outgoing because of dismissal, poor health, 
death, or forced resignation. Furthermore, the findings indicated that corporate 
environmental responsibility, measured by environmental information disclosure, is not 
related to normal turnover and more positive types of chairman’s succession, such as, a 
chairman outgoing because of retirement or contract expiration or internal/external 
promotion. 
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Table 4.1 
Empirical Studies on the relationship between corporate governance and quality of 
environmental disclosure 
Author(s) & 
Date 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Sample Size & 
Type, and 
Time of 
Observation 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Measure 
Analysis & General 
Results 
            
Cormier et 
al. (2005) 
Environmental 
disclosure 
quality 
Information costs 
(captured by risk, 
reliance on capital 
markets, trading 
volume, 
concentrated 
ownership and 
foreign ownership), 
financial condition 
(captured by market 
return and 
leverage), media 
pressure, fixed 
assets age, firm size 
and SEC registrant 
55 large 
German 
companies 
which are 
taken from the 
DAX 30 
/DAX 70 
during the 
1992-1998 
The scoring 
index  
OLS Regression 
RESULT: Risk, 
ownership, fixed 
assets age, firm size 
determined 
environmental 
disclosure quality. 
Moreover, results 
suggested that 
German firms' 
disclosure is 
converging over time. 
Overall, results 
strongly suggested 
that environmental 
disclosure is multi-
dimensional and is 
driven by 
complementary 
forces. 
Brammer 
and Pavelin 
(2006) 
The quality of 
voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure 
(VED) 
Industry type, 
environmental 
performance, firm 
size, organisational 
visibility, company 
ownership, 
profitability, 
leverage and board 
composition 
447 UK 
companies 
from large 
firms in 2000 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Probit and Ordered 
Probit  regression 
analyses                     
RESULT: they found 
a significantly 
negative impact from 
the size of the largest 
shareholding in a firm 
on VED quality; and 
no evidence to prove 
a relationship 
between the number 
of non-executive 
directors and VED 
quality.  
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Brammer 
and Pavelin 
(2008) 
The quality of 
corporate 
environmental 
disclosure 
(CED) 
Environmental 
fines, size, media 
exposure, 
ownership 
concentration, 
profitability, firm 
leverage, non-
executive directors 
447 UK 
companies 
from large 
firms in 2000 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Logistic regression 
analyses                     
RESULT: firm's size 
and its business 
activities are 
determinants of CED; 
large firms with 
environmental 
sensitivity have high 
CED; media exposure 
does not relate to 
CED. 
Prado-
Lorenzo et 
al. (2009) 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
(CSR) 
disclosure 
Financial 
institutions, 
dominant 
shareholder, 
independent board 
members, size, 
different sectors,  
DEBT, ISO14001, 
OHSAS18001, and 
ROA 
99 non-
financial 
Spanish 
companies 
quoted on the 
Spanish 
continuous 
market 
The scoring 
index founded 
on the rules for 
preparation of 
the GRI model 
OLS Regression 
RESULT: the results 
obtained confirm that 
the influence exerted 
by certain 
stakeholders 
(government and 
creditors), together 
with the strategic 
posture of the firm, 
have an important 
effect on the 
publication of a CSR 
report. Economic 
performance has a 
null effect on this 
process.  
Arora and 
Dharwadkar 
(2011) 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
(CSR) 
Ownership 
concentration, 
managerial 
ownership, 
independent 
director, 
governance index, 
industry, firm size, 
research and 
development 
intensity, product 
differentiation, 
market growth, 
demand instability, 
and industry 
structure 
concentration, 
capital intensity, 
dividend payouts, 
CEO age and CEO 
tenure 
518 firms 
from the S&P 
500 and the 
KLD Domini 
400 Universe 
during the 
period 2001-
2005 
Archival 
ratings of 
CSR based on 
the KLD 
dataset 
Regression analysis 
RESULT: strong 
corporate governance 
has a symmetric 
influence on CSR and 
that it decreases both 
positive and negative 
CSR. 
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Cormier et 
al. (2011) 
Social and 
environmental 
disclosures 
(SEDs) 
Environmental 
performance, free 
float (ownership 
dispersion), analyst 
following, leverage, 
profitability, firm 
size, board 
independence, 
board size, board 
size squared, audit 
committee size, 
and, environmental 
news exposure 
137 Canadian 
firms included 
in Toronto 
Stock 
Exchange 
S&P/TSX 
Index for year 
2005 
The scoring 
index 
Regression analyses 
RESULT: 
environmental 
performance, 
environmental news 
exposure, and firm 
size are key 
determinant factors of 
SEDs. Analyst 
following, leverage, 
and board size were 
proved to 
significantly relate 
with environmental 
disclosure. There was 
no evidence found to 
confirm the 
association between 
the environmental 
disclosures quality 
and each of free float, 
profitability, board 
independence, and 
audit committee size.  
Dincer 
(2011) 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
(CSR) 
reporting 
Stakeholder power, 
strategy and 
economic 
performance 
92 companies 
listed in the 
Istanbul Stock 
Exchange 
The scoring 
index 
Multiple regression 
analyses               
RESULT: an 
important effect from 
certain stakeholders 
(government and 
creditors) on the 
publication of CSR 
reporting. The 
relationship between 
economic 
performance and CSR 
practice was not 
found in this study. In 
addition, financial 
institutions, investors, 
and dispersed 
shareholders seem to 
not be interested in 
firms’ sustainable 
strategies or 
activities.  
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AbuRaya 
(2012) 
Quantity and 
the quality of 
environmental 
disclosure 
Board 
independence, role 
duality, board size, 
board meetings, 
education, 
community 
influence, cross-
directorships, CER 
committee 
presence, audit 
committee 
independence, 
remuneration 
committee 
independence, 
nomination 
committee 
independence, 
ownership structure 
and institution 
ownership, Size, 
industry, 
profitability, 
leverage, liquidity, 
systematic risk and 
cross-listing 
229 UK 
companies 
during a 
period 2004-
2007 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
OLS Regression 
analyses               
RESULT: role 
duality, board size, 
board meetings, 
education, corporate 
environmental 
responsibility (CER) 
committee presence, 
audit committee 
independence, 
ownership 
concentration, size, 
and industry play a 
significant role on 
VED quantity while 
board meeting, cross-
directorships, CER 
committee presence, 
audit committee 
independence, 
remuneration 
committee 
independence, size, 
industry, liquidity, 
and systematic risk 
effectively influence 
VED quality. 
Dam and 
Scholtens 
(2012) 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
(CSR)  
Ownership type: 
state, banks, 
institutional 
investors, 
employees, 
individuals and 
firms, Size, ROA, 
industry type, 
country of origin, 
leverage, and 
liquidity ratio 
690 
multinational 
firms from 16 
European 
countries and 
35 industries 
in 2005 
The scoring 
index based on 
three factor 
scores 
“stakeholders”
, “ethics”, and 
“environment” 
from EIRIS 
dataset 
Regression analyses 
RESULT: ownership 
by the state, banks 
and institutional 
investors is not found 
to have a significant 
relationship with 
CSR. The holdings by 
employees, 
individuals, and firms 
are proved to relate 
with poor CSR 
performance. 
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Iatridis 
(2013) 
Environmental 
disclosure 
quality 
Independent 
directors, % of 
independent 
directors in the 
audit committee, 
big 4 auditor, audit 
committee, 
managerial 
ownership, 
institutional 
investors, change in 
the management, 
cross-listed 
company, ROA, 
leverage ratio, and 
size 
529 Malaysian 
listed 
companies 
during the 
period 2005 - 
2011 
The scoring 
index based on 
the GRI 
Guidelines 
The OLS 
regression analysis    
RESULT: quality of 
environmental 
disclosures are 
significantly impacted 
by percentage of 
independent directors 
in board and the audit 
committee, big 4 
auditors, audit 
committee, 
managerial 
ownership, 
institutional 
ownership, change in 
management, cross-
listed company, 
ROA, and firm size. 
Meng et al. 
(2013) 
Environmental 
information 
disclosure 
(EID) 
Top executive’s 
turnover, firms’ 
size, concentration 
of ownership, 
economic 
performance, 
leverage/financial 
risk and duality 
782 Chinese 
manufactur-
ing firms 
listed on 
Shanghai and 
Shenzhen 
Stock 
Exchanges 
during a 3-
year period 
from 2006 to 
2008 
Content 
analysis 
approach 
Regression analyses 
RESULT: a negative 
link between EID and 
involuntary and 
negative turnover 
(e.g., chairman 
outgoing because of 
dismissal, health and 
death, and forced 
resignation); EID is 
not related with the 
normal turnover and 
the types of 
chairman’s 
succession (e.g., 
retirement or contract 
expiration or 
internal/external 
promotion). 
 
4.3 THEORY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
This empirical chapter mainly examines the role of the two mechanisms (ownership 
structure and board structure) of corporate governance on the quality of voluntary 
environmental disclosure using Chinese evidence. Stakeholder theory (e.g., Roberts, 
1992; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Spitzeck, 2009; Huang 
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and Kung, 2010; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; Cong and Freedman, 2011; Bayoud et al., 2012; 
Dam and Scholtens, 2012) and agency theory (e.g., Hackston and Milne, 1996; Halme 
and Huse, 1997; Rouf, 2011) are frequently chosen as the framework in this research area. 
Based on the discussion, analysis and estimation of the theoretical framework in Chapter 
3.3, stakeholder-agency theory, which was introduced by Hill and Jones (1992) and 
applied by Salama et al. (2012), is also adopted in this empirical chapter to develop 
research hypotheses of the impact on qualitative environmental disclosure from five 
forms of ownership structure (state ownership, blockholder ownership, managerial 
ownership, legal person ownership, and foreign share ownership) and board structure 
(the proportion of independent directors (non-executive directors) on the board of 
directors and the amount of members in the supervisory board) respectively. This theory 
integrates the stakeholder concept into agency theory to define explicit and implicit 
contract(s) between a corporation’s stakeholders, who can affect and/or is affected by the 
firm’s success and failure. Different forms of ownerships are involved in stakeholders. 
Managers are recognised as unique stakeholders who control the business’s running as 
the agents and are contracted to relate to all other stakeholders. Corporate management 
needs to evaluate the importance of meeting stakeholder demands and balancing the 
conflicts of different stakeholders’ demands, because the stakeholders effectively impact 
on the sustainable development of the firm. 
 
4.3.1 Ownership structure 
In China, most listed companies were restructured from SOEs. The government, 
currently, have still ultimate ownership in more than 50 per cent of firms. It shows that 
state ownership significantly affects most listed companies in China. The government is 
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can easily access information from other sources. Therefore, the state ownership does not 
need to acquire information from the annual report. However, according to the OECD 
(2010), governments explicitly aim at improving the quality of the environmental and 
social conditions in most countries (Dam and Scholtens, 2012). Khongmalai et al., (2010) 
indicated that the main target of state-owned enterprises is to fulfil the social objectives 
of the state. It therefore needs a high level of environmental disclosure due to increasing 
public concern about social and environmental issues. State ownership could desire 
higher quality environmental disclosure in order to build the firm’s reputation with the 
aim of satisfying various stakeholders and attracting more domestic and foreign investors 
to further develop the Chinese economy. It is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 3(a) State ownership and quality of voluntary environmental disclosure are 
positively related. 
Blockholder ownership, the substantial shareholders who hold 5 per cent or more 
ordinary shares, is one of the main forms in China’s ownership structure. Although many 
studies (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Adrem, 1999; Eng and Mak, 2003; Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2008) deemed that dispersed shareholders would incur a greater agency 
problem due to the conflict interests between agents and many principals, Laidroo (2009) 
pointed out that dispersed ownerships hold less power and therefore have more difficulty 
in obtaining the attention of managers and quality information. As in the finding of 
Broberg et al., (2010), there is no evidence to support a positive relationship between 
general voluntary disclosure and dispersed ownership based on 431 annual reports from 
companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange during a 4-year period from 2002. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that substantial shareholders are expected to possess 
both incentives and greater power to monitor management because of their wealth being 
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tied to the financial performance of the firm. Brown et al. (2011) believed that large 
blockholders have enough ability to drive managers to take actions which align with their 
intentions. Under pressure from blockholder ownership, managers may provide higher 
levels of disclosure in annual reports to free themselves from additional monitoring 
activities and reduce agency costs entailed in these activities. On the basis of the 
monitoring role and the abilities of blockholder ownership, a positive relationship 
between this kind of ownership structure and qualitative environmental disclosure would 
be expected. It is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 3(b) Blockholder ownership and quality of voluntary environmental 
disclosure are positively related. 
Managerial ownership in this empirical chapter is measured as the proportion of ordinary 
shares held by the CEO, senior managers, executive directors, and supervisors. Agency 
problems arise as a result of the separation between shareholders (the principals) and 
managers (the agents) (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The latter may reveal information to 
shareholders in order to reduce the agency problem and cost. When managers take the 
role of ownership, the conflict between principals and agents would be mitigated. As 
argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976), additional monitoring is required by outside 
shareholders as managerial ownership reduces. On the other hand, Adrem (1999) 
indicated that opportunistic management behaviour is more likely to occur in companies 
with a low share of management ownership, which would intensify the conflict between 
principals and agents. Consequently, such companies are expected to increase disclosure 
with quality information compared to companies with a high level of managerial 
ownership. Consistent with Eng and Mak (2003), ‘it is expected that voluntary disclosure 
increase with [a] decrease in managerial ownership’ (p.330). It is hypothesised that: 
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Hypothesis 3(c) Managerial ownership and quality of voluntary environmental 
disclosure are negatively related. 
Legal person ownership, which comprises domestic legal entities and institutions, 
including stock companies, private companies, state-owned enterprises and non-bank 
financial institutions (i.e., investment funds and security companies) (Xu and Wang, 
1997; 1999), holds around one-third of total market capitalisation in China (Ma et al., 
2010). Legal person shares are not tradable on the stock exchanges, but are allowed to be 
transferred between institutions with the approval of government (Xiao and Yuan, 2007; 
Chalmers et al., 2010). Although most legal person shares are similar to state shares 
which are directly or indirectly controlled by different levels of government (provincial, 
municipal, or county), a legal person ownership’s primary interest may be more 
monetary than political which is inconsistent with state ownership (Wei et al., 2005). 
Therefore, legal person shareholders may have more incentives to monitor management 
as they are likely to be engaged in profit maximisation. Environmental disclosure could 
help a company to achieve a better reputation and increase investment, which can assist a 
firm’s economic development. Management may choose to increase the quality of 
environmental information to satisfy the legal person ownership in order to reduce both 
monitoring and agency cost. It is hypothesised that:  
Hypothesis 3(d) Legal-person ownership and quality of voluntary environmental 
disclosure are positively related. 
Foreign share ownership means a higher level of information asymmetry due to different 
cultures, languages, and attitudes of risk (Broberg et al., 2010). More information with 
high level of quality in the annual report is expected which would mitigate potential 
conflicts and misunderstandings between foreign shareholders and managers. Moreover, 
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Khan et al. (2013) mentioned that foreign investors would desire more information 
including environmental disclosure to assist them when making decisions due to their 
different values and knowledge. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) found that a positive 
significant association is found between foreign ownership and corporate social 
responsibility disclosure based on the context of Malaysia. And they argued that foreign 
owners need disclosure in order to monitor the actions of management. It is hypothesised 
that: 
Hypothesis 3(e) Foreign shares ownership and quality of voluntary environmental 
disclosure are positively related. 
 
4.3.2 Board composition  
The board composition and the size of the board would affect its ability and function 
(Brown et al., 2011). In this empirical chapter, the relationship between quality of 
environmental disclosure and the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
(INDs) to the number of directors on the board is examined to explore the role of INDs in 
disclosure practice. According to the Cadbury Report (1992), IND should be more 
inclined to encourage the firms to increase disclosure for shareholders, because they are 
less aligned with management (Eng and Mak 2003). A greater presence of outside 
directors should lead to ‘heightened salience of stakeholder claims and augmented 
resources to address stakeholder claims’ (Zhang et al., 2013, p.384). On the other hand, 
disclosure (including environmental information) is symbolic actions (Mahadeo et al., 
2011), which is seen to be part of the ‘organisation-society’ interaction (Gray et al., 1995, 
p.56). IND has incentives to disclose more information with a higher quality for the 
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purpose of establishing the reputation of its monitoring ability (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
As noted by Brickley and Zimmerman (2010), outside directors favour social and 
political objectives. According to the study of De Villier et al. (2009), companies with 
strong environmental practices have more outside directors. Many previous studies show 
a higher proportion of INDs on the board were associated with a higher level of 
disclosure in a firm (e.g., Forker, 1992; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). 
It is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 4(a) The proportion of independent directors to the number of directors on 
the board and quality of voluntary environmental disclosure are positively related. 
In 1993, China’s company law was enacted, which made requests about the supervisory 
board. This law pointed out that companies have to hold a supervisory board, with at 
least three members, who are independent of the board of directors and whose duty it is 
to oversee the board of directors (Firth et al., 2007). Many scholars (e.g., Dahya et al., 
2003; Mallin, 2006; Wei and Geng, 2008; Tricker, 2009) deemed that the supervisory 
board in Chinese companies is an ineffective ornament. As Mallin (2006) noted, that the 
supervisory board in Chinese companies does not have right to appoint and dismiss 
executive board directors. However, Ding et al. (2010) mentioned that the powers of the 
supervisory board are improved significantly since the amendment of Corporation Law 
in 2005. Supervisory boards now have the power to propose the dismissal of directors 
and top management, and sue managers who commit frauds. They can also raise 
questions and make suggestions in the board meeting, and curb executive compensation. 
The expanded mandate of the supervisory board improves the quality of accounting 
information (Firth et al., 2007). In the same way, the quality of environmental disclosure 
also could be expected to improve, based on the stakeholder-agency theory, that firms 
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tend to disclose more information in order to reduce information asymmetry (Hill and 
Jones, 1992, Huang and Kung, 2010) and obtain stakeholders’ trust. Compared with 
quantitative environmental information, qualitative disclosure is more effective in 
increasing reputation (Hasseldine et al., 2005) and satisfying various stakeholders. 
Consequently, the supervisory board, which should play a pivotal role in setting policies 
and monitoring procedures of information disclosure in listed companies (CSRC), is 
expected to improve board effectiveness in qualitative disclosure practice. It is 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 4(b) The number of members in the supervisory board and quality of 
voluntary environmental disclosure are positively related. 
 
4.3.3 Control variable 
Firm size (FSIZE), measured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB 
in this chapter, is one of the common elements employed in previous research on 
determining factors of disclosure. Mahadeo et al. (2011) asserted that larger firms would 
view legitimacy as such a significant resource for them ‘to manage in their dealings with 
multiple stakeholders’ that they ‘are expected to be involved in a more systematic way in 
the communication of their social responsibilities’ (p.549). Consistently, Ku Ismail and 
Ibrahim (2008) deemed that large firms with more stakeholders mean more visibility to 
the public compared with small firms. There are many empirical studies which have 
proved a significant and positive link between firm size and environmental disclosure in 
both developed countries (e.g., Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; da Silva Monteiro and 
Aibar-Guzmán, 2010; Salama et al., 2012) and developing countries (e.g., Ku Ismail and 
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Ibrahim, 2008; Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Mahadeo et al., 2011; Zeng et al., 2012; 
Iatridis, 2013；Khan et al., 2013; Meng et al., 2013). In this chapter, therefore, a positive 
influence of firm size on the level of environmental disclosure in Chinese listed company 
is expected. 
Leverage (DEBT) is total liabilities divided by total assets. Haniffa and Cooke (2005), 
Reverte (2009) and Mahadeo et al. (2011) mentioned that firms with a high level of 
financial risk need to disclose more quality information (including environmental 
disclosure) to avoid or to lessen a negative reaction or worry on the part of lenders. It 
assumes a positive link between leverage and quality of environmental disclosure. 
For profitability (ROE), return on shareholders’ equity, a low performing firm may use 
good quality environmental disclosure to divert the eyes of stakeholders away from its 
financial difficulties. It may intend for this qualitative environmental information to 
convince its shareholders and potential investors that its current environmental practice 
and/or activities may create an economic benefit for them in the future (Reverte, 2009). 
Hence, a negative relationship between profitability and quality of environmental 
disclosure is assumed. 
Age of firm (AGE) is also employed as a control variable in this chapter. Compared with 
mature firms with long-standing reputation and brand awareness to help obtain 
investment, a new firm may reveal more qualitative environmental information in order 
to attract the attention of financial stakeholders. The quality of environmental 
information not only improves the image of the firm, but it also increases the confidence 
of investors that the firm would develop in a right and proper way and therefore has the 
potential to produce economic benefit in the future. Consequently, a significant negative 
association is expected between age of firm and qualitative environmental disclosure. 
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Environmentally sensitive industries (INDUSTRY) is measured by a dummy variable, 
coded as 1 for a firm belonging to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise. 
INDUSTRY is an important control variable for exploring the determinant factors of 
environmental information in the annual report. As mentioned by Patter (1991), the 
nature of the industry is a significant factor on social responsibility disclosure (including 
environmental information). A firm belonging to an environmentally sensitive industry 
has more attention focused on it by the public with regard to environmental issues and 
protection. In contrast with other industries, firms operating in environmentally sensitive 
industries have greater environmental impacts on society (Ku Ismail and Ibrahim, 2008), 
and hence they need to take more social responsibility to reveal a greater quality of 
environmental information to mitigate the concern of stakeholders and refine its image. 
Concordant with many studies (e.g., García-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003; Hossian et al., 
2006; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Rao et al., 2012), a positive role of INDUSTRY is 
assumed to relate with quality of environmental disclosure in this chapter. 
 
4.4 DATA AND METHODOLGY 
4.4.1 Sample 
In this empirical chapter, there are 3,690 valid firm-year observations used, which are 
listed on both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges between 2009 and 2011. It 
excludes the firms in the financial sector (such as, bank and other financial firms) with a 
separate disclosure requirement and ST/*ST/S*ST firms with finance problems in the 
chapter. The valid sample covers 12 industry sectors. In this research, the CCER database 
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and the CSMAR database are utilised for financial data collection and annual reports 
from both the SZSE and the SHSE are adopted for environmental disclosure collection. 
 
4.4.2 Quality of environmental disclosure index 
In content analysis, commonly measured variables are divided into quantitative and 
qualitative items (Kuo et al., 2012). In contrast with quantity units measuring quantitative 
items, text descriptions are	  appropriate for the measurement of qualitative items (Aerts 
and Cormier, 2009). In the same way, environmental disclosure, the dependent variable 
in this research, is grouped into quantity and quality of environmental information. In the 
first empirical chapter, the impact on quantitative environmental disclosure from the role 
played by corporate governance was investigated using Chinese evidence. In this 
empirical chapter, the unique Chinese corporate governance system (highly concentrated 
ownership and two-tier structure) motivates the exploration of the association between 
corporate governance and qualitative environmental disclosure practice in the annual 
report.  
In the evaluation of the qualitative environmental disclosure, at the beginning, 10 items 
of information are defined in the index to score disclosure in the annual reports, based 
upon the “Sustainability Reporting Guidelines” of the Global reporting initiative, the 
“Environmental Information Disclosure Measurement” issued by the Chinese State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and the actual status of China. 
However, the item of “source significantly affected by withdrawal of source (e.g., water. 
Coal, …) is found barely mentioned in the annual reports of Chinese listed companies in 
the process of data collection. Therefore, this item is deleted and finally 9 items are 
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confirmed in this research. A scale of zero to three is assigned to each item: a zero if 
there is no environmental information, a score of one for items mentioned in general, a 
score of two for well described items, and a score of three for the item with narrative, 
quantitative and comparable data and monetary information (Wiseman, 1982; Meng et 
al., 2013). Based on these 9 items, it could identify company rating for the different 
categories of qualitative environmental information.  In addition, in contrast to a scale of 
zero to three assigned to each company, the score system in this paper extends to the 
measurement of qualitative environmental disclosure in detail. For example, any high 
level of disclosure scores given in this study do not only highlight the companies with 
narrative, quantitative, comparable data and monetary information, but also reflects that 
these firms make great efforts on manifold environmental disclosure practice. There are 
nine items selected for this research as following: 
1 The firm’s environmental protection policies, strategies, aims, and achievement   
2 Consumption of materials, water, energy and other resources       
3 Percentage of materials/resources that is recycled   
4 Materials, energy and resources saved due to conservation efforts, efficiency and 
technology improvement. 
5 Type, quantity, concentration and destination of emissions, effluent and waste   
6 The firm’s environmental investment and cost of pollution control     
7 Construction and operation of environmental facilities         
8 Fines/awards paid / received by firm             
9 Other voluntary environmental information disclosed by the firm  
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4.4.3 Environmental disclosure index example 
A scale of zero to three is assigned to each item: a zero is given for no environmental 
information and a score of three for the item with narrative, quantitative and comparable 
data and monetary information (Wiseman, 1982). For example, the 2009 annual report 
from China Vanke Co., Ltd. stated that ‘…, but also reduce secondary pollution resulting 
from separate furbishing by customers, thereby lowering the consumption of construction 
waste and in line with the energy saving and environmental friendly concept’. For this 
type of environmental disclosure, it is coded as “1”. In contrast, the 2009 annual report 
from China Merchants Property Development Co., Ltd. stated that ‘Based on its 
understanding of and responsibility for the sustainable development of both the industry 
and cities, the Company has kept exploring the new modes for living and real estate 
development and held six sessions of “Sino-foreign Green Property Forum” during 2004-
2009, with the themes respectively being “Concept and Practice of Sustainable 
Development”, “Green Community and Harmonious Homeland”, “Green Buildings and 
Circular Economy”, “Green Practice and Urban Regeneration”, “Green Development and 
Urban Upgrading” and “Green New Cities and Low-carbon Development”. Through the 
said six sessions, the forum has become a grand occasion of gathering for both experts 
and scholars in the field of ecological development and green construction as well as 
media both at home and abroad, and grown into one of the public-welfare international 
conferences with the highest academic level in China’s green development field. While 
advocating the concept of green properties, the company also vigorously applies green 
technologies to develop “green buildings”.’ This is coded as “2”. The 2009 annual report 
from China Fangda Group Co., Ltd. stated that ‘In the report term, the products of the 
Company including energy saving curtain wall, metro screen door, and LED products 
have saved 7,949 KWH of power, equals to 32,000 ton of coal consuming, reduced CO2 
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by 83.84 thousand ton, reduced SO2 by 272 ton, and NO2 by 236.8 ton. This saved 
nearly 100 million of power expenses a year’. This type of detailed information is coded 
as “3”. 
4.4.4 Reliability test of Content Analysis  
‘The importance of reliability tests on the assurance it provides that data are obtained 
independent of the measuring event, instrument or person. Reliable data, by definition, 
are data that remain constant throughout variations in the measuring process’ (Kaplan 
and Goldsen, 1965, pp.83-84). Stability and reproducibility, two common types of 
reliability, are summarised by Krippendorff (2004). Stability is the weaker form of 
reliability, which can be determined when data is constant over time. It uses the same 
coder to measure the same content more than once using the same predefined criteria 
(Salama, 2003). Reproducibility refers to two or more analysts measuring the same 
project at the same time, but at different locations under varying circumstances. These 
analysts have to work independently of each other. Observed conflicts between these 
analysts’ performances result from intraobserver inconsistencies and interobserver 
disagreements in the understandings and scoring criteria for the same units of analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004). Reproducibility is recognised as having intercoder reliability, 
which is a much stronger measure of reliability than stability. In this research, both 
stability and reproducibility are employed to measure the reliability of environmental 
disclosure. The research employed four coders to measure the environmental disclosure 
of 15 randomly chosen annual reports. These four coders include the author, one 
chartered public accountant, and two PhD students in accounting and finance. Each coder 
read the fifteen annual reports and coded the environmental disclosure independently. 
Two weeks later, they did these same measurements again to ensure reliability over time. 
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When more than 2 coders are employed, Coefficient alpha (Waltz et al., 1991, p.166) is 
an effective adjustment to the coefficient of agreement which is concerned with 
environmental disclosure content analysis. The result of inter-rater reliability was 77.1 
per cent in this study, which accords with the view of Wimmer and Dominick (1991). 
They pointed out that 75 per cent or better is normally accepted within the content 
analysis literature. After resolving the disagreements on type and the total of 
environmental disclosure among the coders, the final inter-rater reliability was 92.8 per 
cent. 
 
4.4.5 Environmental disclosure index analysis 
Table 4.2 shows the proportion of each item measured by scores. For example, the total 
scores of item 1 in 2009 are 1,540, the percentage of item 1 in 2009 is 1,540/7,741=19.89%; 
the total scores of item 1 for three years are 5,058, the percentage of item 1 is 
5,058/22,833=22.15%. From the table, it shows that item 1 (22.15%), item 6 (19.79%), and 
item 9 (28.27%) are close to or over one fifth overall. In other words, companies like to 
share their environmental protection policies, strategies, aims, and achievement; and also 
their environmental investment and cost of pollution control to stakeholders via the annual 
report. On the contrary, item 3 (2.16%), item 4 (4.39%), and item 7 (2.22%) are less than 
five per cent, which indicates that these three items are chosen by very few companies to 
be communicated with their stakeholders. In contrast with the most popular environmental 
disclosure, these kinds of information, which involve the percentage of materials/resources 
that are recycled; materials, energy and resources saved due to conservation, efficiency and 
technology improvement; and construction and operation of environmental facilities, are 
more practical. They would reflect what the firms did	  concretely for implementing good 
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environmental practice, and how they did it. The fact that these kinds of environmental 
information are insufficiently disclosed means that most companies are falling short in the 
practice of recycling and saving materials and/or resources, and in using environmental 
facilities utilisation. 
Table 4.2 
Per cent of each item 
 
 
Table 4.3 
Detail of each item 
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Table 4.3 shows how many observations reveal environmental disclosure for each item at 
each of the three different levels. For example, 1,007 firm-year observations are scored 1 
for item 1; 1,175 firm-year observations are scored 2 for item 1. The table shows 
company preference in environmental disclosure practice. With regard to item 1, it shows 
that more companies tend to reveal descriptive information about their firm’s 
environmental protection policies, strategies, aims, and achievement. For item 6, 
companies prefer to disclose narrative, comparable data and monetary information to 
explain their environmental investment and cost of pollution control. 
 
4.4.6 Model specification  
Due to the scores of qualitative environmental disclosure being not less than zero, both 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and TOBIT formulation are employed in this empirical 
chapter, as for the regression of quantitative environmental disclosure. Moreover, 
ordered PROBIT regression is also engaged to examine the impact of ownership 
structure and board composition on quality of environmental disclosure in order to 
minimise loopholes in empirical testing. The following model is estimated: 
DISCQuality = 𝛽 0 + 𝛽 1SOE + 𝛽 2BLOCK + 𝛽 3MOWN + 𝛽4LEGAL + 𝛽5FOWN + 𝛽6IND +𝛽7SUPVR + 𝛽 8FSIZE + 𝛽 9DEBT + 𝛽 10ROE + 𝛽 11AGE 
+  𝛽12INDUSTRY+ ε 
Where DISCQuality, is the quality of voluntary environmental disclosure score; SOE, the 
dummy variable for state ownership, coded as 1 for where the ultimate ownership is the 
state and 0 otherwise; BLOCK, the percentage of ordinary shares held by substantial 
	  	  
	  
177	  
shareholders (with 5 per cent or more shareholding); MOWN, the percentage of ordinary 
shares held by the CEO, senior managers, and directors; LEGAL, the percentage of 
ordinary shares held by a legal person; FOWN, the dummy variable for foreign share 
ownership, coded as 1 for if the firm had issued B shares or/and H shares and 0 otherwise; 
IND, the proportion of independent non-executive directors to the number of directors on 
the board; SUPVR, the amount of members in the supervisory board; FSIZE, the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB; DEBT, the leverage ratio: total liabilities 
divided by total assets; ROE, profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; AGE, age of 
the firm (since it set up); INDUSTRY, the dummy variable for environmentally sensitive 
firms, coded as 1 for a firm belonging to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 
otherwise. 
 
4.5 RESULTS 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
Table 4.4 provides the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
based on 3,690 firm-year observations during the period 2009-2011 in this empirical 
chapter. The dependent variable, the quality of environmental disclosure 
(SQDISCQuality), is measured by the square root of DISCQuantity in order that the 
dependent variable might tend to a normal distribution as shown in Figure 4.1. The 
maximum score of SQDISCQuality is 5.2 and the average SQDISCQuality is 2.29 with 
the median value 2.24, which reflects the quality of environmental disclosure in the 
annual report tending to a comparatively low level in most Chinese listed companies. In 
addition, the minimum score of SQDISCQuality (0.00) shown in Figure 4.1 indicates that 
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there are some listed companies in China which have not revealed any environmental 
information at all in the annual report. In contrast with SQDISCQuantity, dependent 
variable distributions for SQDISCQuality are more symmetrical and balanced. Figure 4.2 
depicts the trend in qualitative environmental disclosure in each of the sample years, 
2009-2011 inclusive. There is a steady increase in SQDISCQuality over the research 
period, where the mean quality of environmental disclosure is 2.27 in 2009, 2.28 in 2010, 
and 2.30 in 2011. The increasing trend reflects an improvement of environmental 
information quality in the annual reports of Chinese listed companies on average in 
recent years. The possible explanations for the increase of qualitative environmental 
disclosure are modified relevant policies and regulations of disclosure practice (e.g., 
“Measures for the Disclosure of Environmental Information (for Trial Implementation)” 
and “Guidance for strengthening the supervision and management on the Environmental 
Protection of listed compan[ies]” issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of 
the People’s Republic of China in 2008; “Guidelines of environmental disclosure in	  listed 
companies” issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2008; “Announcement on 
fulfilling the annual reports of listed companies in 2009 and relevant work” issued by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC); and “Guidelines of environmental 
disclosure in	   listed companies (Draft)” issued by the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection of the People’s Republic of China in 2010) and the higher requirement of 
stakeholders because of their more extensive knowledge and higher achievements (e.g., 
higher education, convenient Internet access, and various other sources of information). 
However, It is worth mentioning that, in the annual reports of Chinese listed companies, 
the increase of qualitative environmental still lacks ‘bad news’ disclosed. 
Blockholder ownership shows a minimum score of 0.00% and maximum of 95% in the 
table. Its mean value (46%) and median value (47%) show that its distribution is quite 
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symmetrical at all levels of blockholder’s percentage. As can be seen from table 4.4, 
insider shares (non-tradable) held by the CEO, senior managers, and directors represents 
1% of the issued share capital on average. The mean value (9%) of foreign share 
ownership indicates that very less Chinese firms are issued B shares on one of these two 
Chinese flagship stock exchanges, which are set up in Shanghai and Shenzhen, or/and 
issued H shares in Hong Kong exchange. The average number of independent non-
executive directors is 36 per cent (median is 33 per cent) and the average supervisory 
board has 3.9 members (median is 3) reflecting that most listed companies in China are 
complying with the requirements of size and proportion in board composition based on 
the relevant rules and regulations, which are the Corporate Law (2006 version) and the 
“Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China”. It is just 29 years since 
the oldest company was set up, which means that all listed companies are still young in 
the Stock Exchanges. In terms of skewness and kurtosis, Mohamed et al. (2010) 
mentioned there is a symmetrical distribution when the values of skewness and kurtosis 
are between 1.0 and -1.0, and vice versa. As shown in the table 4.4, we found that at least 
one value of skewness and kurtosis for all of variables are over the range. It means that 
not all variables are fully symmetrical. However, the values of these variables in this 
study are nevertheless close to the range. In other words, their distributions are relatively 
symmetrical, which is expedient for developing the regression tests.  
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Table 4.4 
Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
 
Variables
Mean 
(Median)
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum 
(Maximum)
Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: Dependent
SQDISCQuality 2.29 0.98 0.00 -0.21 2.88
(2.24) (5.20)
Panel B: Independent 
lagSOE 0.59 0.49 0.00 -0.36 1.13
(1.00) (1.00)
lagBLOCK 0.46 0.17 0.00 0.05 2.55
(0.47) (0.95)
lagMOWN 0.01 0.06 0.00 5.96 42.86
(0.00) (0.69)
lagLEGAL 0.10 0.18 0.00 1.99 6.10
(0.00) (0.85)
lagFOWN 0.09 0.28 0.00 2.97 9.84
(0.00) (1.00)
lagIND 0.36 0.05 0.09 1.53 7.28
(0.33) (0.71)
lagSUPVR 3.90 1.26 1.00 1.31 5.17
(3.00) (12.00)
lagLogFSIZE 21.77 1.21 18.27 0.80 4.07
(21.63) (27.62)
lagDEBT 0.48 0.19 0.01 -0.21 2.35
(0.49) (0.96)
lagROE 0.09 0.09 -0.44 -0.39 6.51
(0.08) (0.44)
lagAGE 12.52 4.41 1.00 0.03 2.85
(12.00) (29.00)
lagINDUSTRY 0.66 0.47 0.00 -0.68 1.46
(1.00) (1.00)
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Figure 4.1 
Dependent variable distributions
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
Trend of Environmental Disclosure Quality 
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4.5.2 Multicollinearity 
In this empirical chapter, Pearson's Correlation is adopted to measure whether 
multicollinearity is a problem in the relationship between independent and control 
variables. Due to the same independent and control variables being employed in the 
regressions to test the relationships both with quantity and with quality of environmental 
disclosure, the correlation coefficient between these variables to each other in table 4.5 is 
the same as in table 3.6. The highest value of coefficient is -0.4396 between SOE and 
LEGAL, which is at an acceptable level of multicollinearity well below the harmful level 
(more or equal to ±0.8). In the same way, looking at VIF, which is another effective 
means of testing multicollinearity (Ho and Wong, 2001), scores also ranged from 1.02 
for IND to 1.59 for logFSIZE as shown in table 4.6, which is well below the harmful 
value of VIF (10). Thus, together these results indicate that multicollinearity is not an 
issue in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183
Table 4.5 
Correlation coefficients of key variables 
DSCORE voluntary environmental disclosure score; SOE dummy variable for state ownership, coded as 1 for where the ultimate ownership is the state and 0 otherwise; BLOCK percentage of ordinary 
shares held by substantial shareholders (with 5 per cent or more shareholding); MOWN percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO, senior managers, and directors; LEGAL percentage of ordinary 
shares held by a legal person; FOWN dummy variable for foreign share ownership, coded as 1 for where the firm had issued B shares or/and H shares and 0 otherwise; IND proportion of independent 
non-executive directors to the number of directors on the board; SUPVR the amount of members in supervisory board; FSIZE natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB; DEBT leverage ratio: 
total liabilities divided by total assets; ROE profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; AGE age of the firm (since it set up); INDUSTRY dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 
1 for a firm belonging to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise
ordinary shares held by substantial shareholders (with 5 per cent or more shareholding); MOWN percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO, senior managers, and directors; LEGAL
percentage of ordinary shares held by a legal person; FOWN dummy variable for foreign share ownership, coded as 1 for where the firm had issued B shares or/and H shares and 0 otherwise;
IND proportion of independent non-executive directors to the number of directors on the board; SUPVR the amount of members in supervisory board; FSIZE natural logarithm of the firm’s total
assets in RMB; DEBT leverage ratio: total liabilities divided by total assets; ROE profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; AGE age of the firm (since it set up); INDUSTRY dummy variable
for environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for a firm belonging to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise
SQDISCQuality lagSOE lagBLOCK lagMOWN lagLEGAL lagFOWN lagIND lagSUPVR lagLogFSIZE lagDEBT lagROE lagAGE lagINDUSTRY
SQDISCQuality 1
lagSOE 0.1398 1
lagBLOCK 0.1011 0.0369 1
lagMOWN -­‐0.0244 -­‐0.2470 0.0548 1
lagLEGAL -­‐0.0730 -­‐0.4396 0.2379 -­‐0.0319 1
lagFOWN 0.0352 0.1326 0.1335 -­‐0.0660 -­‐0.0753 1
lagIND -­‐0.0023 -­‐0.0282 0.0475 0.0449 -­‐0.0151 0.0278 1
lagSUPVR 0.1678 0.2680 0.0439 -­‐0.1151 -­‐0.1609 0.0666 -­‐0.0756 1
lagLogFSIZE 0.2896 0.2764 0.1780 -­‐0.1481 -­‐0.1134 0.2965 0.0665 0.2159 1
lagDEBT 0.1163 0.1473 -­‐0.0472 -­‐0.1073 -­‐0.0614 0.0469 -­‐0.0068 0.1177 0.4352 1
lagROE -­‐0.0087 -­‐0.0792 0.1494 0.0522 0.0575 -­‐0.0076 -­‐0.0219 0.0066 0.1685 0.0070 1
lagAGE -­‐0.0899 0.1305 -­‐0.3619 -­‐0.2270 -­‐0.0914 0.1463 -­‐0.0297 0.0714 0.1339 0.1777 -­‐0.0263 1
lagINDUSTRY 0.3638 -­‐0.0275 0.0325 0.0449 0.0242 -­‐0.0032 0.0074 0.0264 -­‐0.0392 -­‐0.0279 -­‐0.0334 -­‐0.1931 1
Note:	   N=3690	  observations
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4.5.3 Endogeneity test 
Due to endogeneity problems existing in empirical regressions would impact on their 
results significantly  (Core et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012), the regression of the 
relationship between quality of environmental disclosure and corporate governance need 
to do endogeneity test in order to insure the accuracy of the research findings in this 
empirical chapter. 
According with the suggestion of Dam and Scholtens (2012) and Nitm et al. (2012), the 
independent and control variables are lagged from the dependent variables in order to 
reduce potential problems with endogeneity. Then, single-equation instrumental-
variables regression with a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator is employed to do 
the Hausman test. In the process, independent variables are regarded as endogenous 
variables; control variables are treated as	  exogenous variables; and lagged endogenous 
variables are found as instrumental variables to run the single-equation instrumental-
variables regression. It assumes that H0: variables are exogenous. The result of the 
endogeneity test indicates that F value is equal to 1.38684 with p = 0.2063. H0 is 
accepted when p value is more than 0.05. Thus, endogeneity problems are not a concern 
in this research. 
 
4.5.4 Results of empirical testing 
The empirical results on the relationship between environmental disclosure quality and 
corporate governance are tested through both cross-sectional and time series data. Table 
4.6 presents the results of regressing the explanatory variables on the quality of 
environmental disclosure score based on OLS, TOBIT and Ordered PROBIT formulation 
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by cross-sectional data. This table indicates an adjusted R-squared value of 0.245 and an 
F value of 102.03 (p=0.000), which shows that 24.5% of the variation in the 
environmental disclosure quality level can be explained by variation in the whole set of 
independent and control variables. The F value of OLS regression is 102.03 with 
significance at p=0.000 which means that this regression model is statistically significant. 
There are two independent variables (FOWN and SUPVR) with a regression coefficient 
which is significant at the 0.01 level and two independent variables (SOE and BLOCK) 
with a regression coefficient which is significant at the 0.05 level in these three 
regressions. Moreover, the independent variable (LEGAL) is significant at the 0.1 level. 
Some well-known control variables (e.g., LogFSIZE, ROE, AGE, and INDUSTRY) from 
previous research are provided to influence the analysis of environmental disclosure 
quality in this study. Table 4.7 shows the outcomes of regressing panel data by fixed and 
random effect models (with and without industry effects). The figures in parentheses are 
standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. The significant values (54.96 with p=0.000 
and 52.41 with p=0.000) for the Hausmen test indicate that the fixed effect estimates are 
more appropriate than the random effect estimates in this empirical study. In the results 
of fixed effect model, it shows a positive significant coefficient (𝛽 = 0.633, p < 0.01) of 
the managerial ownership (MOWN) variable. It implies more managerial ownership 
means a higher level of environmental information in the annual report based on the time 
series data. There is no impact found on environmental disclosure from IND on the 
quality of environmental information, which is consistent with the outcomes from OLS, 
TOBIT, and Ordered PROBIT regressions. In contrast with pooled data, however, there 
are many different results. It displays that SOE, BLOCK, LEGAL, FOWN, SUPVR and 
FSIZE are not significantly associated with quality of environmental disclosure. The 
great discrepancy in the outcomes between pooled data and panel data is probably caused 
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by a 3-year observation period being too short to do the Hausman test by panel data. 
Therefore, the analysis and discussion of the regression results is mainly focused on the 
cross-sectional data in this empirical chapter to explore the monitoring role played by 
different corporate governance mechanisms on environmental disclosure quality. 
Table 4.6 
Regression results 
	  
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
DSCORE voluntary environmental disclosure score; SOE dummy variable for state ownership, coded as 1 for where 
the ultimate ownership is the state and 0 otherwise; BLOCK percentage of ordinary shares held by substantial 
shareholders (with 5 per cent or more shareholding); MOWN percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO, senior 
managers, and directors;	  LEGAL percentage of ordinary shares held by a legal person; FOWN dummy variable for 
foreign share ownership, coded as 1 for where the firm had issued B shares or/and H shares and 0 otherwise; IND 
proportion of independent non-executive directors to the number of directors on the board; SUPVR the amount of 
members in supervisory board; FSIZE natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB; DEBT leverage ratio: total 
liabilities divided by total assets; ROE profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; AGE age of the firm (since it set 
up); INDUSTRY dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for a firm belonging to an 
environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted	   Ordered	  Probit	  Regression
sign VIF
Variable Coeff. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Coeff. Coeff. Robust	  Std.	  Err.INTERCEPT -­‐3.616 *** (0.308) -­‐3.619 *** (0.308)lagSOE + 0.084 ** (0.035) 0.084 ** (0.035) 0.100 ** (0.041) 1.52lagBLOCK + 0.201 ** (0.100) 0.202 ** (0.100) 0.261 ** (0.118) 1.42lagMOWN -­‐ 0.132 (0.202) 0.132 (0.201) 0.141 (0.236) 1.16lagLEGAL + -­‐0.164 * (0.093) -­‐0.164 * (0.093) -­‐0.199 * (0.109) 1.42lagFOWN + -­‐0.223 *** (0.053) -­‐0.223 *** (0.053) -­‐0.269 *** (0.063) 1.16lagIND + -­‐0.393 (0.270) -­‐0.392 (0.270) -­‐0.476 (0.322) 1.02lagSUPVR + 0.065 *** (0.012) 0.065 *** (0.012) 0.080 *** (0.014) 1.12lagLogFSIZE 0.248 *** (0.015) 0.249 *** (0.015) 0.302 *** (0.019) 1.59lagDEBT -­‐0.051 (0.087) -­‐0.052 (0.087) -­‐0.069 (0.102) 1.29lagROE -­‐0.586 *** (0.174) -­‐0.587 *** (0.174) -­‐0.786 *** (0.208) 1.08lagAGE -­‐0.012 *** (0.004) -­‐0.011 *** (0.004) -­‐0.014 *** (0.004) 1.36
lagINDUSTRY 0.749 *** (0.031) 0.749 *** (0.031) 0.890 *** (0.039) 1.05Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.245 Pseudo	  R2 0.102 Pseudo	  R2 0.052N 3690 3690 3690
Quality	  of	  VEDRobust	  Std.	  Err.
OLS	  Regression Tobit	  RegressionQuantity	  of	  VED	   Quantity	  of	  VED
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Table 4.7 
Fixed or Random: Hausman test 
	  
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
DSCORE voluntary environmental disclosure score; SOE dummy variable for state ownership, coded as 1 for where 
the ultimate ownership is the state and 0 otherwise; BLOCK percentage of ordinary shares held by substantial 
shareholders (with 5 per cent or more shareholding); MOWN percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO, senior 
managers, and directors;	  LEGAL percentage of ordinary shares held by a legal person; FOWN dummy variable for 
foreign share ownership, coded as 1 for where the firm had issued B shares or/and H shares and 0 otherwise; IND 
proportion of independent non-executive directors to the number of directors on the board; SUPVR the amount of 
members in supervisory board; FSIZE natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB; DEBT leverage ratio: total 
liabilities divided by total assets; ROE profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; AGE age of the firm (since it set 
up); INDUSTRY dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for a firm belonging to an 
environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise 
 
In the study, Table 4.6 shows a positive significant coefficient (𝛽 = 0.084, p < 0.05) of 
the state ownership (SOE) variable in OLS regression. Moreover, positive significant 
coefficients (𝛽 = 0.084, p < 0.05; and 𝛽 = 0.100, p < 0.05) of SOE variables are also 
presented in both TOBIT and Ordered PROBIT regressions, respectively. They imply 
that the state having ultimate ownership results in a high level of environmental 
disclosure thus supporting Hypothesis 3(a). In China, where there is state ownership in 
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.INTERCEPT 3.921 *** (1.329) -­‐3.041 *** (0.421) -­‐2.591 *** (0.445)lagSOE -­‐0.001 (0.058) 0.079 ** (0.038) 0.080 ** (0.038)lagBLOCK 0.229 (0.262) 0.160 (0.127) 0.141 (0.126)lagMOWN 0.633 *** (0.210) 0.275 (0.183) 0.328 * (0.183)lagLEGAL -­‐0.188 (0.116) -­‐0.201 ** (0.090) -­‐0.187 ** (0.090)lagFOWN 0.027 (0.269) -­‐0.181 ** (0.077) -­‐0.186 ** (0.076)lagIND -­‐0.279 (0.469) -­‐0.350 (0.309) -­‐0.296 (0.306)lagSUPVR -­‐0.003 (0.036) 0.063 *** (0.016) 0.056 *** (0.016)lagLogFSIZE -­‐0.081 (0.067) 0.223 *** (0.021) 0.225 *** (0.021)lagDEBT -­‐0.369 * (0.223) -­‐0.134 (0.110) -­‐0.062 (0.113)lagROE 0.161 (0.204) -­‐0.197 (0.176) -­‐0.127 (0.178)lagAGE 0.024 (0.018) -­‐0.012 ** (0.005) -­‐0.013 ** (0.005)lagINDUTRY 0.747 *** (0.045) -­‐0.225 (0.200)Industry	  effect No No
Hausman	   54.96 *** 52.41 ***
Number	  of	  observations 3690 3690 3690
Yes***
Quality	  of	  VED	  
Fixed Random Random
Robust	  Std.	  Err. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Robust	  Std.	  Err.
	  	  
	  
188	  
listed companies, it holds supreme power, sufficient to determine the career of managers 
(such as, promotion, demotion, and even dismissal) and the targets of the corporation. 
Therefore, the main objective of managers operating these firms is to fulfill the aims of 
the state ownership in order to protect their own position and get promotion. The State, 
as the main ownership in a firm, aims to fulfil social objectives rather than merely 
maximising shareholders’ wealth. Especially in recent years, environmental issues have 
reached such a severity as to give a negative image of China. Hence, managers need to 
increase the quality of environmental information given in order to reduce concerns 
about environmental problems and to improve public impressions in order to satisfy the 
state. The evidence of this study confirms well that state ownership effectively drives 
managers to reveal a higher level of environmental disclosure quality in the annual 
reports to mitigate increasing of public concern about social and environmental issues, to 
build the firms’ reputation to satisfy various stakeholders, and to attract more domestic 
and foreign investors for the development of the Chinese economy.  
In the results of both OLS and TOBIT regressions, there is evidence found to support the 
effective impact of blockholder ownership (BLOCK) on the quality of environmental 
disclosure. It presents a significant positive relationship between blockholder ownership 
(with coefficients 𝛽 = 0.201, p < 0.05 in the OLS regression; and 𝛽 = 0.202, p < 0.05 in 
the TOBIT regression) and environmental disclosure quality. In addition, there is a 
positive significant coefficient (𝛽 = 0.261, p < 0.05) of BLOCK in Ordered PROBIT 
formulation, which implies that a higher proportion of blockholder ownership results in a 
higher level of environmental disclosure quality. Consequently, Hypothesis 3(b) is 
proved through analysing the evidence of Chinese listed companies. As mentioned above, 
managers prefer to utilise a high level of environmental disclosure in order to satisfy the 
demands of blockholder ownership and thus to relieve monitoring activities and reduce 
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agency costs entailed in these activities, because blockholder ownership is deemed to 
hold enough ability and power to drive managers to take actions aligning with its 
intentions (Brown et al., 2011). In China, as many blockholder ownerships are controlled 
by the state, social objectives are considered as well as financial in their decision-making.  
In the association between managerial ownership and voluntary information disclosure, 
there are mixed findings in previous research. In table 4.6, it displays that managerial 
ownership (MOWN) is not significantly associated with the level of qualitative 
environmental disclosure. In detail, there is a slightly positive influence of managerial 
ownership (with coefficients 𝛽 = 0.132, p > 0.1 in OLS regression; 𝛽 = 0.132, p > 0.1 in 
TOBIT regression; and 𝛽 = 0.141, p > 0.1 in Ordered PROBIT regression) on quality of 
environmental disclosure. In contrast with quantitative disclosure practice, the outcomes 
reflect that managerial ownership does not attach importance to the quality of 
environmental disclosure. In other words, managerial ownership deems that the amount 
of disclosure information alone would be adequate to contribute to the aim of the firm; 
they do not need to provide meaningful information in the annual report. However, a 
positive significant relationship between managerial ownership and environmental 
disclosure quality is found based on time series data. Combined with the results of cross-
sectional data, it suggests that although managerial ownership on the whole does not pay 
a lot of attention to environmental disclosure quality, the importance of qualitative 
environmental disclosure practice is gradually being realised by managerial ownership, 
year on year. 
Hypothesis 4(d) is unacceptable based on the findings in the research. In all three 
regressions, legal person ownership is found to negatively impact on environmental 
disclosure quality. The results reflect that legal person ownership prefers profit 
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maximisation and current interest rather than social and political objectives and long-
term benefit. In detail, many costs would be incurred in the process of environmental 
disclosure practice. It could hinder profit maximisation which is the main aim of legal 
person ownership. Although quality of environmental disclosure could contribute to the 
social and political objectives of the state and bring long-term benefit from sustainable 
development, current profit maximisation holds more attraction for legal person 
ownership which emerged as a part of economic reform plans to reduce government 
intervention in companies and encourage profit-seeking incentives and competition (Qian, 
1999; Delios and Wu, 2005). Furthermore, compared with limited good environmental 
information, legal person ownership would actually prefer to hide environmental 
information, especially poor information, in order to protect a firm’s image and profit. 
These interpretations explain why a high level of legal person ownership relates to a low 
level of environmental disclosure quality. 
The results present negative significant coefficients (𝛽 = -0.223, p < 0.01 in OLS 
regression; 𝛽 = -0.223, p < 0.01 in TOBIT regression; and 𝛽 = -0.269, p < 0.01 in 
Ordered PROBIT regression) of foreign share ownership (FOWN) variables in three 
regressions. It indicates that the firms issuing B shares and/or H shares resulted in having 
a low level of qualitative environmental disclosure, which is contrary to Hypothesis 3(e). 
One possible explanation for the failure to find a positive significant association between 
foreign share ownership and environmental disclosure quality is the characteristic 
properties of Chinese society (e.g., strong uncertainty avoidance). When firms in Chinese 
market, which have issued B shares and/or H shares, are required to supply their annual 
reports in both Chinese and English, they would tend to reduce transparency and reveal 
less voluntary information about the environment in the annual reports to foreign 
stakeholders in order to refrain from risk-taking because of uncertainties. In the study of 
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Bokpin and Isshaq (2009), a negative significant relationship between total disclosure 
score (TDS) and foreign ownership (FORESHRE) was found through analysing the 
evidence from the Ghana Stock Exchange during a six-year period 2002-2007. Aksu and 
Kosedag (2006) and Mangena and Tauringana (2007) employed two models to 
investigate the impact of foreign ownership (independent variable) on total disclosure 
score (dependent variable) and the influence of disclosure score (independent variable) 
on foreign ownership (dependent variable), respectively. They found negative significant 
coefficients (𝛽 = -0.001, p < 0.01) of FORESHRE and (𝛽 = -72.921, p < 0.01) of TDS in 
these two regression results and therefore suggest that a high level of foreign ownership 
in a firm results in less corporate disclosure. The results of their study on corporate 
governance, disclosure and foreign share ownership is consistent with the finding in this 
research about the effect of foreign share ownership on environmental disclosure quality.  
In this study, there is no evidence found to confirm Hypothesis 4(a) that a positive 
significant role is played by independent non-executive directors (IND) on environmental 
disclosure quality. Table 4.6 documents negative coefficients (𝛽 = -0.393, p > 0.1 in OLS 
regression; 𝛽 = -0.392, p > 0.1 in TOBIT regression; and 𝛽 = -0.476, p > 0.1 in Ordered 
PROBIT regression) of IND, which means a slightly negative association between IND 
and environmental disclosure. It reflects that in terms of VED, the role of independent 
non-executive directors in Chinese listed companies is ineffective. This result is 
consistent with the role of IND on quantity of environmental disclosure, which is 
explored in Chapter 3.  For similar reasons, independent non-executive directors in 
Chinese listed companies are	  regarded as a kind of symbolic mechanism in order to meet 
the requirement of the “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China” 
which states that the board should be made up of at least one-third independent directors. 
In fact, almost all independent non-executive directors in Chinese listed companies are 
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social celebrities and important government officials. They are too busy to perform their 
obligations effectively (Lin et al., 2003), and/or they lack the knowledge and experience 
needed to exert any substantial influence on the board (Zhang, 1999; Wei, 2002). In 
addition, most independent non-executive directors have their own jobs. Independent 
directorship is a temporary post or a subordinate occupation for these people, and so 
losing it would not threaten their livelihood. That is why independent non-executive 
directors do not focus their attention and energy on the development of environmental 
disclosure practice. There is another possible explanation that the findings are 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 4(a). As the above mentioned, managers are in the hand of 
the state ownership in Chinese listed companies. Therefore, managers directly follow the 
interests of state ownership or other powerful blockholder ownerships who are important 
for managers’ position (based on the organisation and managerial perspective evolved 
from stakeholder theory). To some extent, it makes independent non-executive directors 
mere figureheads who cannot impact the decisions of disclosure practices. Although 
there are many Guides and Codes issued in China to direct and rule independent directors’ 
activities, the results of this study implies that these rules and regulations are useless, and 
therefore need to be strengthened and improved if they are to regularise independent 
directors’ behaviour and increase their initiative. 
Hypothesis 4(b) is confirmed well in this study. There are positive significant 
coefficients (𝛽 = 0.065, p < 0.01 in the OLS regression; 𝛽 = 0.065, p < 0.01 in TOBIT 
regression; and 𝛽 = 0.080, p < 0.01 in Ordered PROBIT regression) of the supervisory 
board (SUPVR) variables in Table 4.6. It means that more members in the supervisory 
board results in a higher level of qualitative environmental disclosure. As mentioned 
above, the rights and powers of the supervisory board have been improved due to the 
amendment of Corporation Law in 2005. The expanded rights could assist the 
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supervisory board in encouraging managers to be engaged in quality disclosure practice. 
Based on the stakeholder-agency theory, the supervisory board, which should play a 
pivotal role in setting policies and monitoring procedures of information disclosure in 
listed companies (CSRC), is expected to improve board effectiveness in qualitative 
disclosure practice. This study proved that the supervisory board with its improved rights 
effectively drives managers to reveal a higher level of environmental disclosure quality 
in the annual report in China. Compared with independent non-executive directors, board 
members in the supervisory board with Chinese characteristics attach more importance to 
their job in the listed company and therefore assist with the development of qualitative 
environmental disclosure practice. 
Table 4.6 also confirms two well-known control variables from prior studies on 
determinants of disclosure practice. Firm size (FSIZE) and firms operating in 
environmentally sensitive industries (INDUSTRY) are found to play an important role in 
driving environmental disclosure quality in the annual report. In other words, quality of 
environmental information is effectively better in larger firms which are in 
environmentally sensitive industries. Firm age (AGE) and return on shareholders’ equity 
(ROE) are found to have negative significant coefficients at the 0.01 level to relate with 
environmental disclosure practice. It reflects that new firms and firms with low profit 
prefer to reveal a high level of environmental information in order to satisfy shareholders’ 
demand and attract investors compared to well-known firms and firms with high 
profitability, which prefer profitable financial disclosure to influence the decision making 
of shareholders and investors. However, the relationship between total liabilities divided 
by total assets (DEBT) and quality of environmental disclosure is not proved using the 
context of China in this study.  
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
In this empirical chapter, the effect of corporate governance on environmental disclosure 
quality was examined and analysed using Chinese evidence. Based on the stakeholder-
agency framework, it distinguished different monitoring roles played by various 
ownerships and board composition in Chinese listed companies during a three period, 
2009-2011. The empirical findings indicate that quality of environmental disclosure is 
significantly and positively related to state ownership, blockholder ownership, size of the 
supervisory board, firm size and industry; and it is negatively related to legal person 
ownership, foreign share ownership, profitability and firm age. In contrast with the 
findings of research on quantitative environmental disclosure in the last empirical chapter, 
the difference in quality of environmental disclosure shows that, based on cross-sectional 
data, there is no evidence to support the impact of managerial ownership on qualitative 
environmental information in the annual report. However, the fixed effect model of panel 
data documents a positive significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
environmental disclosure quality. The combination of cross-sectional and time series data 
suggests that although managerial ownership in general pays little attention to 
environmental disclosure quality, there is a gradual realisation of the importance of 
qualitative environmental disclosure by managerial ownership, year on year.  
In addition, this study confirms that state ownership, blockholder ownership and a bigger 
supervisory board with an effective monitoring role in the company encourage the firm 
be engaged in environmental disclosure quality. Firm size and working within an 
environmentally sensitive industry are two effective determinants of high levels of 
qualitative environmental information in the annual report. Comparable the relationship 
between IND and the quantity of environmental disclosure, there is no empirical 
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evidence to support the theory that IND effectively acts on environmental disclosure 
quality. It reflects an immature mechanism of independent non-executive directors, 
which would be ameliorated by amending the code of corporate government and 
corporate law to strengthen requirements for board directors and for improving the 
knowledge and skills of independent non-executive directors. Furthermore, this study 
notes that there was a very low level of quality environmental information disclosed in 
the annual reports of most Chinese listed companies. It suggests that firms should 
improve the quality of environmental information in the future to promote a win-win 
situation between the firm and their stakeholders under the stakeholder-agency 
framework. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE VALUE RELEVANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURES: 
SOME CHINESE EVIDENCE 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1950s, following the Second World War, the economies of developed countries 
have been growing quickly. This rapid development has produced lots of serious 
pollution and environmental issues. According to the report of the World Health 
Organisation, approximately three-quarters of the 49 million deaths each year are related 
to environmental problem. For this reason, many governments are paying more and more 
attention to sustainable development and environmental protection. A series of 
regulations and standards on the environment have been published to control and reform 
corporations’ behaviour. Environmental disclosure in the annual report is regarded as an 
important instrument of information transmission from companies to the public, and an 
approach of supervising firms by society (Shen, 2011) which has been attracting more 
attention from various stakeholders.  
Managers have an interest in utilising environmental disclosure in order to enhance their 
firms’ image and reputation, and thus attract existing and potential investors 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000; Dixon et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2010), because any information, 
including environmental disclosure, obtained by shareholders and potential investors 
could be beneficial to their appreciation of firm value (Cormier and Magnan, 2007). In 
addition, high quality (environmental) disclosure would also enhance the reputation of 
	  	  
	  
197	  
managers and their social profile which could reduce uncertainty and obtain the firm a 
competitive advantage, international investor confidence and economic benefits (Iatridis, 
2013). For example, Ernst and Young (2002) interviewed senior executives at 147 firms 
from the Global 1000 companies and found that ‘Companies are increasingly 
acknowledging that corporate ethical, environmental and social behaviour can have a 
material impact on business value (that is, the market utilises the information). The great 
majority of companies (79 per cent) forecast the importance of this issue to rise over that 
next five years as companies across a range of industry sectors recognise its relevance to 
their business. Research has found that a company’s reputation in respect to issues 
pertaining to CSR is a factor in purchasing decision for 70 per cent of all consumers’ 
(Deegan, 2004, p.93).  
Cormier et al. (2005) provided ‘extensive evidence that environmental information is 
useful for decision-making by financial stakeholders’ (p.6). Similarly, environmental 
disclosure requirements of shareholders were explored by de Villiers and van Staden 
(2010), using data from Australia, the UK and the US. They found that more than two 
thirds of shareholders want to receive environmental disclosure in order to decide how 
their funds are utilised. De Klerk et al. (2012) emphasised that CSR (environmental 
disclosure is a part of CSR) plays a helpful role in shareholders’ investment decisions. As 
stated by Cormier and Magnan (2007), ‘environmental reporting will be likely used by 
investors to better assess firm’s earnings prospects and reduce implied uncertainty’ 
(p.614). An intelligence company enhances the confidence of investors via voluntary 
disclosure (Li and Qi, 2008), because it decreases the information asymmetry between 
the insiders (managers and directors) and outsiders (shareholders and investors) of the 
company (Lo, 2009) and increases investors’ understanding of the firm. Berglof and 
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Pajuste (2005) implied that voluntary disclosure reduces the cost of capital in the firm 
and increases firm value.  
Although there is a growing body of literature on the relationship between disclosure and 
its value-relevance, most of it was investigated using data from developed countries. 
China, as a representative developing country, has the main features of emerging capital 
markets: relatively weak corporate governance, highly concentrated ownership and high-
developing potential. In addition, it has its own uniqueness of socialism, its legal system 
and cultural traditions. The People’s Republic of China, a socialist country, was founded 
on the 1st of October, 1949. 1978 was a turning point of economic reform. The Chinese 
government adopted the ‘open-door’ policy for improving its economy. There have been 
many successful cases of privatising SOEs in developed countries through share issuing 
privatisation since the 1980s (Megginson and Netter, 2001), a step which was also taken 
by China in order to reform its economic system. The early 1990s began to see a change. 
In December 1990, the first stock exchange started trading in Shanghai. Then, Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange was set up in April 1991. Many businesses started to restructure from 
SOEs to companies listed on these two stock exchanges. By 6th March 2015, the number 
of companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges had increased to 2,659 
firms and the total market value amounted to RMB 40,520 billion. 
Whilst the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly, pollution and other 
environmental issues are also getting worse in China. According to the BBC (2005) and 
the New York Times (2007), the industrial pollution (air and water) problems in China 
seriously threaten the health of the population. Recently, (in January, 2013) news of 
severe pollution in Beijing, the Chinese capital, was frequently appearing in the BBC 
News. The news indicated that air pollution has soared to hazardous levels as outlined by 
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the World Health Organisation (WHO). A BBC correspondent pointed out that coal dust 
and car fumes are the main sources of air pollution. Economic growth has left a severe 
air problem in many cities in China. Serious environmental issues are attracting 
increasing concerns from the public. Disclosing environmental information by 
corporations is one way to mitigate the concern. At the same time, good environmental 
practices could bring business opportunities and market benefits to companies through a 
greater reputation for environmental care and by improving their public relations (KPMG, 
1997). Whether or not voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual report is a 
critical role that provides value relevant information, is an interesting and important 
research area for emerging markets.  
The aim of this research is to explore the value relevance of voluntary environmental 
disclosures (VED) in the annual report through evidence from a fast growing developing 
country, China. This study expects to contribute to the knowledge about the association 
between market value and both qualitative and quantitative environmental information in 
the annual report in fast developing countries based on a large sample of firm data during 
consecutive years. In addition, it is an up-to-date empirical research on quality and 
quantity of voluntary environmental disclosure and its value relevance under both cross-
sectional and time-series data of the Chinese market in English. Furthermore, the 
research provides useful information for various stakeholders: for Investors, this 
empirical study adds to their knowledge and understanding about the function of 
environmental disclosure in the annual report and assists their investment decision 
making in the Chinese stock market; For Managers, it helps them to realise whether or 
not voluntary environmental disclosure increases a firm’s market value and thus decide 
on their own company’s disclosure practices; Scholars would further comprehend the 
Chinese stock market and disclosure development; this research uncovers the issues of 
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environmental disclosure in the annual report of Chinese listed companies, which assists 
Regulators in enforcing compliance with regulations about disclosure practice in future. 
An efficient stock market built by the government in China is expected by the authors. 
Finally, it enhances understanding in terms of qualitative and quantitative VED and the 
Ohlson’s (1995) model.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Previous research on value relevance of 
social and/or environmental disclosure is reviewed in the next section. Section 5.3 
discusses the theory and the research hypothesis of the relationship between 
environmental disclosure and the market value of the firm. Section 5.4 explains sample, 
variables and methodology. The empirical results are provided in Section 5.5. The final 
section concludes the findings, contribution, and limitations of this research. 
 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
5.2.1 Prior research on value relevance of environmental performance/disclosure 
Developing on an important research area in voluntary disclosure and its determinants 
which has been studied since the 1970s, many researchers have started to explore the 
value relevance of voluntary disclosure. Carnevale et al. (2009) outlined that ‘an 
accounting value is defined as value-relevant if it has predicted association with equity 
market values’ (p.4). These previous studies mainly examined the effect of voluntary 
disclosure on cost of capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Zhang and Ding, 2006; Francis et al., 
2008; Plumlee et al., 2010), share returns or/and future earnings (e.g., Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Murray et al., 
2006; Banghøj and Plenborg, 2008), share price (e.g., Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Clarkson 
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et al., 2010; de Klerk and de Villiers, 2012; de Klerk et al., 2012), and market value of 
equity / Tobin’s Q (e.g., Trueman, 1986; Keasey and McGuinness, 2008; Murcia and 
Santos, 2010; Uyar and Kiliç, 2012). Corporate governance disclosure, financial 
disclosure, and (social and) environmental disclosure are normally paid more attention in 
value relevance research. Prior studies of voluntary disclosure mainly focused on US 
corporations (Zarb, 2007 and Hassan et al., 2009). Banghøj and Plenborg (2008) argued 
that the results from the US cannot be generalised to other countries, because disclosure 
practices vary substantially across different countries (Hope, 2003). Thus, recent 
researches have been extended into Europe and Asia. There is a summary table which 
describes recent research on the value relevance of environmental / CSR disclosure or 
environmental performance as shown table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1 
Empirical research on the value relevance of environmental / CSR performance /disclosure 
Author(s)& 
Date 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Sample Size 
&Type, and 
Time of 
Observation 
Analysis & General 
Results 
          
Hassel et al. 
(2005) 
Market value 
(MV) of equity  
Environmental 
performance (EP), 
book value (BV) of 
equity, net income 
71 firms listed 
on the stock 
exchange in 
Sweden 
between June 
30, 1998 and 
September 
2000, which 
include 337 
firm-quarter 
observations 
Ohlson (1995) model 
regression 
General Result - 
environmental 
performance negatively 
impacts on the market 
value on firms. 
Murray et al. 
(2006) 
Share returns Environmental 
disclosure 
Top 100 UK 
companies 
during the 
period from 
1988 to 1997  
The regression analysis        
General Result - no 
direct relationship 
between SED and share 
returns.  
Cormier and 
Magnan (2007) 
1 - Market to 
book premium         
2 - ER           
3 - Stock price 
Environmental 
Reporting (ER), 
equity, earnings, 
media exposure, size, 
age of asset, industry  
France - 237 
firm-year 
observations (6 
years prior to 
1998); Germany 
- 308 firm-year 
observations (7 
years prior to 
1998);  Canada - 
580 firm-year 
observations (6 
years prior to 
1998)  
OLS regression and 
3SLS regression    
General Result - a 
moderating influence 
from ER to a firm’s 
earning in Germany. 
ER does not 
significantly impact on 
the stock market 
valuation of firm 
earnings in Canada and 
France. 
Ragothaman 
and Carr 
(2008) 
Tobin's Q Environmental 
information 
disclosure, number 
of employees, return 
on assets, price 
earnings ratio, audit 
opinion 
90 companies 
based on 
COMPUSTAT 
in the year 2000 
Multivariate regression        
General Results - waste 
variable negatively 
impacts on firm value. 
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Moneva and 
Cuellar (2009) 
MV of Equity Environmental 
disclosure, BV of 
equity, the 
discounted value of 
residual earning, 
industry, firm size  
124 Spanish 
companies listed 
on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange 
between 1996 
and 2004 
Ohlson (1995) model 
regression  
General Result - a 
significant market 
valuation of financial 
environmental 
disclosure, but not of 
non-financial. 
Semenova et 
al. (2009) 
MV of Equity  Environmental and 
social performance, 
BV of equity, net 
income, Sales 
growth, firm age, 
industry dummies 
Swedish SIX 
300 companies 
between 2005 
and 2008 
Ohlson (1995) model 
OLS regression and 
panel data approach            
General Result - 
environmental and 
social performance is 
value relevant and a 
significantly positive 
relation between MV 
of equity and EP 
Gallego-
Álvarez et al. 
(2010) 
Value creation Social and 
environmental 
practices, marketing, 
size, ROA, sector 
120 biggest 
European 
companies 
Logistic regression and 
linear regression   
General Result - 
shareholder value 
creation is positively 
affected by social and 
environmental 
practices 
Jacobs et al. 
(2010) 
Market value of 
firm 
Announcements of 
Corporate 
Environmental 
Initiatives (CEIs) and 
announcements of 
Environmental 
Awards and 
Certifications 
(EACs) 
340 unique 
companies 
between 1986 
and 1991  
Ordinary least squares 
regression  
General Result - the 
market is not 
significantly influenced 
by the aggregated CEI 
and EAS 
announcements, but a 
significant market 
response was found by 
certain CEI and EAC 
subcategories 
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Murcia and 
Santos (2010) 
Social-
environmental 
disclosure 
Tobin’s Q, size, 
sector, origin of 
control, profitability, 
leverage, corporate 
governance, stocking 
issuing, growth, 
concentration of 
control, auditing 
firm, 
internationalisation 
The top 100 
largest non-
financial listed 
companies in 
Brazil between 
2006 and 2008.  
Panel Model 
General Result - A 
significantly positive 
effect on firm value 
(Tobin’s Q) was also 
found between social-
environmental 
disclosure and total 
disclosure. 
Schadewitz 
and Niskala 
(2010) 
MV of equity Responsibility 
reporting, BV of 
equity, accounting 
earnings 
All listed 
Finnish firms 
that have 
adopted GRI 
during the years 
2002-2005 
Ohlson (1995) model 
regression  
General Result - 
communication via 
GRI responsibility 
reporting is an 
important explanatory 
factor for a firm's 
market value. 
Wu and Shen 
(2010) 
Tobin's Q Voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure (VED), 
size, ROA, debt 
lever, growth of 
revenue 
145 listed 
chemical firms 
from 2008 stock 
market in China 
Multivariate regression   
General Results - 
environmental 
disclosure cannot 
impact firm value 
significantly. 
Moroney et al. 
(2011) 
Voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure  
Tobin’s Q, 
environmental 
assurance, 
professional 
accountant assurer, 
J-F coefficient, FIN, 
ROA, leverage, size, 
asset newness, 
capital intensity 
The top 500 
listed companies 
on the 
Australian 
Securities 
Exchange 
Linear regression  
General Results -  
Tobin’s Q is negatively 
associated with 
voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure. 
Carnevale et 
al. (2012) 
Stock price Corporate social 
reporting, BV per 
share, earnings per 
share, 
130 banks from 
all European-
listed bank in 
the Euro-12 
zone between 
the 2nd quarter 
of 2002 and the 
2nd quarter of 
2008 
Panel data regression              
General Results - social 
reporting is value 
relevant in some 
countries, and 
positively influences 
the stock price; but 
other countries show a 
significantly negative 
relationship. 
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de Klerk and 
de Villiers 
(2012) 
1 - Share price             
2 - MV of 
equity 
Corporate 
responsibility 
reporting (CRR), BV 
of equity, net 
income, industry 
The top 100 
South African 
companies 
between 2007 
and 2008 
A modified Ohlson 
model regression     
General Results - 
higher share prices 
associate with higher 
levels of CRR. 
Xu et al. 
(2012) 
1 - Abnormal 
Return (AR) 
2 - CAR 
Accumulative 
abnormal return  
Disclosure of 
environmental 
violation events 
(EVEs), pollution 
type, disclosure 
origin, intensity, 
modernisation levels, 
ownership, 
characteristics of the 
ultimate owners, size 
EVEs of 57 
Chinese firms 
covering 12 
industries in 
2010 
Multivariate regression 
analysis   
General Results - In 
contrast with similar 
events in other 
countries, average 
reduction in market 
value impacted by 
events in China is 
much lower.  
Iatridis (2013) 1 - Stock price             
2 - MA of 
equity divided 
by BV of equity  
Environmental 
disclosure, (lagged) 
BV per share, lagged 
abnormal earnings 
per share, net income 
shared by BV, total 
amount of hazardous 
waste produced /net 
sales, EP, company 
reports initiatives 
529 Malaysian 
listed companies 
from beverages, 
chemical, food 
production, 
forestry and 
paper, industrial 
metal and 
mining 
industries 
during the 
period of 2005 - 
2011 
The OLS 
regression analysis    
General Results - High 
quality environmental 
disclosures are value 
relevant and improve 
investor perceptions.    
 
Murray et al. (2006) investigated whether or not the financial market cares about social 
and environmental disclosure (SED) based on data from the “Top 100” UK companies 
(the Times 1,000) during a period from 1988 to 1997. The CSEAR database of UK 
companies was used to collect the social and environmental information component. The 
authors employed a series of statistical tests, which include the Pearson correlation 
coefficients, Chi-squared test and a general linear model, to explore the role played by 
SED on the financial market. The finding indicated no direct relationship between SED 
and share returns.  
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Similarly, Moneva and Cuellar (2009) explored the value relevance of environmental 
disclosure focusing on both financial and non-financial elements because of mixed 
results in the relationship between financial performance and environmental disclosure in 
previous studies. They employed the framework of the Ohlson (1995) model and 124 
Spanish companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange between 1996 and 2004. In this 
study, the environmental variable was measured through the environmental information 
in corporations’ annual reports. They classified this information into five aspects: ‘the 
disclosure of a formal environmental policy’; ‘the disclosure of formal environmental 
management systems’; ‘the disclosure of environmental assets’; ‘the disclosure of 
environmental expenditures’; and ‘the disclosure of environmental liabilities and 
contingencies’ (p.445). The former two belong to non-financial environmental disclosure 
and the others are financial environmental disclosure. Ultimately, they did not find 
significant value relevance of non-financial environmental disclosure, but they did for 
financial environmental information.  
Just as the empirical results based on two types of environmental disclosure research 
differed, Cormier and Magnan (2007) also got differing findings from three countries 
which are Canada, France and Germany. The sample of this study included 237 firm-year 
observations from the French stock market during 6 years prior to 1998; 308 firm-year 
observations of German listed companies during 7 years prior to 1998; and 580 firm-year 
observations chosen from Canada during 6 years prior to 1998. The pooled cross-
sectional OLS regression and 3SLS regression were developed to test the contribution of 
environmental reporting on the market-to-book premium and control endogeneity in their 
research. Thereafter, the auditors used the stock price as the dependent variable to replace 
the original one in order to do an additional sensitivity analysis. This international 
perspective research found a moderating influence from environmental reporting to firm 
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earnings in Germany. However, environmental information did not significantly impact 
on the stock market value of firm earnings in Canada and France.  
Carnevale et al. (2012) also did cross-country analysis of the effect from corporate social 
reporting (SR) in banks on the firm value. The sample for this study included 130 
European-listed banks in the Euro-12 zone between the 2nd quarter of 2002 and the 2nd 
quarter of 2008. SR was measured based on the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines 
(GRI). Book value per share (BPS) and earnings per share (EPS), which are traditional 
determinants affecting the stock price, were used as accounting variables to assist with 
looking for the relationship between SR and firm’s market value. In this study, both 
direct and indirect influences from SR publication to the stock market were explored. 
The results showed that social reporting is value relevant in some countries, and 
positively influences the stock price; but the others showed a significantly negative 
relationship between social reporting and market value in other European banks.  
Moreover, Semenova et al. (2009), Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2010), Murcia and Santos 
(2010), Schadewitz and Niskala (2010), de Klerk and de Villiers (2012), Uyar and Kiliç 
(2012), and Iatridis (2013) found a significantly positive link between disclosure level 
and firm value, while Hassel et al. (2005), Ragothaman and Carr (2008), Jacobs et al. 
(2010), and Moroney et al. (2011) found a significantly negative association.  
In detail, Uyar and Kiliç (2012) examined whether or not voluntary disclosure practices 
are value-relevant in the capital market based on 129 manufacturing firms listed on the 
Turkish Istanbul Stock Exchange in 2010. They found that more voluntary information 
disclosed by companies means higher market capitalisation by multiple regression 
analysis. In their study, Uyar and Kiliç (2012) pointed out that voluntary disclosure could 
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help to reduce the information asymmetry between owners and managers and therefore 
add firm value.  
Semenova et al. (2009) explored the value relevance of environmental and social 
performance, focusing on SIX 300 companies listed on the OXM Stockholm in Sweden 
from 2005 to 2008. They used the pooled cross-section time series data and the panel 
data approach based on the Ohlson (1995) model in their paper. It is worth mentioning 
that the auditors deflate all accounting and market-based variables by TAt-1 for 
controlling size differences. Their findings indicated that the stock market responds to 
environmental and social performance and that there is a significant and positive 
association between environmental disclosure and market value of equity. Their study 
contributed to the intangible determinants of stock returns in the research area.  
Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2010) supplied proof that shareholder value creation is positively 
affected by social and environmental practices through empirical evidence of the 120 
biggest European companies. That value creation was measured by two variables: 
reputation and value creation. The former one was collected from the Fortune website 
and financial data was obtained by the Forbes website. Shareholder value creation was 
gauged by the ratio: the difference between the outcome of market value minus capital in 
2008 and the outcome of market value minus capital in 2006, divided by the 2006 
outcome (of subtracting capital from market value). The study employed both logistic 
regression and linear regression to find that social and environmental practices, 
especially those related to improving a firm’s image, are an effective marketing tool to 
enhance shareholder value creation.  
Schadewitz and Niskala (2010) employed the Ohlson (1995) model regression to 
examine the effect of communication via responsibility reporting (RR) on firm value. 
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The sample of this study was collected from all listed Finnish firms that have adopted 
GRI during the years 2002-2005. The finding indicated that RR is one part of a 
corporation’s communication tools for information asymmetry reduction between 
shareholders and managers. In addition, communication via RR was proved as a 
significant explanatory element for the value of the firm. 
A significantly positive effect on firm value (Tobin’s Q) was found from social-
environmental disclosure and total disclosure respectively based on Panel data analysis in 
the study of Murcia and Santos (2010). Content analysis was employed for voluntary 
disclosure measurement. The framework of disclosure involved 92 items which are 
separated into economic parts (43) and social-environmental parts (49). They tested 
corporate voluntary disclosure and its determinants in Brazil based on the top 100 largest 
non-financial listed companies between 2006 and 2008. They concluded that “good” 
quality companies in Brazil reveal more information, and explained this situation as that 
firms ‘do that to screen themselves and avoid the risk of being evaluated by the market as 
a “lemon”’ (p.19). 
The reaction of the stock market to firms’ corporate responsibility reporting (CRR) was 
investigated by de Klerk and de Villiers (2012) using the evidence of the top 100 South 
African companies between 2007 and 2008. In this paper, corporate responsibility 
reporting was explained as information dealing with corporations’ ethical, economic, 
social, and environmental impact. The KPMG dataset and the McGregor BFA database 
were used in order to collect firms’ CRR and financial data respectively. In the research 
on the value relevance of CRR, a modified Ohlson model developed by Hassel et al. 
(2005) was chosen by the auditors. Based on the agency theory, they argued that CRR 
decreases the information asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders 
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(shareholders), and thus influences investors’ investment appreciation. The finding 
indicated that a higher level of CRR improves share prices.  
Iatridis (2013) examined whether or not environmental disclosures are value relevant and 
how they impact on investor perceptions based on 529 Malaysian listed companies 
during the period 2005-2011. The author employed two models, the Ohlson (1995) 
valuation equation and another model based on Cormier and Magnan (2007, p.617), to 
measure the value relevance and found that high quality environmental disclosures 
effectively influence firm value and investors’ perceptions. They suggested that firms 
would be motivated to enhance voluntary environmental disclosure in order to impress 
stakeholders and decrease scepticism.  
In Contrast, Hassel et al. (2005) investigated the value relevance of environmental 
performance based on the residual income valuation model developed by Ohlson (1995) 
and 337 firm-quarter observations from the stock exchange in Sweden between June 30, 
1998 and September 2000, and they found a negative impact from environmental 
performance on the market value of firms. They concluded that their finding is consistent 
with the cost-concerned school which deemed environmental investments merely 
increasing costs and resulting in reduced earnings and firm value.  
Similarly, Moroney et al. (2011) found that Tobin’s Q negatively associates with 
voluntary environmental disclosure through studying a sample of the top 500 companies 
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. In this study, they mainly researched 
quality of voluntary environmental disclosure and its determinants. Thus, environmental 
information was the dependent variable which was measured by an index based on the 
GRI. Tobin’s Q was used as an independent variable to detect the relationship between 
environmental reporting and firm value.  
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In addition, Ragothaman and Carr (2008) examined the effect from environmental 
disclosure on shareholder returns based on 90 firms out of the top 100 corporate air 
polluters from the COMPUSTAT database. In addition to environmental information 
disclosure, in this study, number of employees (size), return on assets, price earnings 
ratio (growth), audit opinion (corporate governance) were also applied as independent 
variables to explore their association with firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. They 
developed a regression model and performed some robustness tests for the research 
question, and then found that the waste disposal variable (bad environmental information) 
reduce firm value. In other words, there is a negative relationship between shareholder 
return and (bad) environmental information disclosure.  
Jacobs et al. (2010) examined the role of environmental performance played in the 
market value of the firm, using a sample of 780 announcements spanning 340 unique 
companies between 1986 and 1991. These 780 announcements consisted of two sets of 
data: 417 announcements of Corporate Environmental Initiatives (CEIs) and 363 
announcements of Environmental Awards and Certifications (EACs). The event study 
methodology is employed in the paper to test the market response to announcements of 
environmental performance by ordinary least squares regression. The results indicated 
that the market is not significantly influenced by the aggregated CEI and EAS 
announcements, but a significant market response was found by certain CEI and EAC 
subcategories. For example, they found a significantly negative association between 
voluntary emission reductions and market value whereas there was a significant positive 
relationship between ISO 14001 certifications and market reaction. Therefore, they 
asserted that ‘the market is selective in reacting to announcements of environmental 
performance with certain types of announcements even valued negatively’ (p.430) In 
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summary, these previous empirical studies above have given mixed results on the value 
relevance of CSR/environmental performance /disclosure.  
In the Chinese market, Keasey and McGuinness (2008) and Ronnie Lo (2009) 
investigated the connection between firm value and voluntary disclosure (forecast 
earnings disclosure and corporate governance disclosure respectively) in Hong Kong. 
The former research found a significantly positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and 
forecast earnings disclosure while the latter found that corporate disclosure just 
significantly and positively links to market valuation for small companies, but does not 
for medium and large companies. In their studies, it described Hong Kong’s unique 
position in China. Firms in Hong Kong have a strong legal investor-protection regime 
which was influenced by Anglo-Saxon common law tradition from the UK before 1997. 
In other words, there are many differences in firm performance and voluntary disclosure 
practice between Hong Kong and the mainland of China.  
Cheung et al. (2010) examined whether or not disclosure influences the market for 
Chinese listed companies based on data from the Chinese stock market during the period 
2004-2007. The results revealed that the market value is significantly and positively 
affected by company transparency. Then they spilt the transparency index into voluntary 
and mandatory disclosure indexes to re-apply the regression and found that the market 
value merely associates with the voluntary disclosure index. 
In the recent study of environmental disclosure in China, the reaction of the stock market 
to disclosure of environmental violation events (EVEs) was tested by Xu et al. (2012). 
The method of event study was employed to examine the stock market’s responses to 57 
EVEs in the year 2010. Daily abnormal return (AR) and accumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) were calculated in an event window. These EVEs from 57 Chinese firms were 
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revealed by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China and the media. Based on 
multivariate analysis, the findings showed that river pollution made by firms with a 
disperse ownership, appearing market reaction after more than 20 days before and after 
the announcement day. In addition, in contrast with similar events in other countries, 
average reduction in market value effected by EVEs is much lower. The auditors 
indicated that, currently, negative EVEs weakly impact market value in China.  
Wu and Shen (2010) also employed a sample from the Chinese stock market to explore 
the relationship between environmental disclosure and firm value. They mentioned that 
environmental disclosure would not necessarily add firm value when the firm merely 
reveals good news and hides bad news. In the study, the authors applied the Global 
Reporting Initiative sustainability reporting guidelines for environmental disclosure 
measurement and Tobin’s Q for firm value measurement. They did not find any evidence 
to prove that environmental disclosure significantly impact firm value based on 145 
listed chemical firms from the 2008 Chinese stock market. Their study merely focused on 
the chemical industry which cannot reflect the value relevance of VED in the whole 
Chinese market. Hence, this paper would contribute to this area by examining the value 
relevance of VED in mainland China using a large sample of Chinese listed companies 
which covers 12 industries.  
 
5.2.2 The gap in previous research  
There are some limitations in the previous studies on environmental disclosure and its 
value relevance as below. First, mixed results of the empirical research occur in the value 
relevance studies. These problems are produced because of two broad reasons: 
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differences in disclosure measurement and variation in valuation models used. In the 
measurement of environmental disclosure, this paper applies the method which integrates 
mechanistic content analysis approach (disclosure volumes and/or frequencies) (e.g., 
Ness and Mirza, 1991; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Campbell, 2003) and interpretative 
approach (meaning and understanding of disclosure) (e.g., Buhr and Reiter, 2006; 
Coupland, 2006) to reduce errors of research results.  In the valuation model, the Ohlson 
(1995) model is regarded as ‘best-known conceptual model of value relevance analysis’ 
(Carnevale et al., 2009). According to experience of previous studies and the actual 
status of China, the regression in this research is developed based on a modified Ohlson’s 
(1995) model.  
Second, value relevance of disclosure practice has been widely studied in the developed 
market. In the developing market, there is a growing body of research on corporate social 
responsibility / environmental disclosure and its value relevance. For example, Murcia 
and Santos (2010) observed corporate voluntary disclosure and its determinants in Brazil 
based on the top 100 largest non-financial listed companies between 2006 and 2008. A 
significantly positive effect on firm value (Tobin’s Q) was found from social-
environmental disclosure and total disclosure respectively. They concluded that “good” 
quality companies in Brazil reveal more information, and explained this situation as that 
firms ‘do that to screen themselves and avoid the risk of being evaluated by the market as 
a “lemon”’ (p.19). The reaction of the stock market to firms’ corporate responsibility 
reporting (CRR) was investigated by de Klerk and de Villiers (2012) through the 
evidence of the top 100 South African companies between 2007 and 2008. The finding 
indicated that a higher level of CRR improves share prices. Iatridis (2013) examined 
whether or not environmental disclosures are value relevant and how they impact 
investor perceptions based on 529 Malaysian listed companies (from the beverages, 
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chemical, food productions, forestry and paper, industrial metals and mining industries) 
during the period 2005-2011. They found that high quality environmental disclosures 
effectively influence firm value and investors’ perceptions. These three countries have a 
common basis, in that they are all former colonies of European countries, either the UK 
or Portugal. Their legal system, culture and economic development were influenced by 
European countries. China is different, in that it is a very fast growing developing 
socialist country. ‘Relatively high levels of collectivism and power distance, and strong 
uncertainty avoidance’ are features exhibited in this socialist country (Ronnie Lo, 2009, 
p.7). This author asserted that ‘societal values of high collectivism and large power 
distance suggest a tendency for the members of a society to adhere to rules and 
regulations, conform to peer norms, follow the guidance from leaders, and refrain from 
risk-taking due to uncertainties’. Based on these properties of society, Chinese 
companies would tend to reduce transparency and reveal less voluntary information in 
the annual report in comparison to European countries. The Chinese stock market has 
been developing rapidly since the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were set up 
in the early 1990s. According to Zeng (2012), the Chinese stock market experienced 
unprecedented development and had become the largest in developing countries by 2001; 
and by December 2010, market capitalisation of the Shanghai Stock Exchange had 
become the 5th largest in the world. However, in contrast with the UK and the US, the 
two Chinese stock markets are underdeveloped and strongly affected by state policies 
(Liu, 2009). The main reason is that, following reform, China’s economy has been 
growing rapidly in the last three decades, but the development of the Chinese legal and 
political system is still lagging behind the changes in the economy, because the 
government needs to protect the rights and status of Chinese Communism and keep its 
communist ideology. Under this market circumstance, information asymmetry exists 
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between the state, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders, and the agencies. It 
leads to Chinese stock markets being highly speculative and volatile (Morck et al., 2000). 
At beginning of China’s economic reform, many codes and practices of corporate 
governance and reporting regulation were borrowed from developed countries. On 7th 
January, 2001, the “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China” was 
issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State Economic 
and Trade Commission. In 2006, 38 Chinese accounting standards for business 
enterprises, which involved 22 newly-promulgated and 16 revised accounting standards, 
were issued with the assistance of Deloitte, one of the Big-4 international CPA firms (Liu, 
2009). The new accounting standards cover all topics of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs). This research would explore the development of 
environmental disclosure and its value relevance under the effect of the “Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China” and the new accounting standards. 
Although China is similar to most developing countries with a low level of reporting 
practices and an information environment which is not transparent, the uniqueness of 
China and its stock market environment under the nation’s distinct political, legal, and 
economic context means that research on the value relevance of its environmental 
disclosure is important. 
Third, value relevance research is divided into two types, which include event studies 
and association studies (long-term relationships), based on two distinctive characteristics 
(Beaver, 2002 and Beisland, 2009). Event studies typically test whether the firm-specific 
information events affect stochastic behaviours of share prices (Strong, 1992). It 
considers to what extent the effect of information released results in price movements 
over short periods of time, which may be as short as one or two days. Association studies 
mainly explore how the market reacts to disclosure practice during relatively long 
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periods, which are normally from several months to years. These two types of value 
relevant research on environmental disclosure have been attempted using the evidence of 
Chinese listed companies in the studies of Xu et al. (2012) and Wu and Shen (2010) 
respectively. Xu et al. (2012) analysed the reaction of the stock market to the disclosure 
of environmental violation events (EVEs). The method of event study was employed to 
examine the stock market’s responses to 57 EVEs in the year 2010. Daily abnormal 
return (AR) and accumulative abnormal return (CAR) were calculated in an event 
window. These EVEs of 57 Chinese firms were revealed by the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection of China and the media. Based on multivariate analysis, the 
findings outlined that river pollution made by firms with a disperse ownership, appearing 
to show a market reaction after more than 20 days before and after the announcement day. 
In addition, compared with similar events in other countries, average reduction in market 
value impacted by EVEs is much lower in China. The auditors indicated that, currently, 
negative EVEs weakly impacts market value in China. Wu and Shen (2010) also 
employed a sample from Chinese stock market to explore the relationship between 
environmental disclosure and firm value. They mentioned that environmental disclosure 
would not necessarily add firm value when the firm merely reveals good news and hides 
bad news. In the study, the authors applied the Global Reporting Initiative sustainability 
reporting guidelines for environmental disclosure measurement and Tobin’s Q for firm 
value measurement. They did not find any evidence to prove that environmental 
disclosure significantly impacts firm value based on 145 listed chemical firms from the 
2008 Chinese stock markets. Their study merely focused on the chemical industry in a 
single year which lacks time-series analysis and cannot reflect value relevance of VED in 
the whole Chinese market. Due to the limitations of previous research on the association 
studies of value relevance, this research examines the data of 2,850 firm-year 
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observations during the period 2009-2011 covering 12 industries based on the Chinese 
market. 
 
5.3 THEORY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
This paper develops a research hypothesis based on signalling theory and the concept of 
information asymmetry. Signalling theory has been widely employed in previous studies 
to explore why voluntary disclosure is revealed by companies to stakeholders (Uyar and 
Kiliç, 2012). This theory suggests that voluntary disclosure would be implemented with 
the aim of signalling good news to stakeholders (Oliveira et al., 2006). Gordon et al., 
(2010) indicated that voluntary information revealed in the annual report gives the 
marketplace many signals, which are expected to improve the stock market value of a 
firm. Investors may interpret these signals as useful information which relates to the 
firm’s prospect for development and future value. Clarkson et al. (2008) and Iatridis 
(2013) indicated that voluntary environmental information is disclosed by companies 
which tend to use less environmentally harmful practices. In China, this situation is more 
serious, because almost all companies merely report favourable environmental 
information to build their firms’ reputation, reduce shareholders’ concern, and obtain 
economic benefit. Wu and Shen (2010) outlined that environmental disclosure would not 
necessarily add firm value when the firm reveals good news and hides bad news. 
However, Holm and Rikhardsson (2008) argued that positive information would create 
market value for a firm when investors take the information into account to make their 
investment decisions. In addition, Ragothaman and Lau (2000) stated that a good 
reputation of the company could be translated from good environmental performance 
(information) which enhances investor trust. On the other hand, Semenova et al., (2009) 
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mentioned that environmental performance (information) is regarded as an intangible 
asset, which is reflected as goodwill in the stock market. Similarly, in the study of Miles 
and Covin (2000), environmental performance (disclosure) is deemed as becoming a 
significant component of a firm’s reputation which is regarded as an intangible asset that 
associates to market and financial performance. A superior reputation is a source of 
strategic advantage which improves a firm’s long term ability to create value (Caves and 
Porter, 1977). To sum up, good environmental disclosure revealed by a company 
supplies good signals in the stock market that can increase a firm’s reputation, which is 
recognised as an intangible asset (such as goodwill). This can enhance investors’ 
confidence and improve their appreciation of the firm when making investment decisions, 
and thus add market value to the firm.   
In the concept of information asymmetry, Cormier and Magnan (2007) outlined that 
‘interactions between a firm’s disclosure strategy and its stock market value are most 
often described in terms of information asymmetries between investors and managers’ 
(p.614). Better quality disclosure reduces the information asymmetry between them (Kim 
and Verecchia, 1994) and thus decreases agency cost which enhances firm value. As 
stated by Huang and Zhang (2012), greater disclosure could influence shareholder value 
through a reduced level of information asymmetry. In particular, Cormier et al. (2011) 
provided evidence to support the effect of environmental disclosure on decreasing 
information asymmetry and indicated that a potential benefit for a company when 
management reveals good information is to reduce information asymmetry. Therefore, it 
is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 5 Voluntary environmental information disclosed by companies is value 
relevant, which increases the value of the firm. 
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5.4 DATA AND METHODOLGY 
5.4.1 Sample  
The sample of this research is collected from both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in the Chinese market. There are 2,850 valid firm-
year observations for 3 consecutive years from 2009 to 2011. It excludes the firms in the 
financial sector (such as, bank and other financial firms) which have a separate disclosure 
requirement, and ST/*ST/S*ST firms with problems in finance. The valid sample covers 
12 industry sectors. In this paper, the CCER database and the CSMAR database are 
utilised for financial data collection and annual reports from both the SZSE and the 
SHSE are adopted for environmental disclosure collection. In the process of this 
investigation, some incorrect data from these two databases have already been amended 
in order to improve the accuracy of the research. 
 
5.4.2 Dependent variable measurement 
Previous research has varyingly revealed that increased disclosure would decrease 
(increase) cost of capital and hence enhance (reduce) firm value, however, there is a lack 
of direct empirical evidence in the relationship between disclosure practice and firm 
value (Hassan et al., 2009;	  Al-Akraa and Alib, 2012). Moreover, Clarkson et al. (2010) 
researched whether or not environmental disclosure plays a part in impacting on the cost 
of equity capital and firm valuation. Their findings demonstrated that voluntary 
environmental disclosure effectively influences firm value, but does not for the cost of 
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equity capital. Hassan et al. (2009) suggested that the ratio of market-to-book value of 
equity (MTBR) ‘shows whether securities are undervalued or overvalued ... if the ratio is 
greater than (less than) one then the firm is overvalued (undervalued)’ (p.91). In contrast 
with the logarithm of the market equity, Fama and French (1992) and Berk (1995) 
indicated that the logarithm of the ratio of book-to-market value is a more powerful and 
better measure in explaining average returns and compounded expected return. Thus, 
LnMTBR is employed in this research to measure the value relevance as Hassan et al. 
(2009). Market value of equity is measured as the number of outstanding shares at the 
end of year multiplied by share price of the stock at the end of year.  
v LnMTBR = the natural logarithm of the ratio (market value of equity / book 
value of equity) 
 
5.4.3 Model development 
The Ohlson (1995) model is the ‘best-known conceptual model of value relevance 
analysis’ (Carnevale et al., 2009): 
v MVt = α0BVt + α1AEt + α2υt 
Where MVt is market value of equity at time t, BVt is book value of equity at time t, AEt 
is abnormal earnings for period t (which is measured as the difference between net 
income and opening book value of equity multiplied by the required rate of return), and 
υt is other non-accounting value-relevant information (Hassel et al., 2005). However, in 
the calculation of abnormal earnings, there is a problematic value in that the required rate 
of return is unobtainable (de Klerk and de Villiers, 2012). Thus, researchers used net 
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income to replace abnormal earnings in the studies (e.g. Hassel et al., 2005; Semenova et 
al, 2009; de Klerk and de Villiers, 2012). 
Ohlson’s (1995) model supplies a framework which ‘is fully articulated in that it relates 
the value of the firm to the information provided in the income statement (earnings), the 
balance sheet (book value of equity), and other value-relevant information’ (Berry and 
Wright, 2001, p745). Carnevale et al. (2012) indicated that book value (per share) and 
earnings (per share) traditionally influence the market value (stock price). It is a very 
popular model applied in research on the value relevance of voluntary disclosure (e.g., 
Hassel et al., 2005; Liu and Liu, 2007; Moneva and Cuellar, 2009; Semenova et al., 2009; 
Schadewitz and Niskala, 2010; de Klerk and de Villiers, 2012; Iatridis, 2013).   
‘In order to mitigate the problems that might result from the appearance of potential scale 
effects in the estimation of price models, the variables have been divided by the total 
assets of the firm at the beginning of period (TAt-1)’ (Moneva and Cuellar, 2009, p448). 
Similarly, Semenova et al. (2009) also deflate all accounting and market-based variables 
by TAt-1 for controlling size differences. Moreover, De Klerk and de Villiers (2012) 
utilised variables divided by opening book value to control the size.  
Based on the Ohlson (1995) model, size-control factor, and previous researches (e.g., 
Hassan et al., 2009; Uyar and Kiliç, 2012; Iatridis, 2013), the regression model in this 
paper is given as: 
        LnMTBR =   𝛽 0 + 𝛽 1 VED + 𝛽 2 Ln(1/BVOE) + 𝛽 3 LnROE + 𝛽 4 
SCSIZE + 𝛽5 LnGROWTH +  𝛽6 INDUSTRY+ ε 
Where LnMTBR is the natural logarithm of the ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity at the end of year; VED is the voluntary environmental disclosure index; 
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BVOE is the book value at end of the financial year; LnROE is the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of net profit to book value of equity at the end of year; SCSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of total assets to book value of equity at the end of year; 
LnGROWTH is the natural logarithm of the ratio of sales in current year to sales in the 
previous year; INDUSTRY is the dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, 
coded as 1 for if the firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 
otherwise. 
 
5.4.4 Robustness test  
The research employs Tobin’s Q and Share return in order to measure the robustness of 
the empirical test. The regression model is adopted as below: 
Tobin’s Q (or Ri,t) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 VED + 𝛽2 FSIZE + 𝛽3 ROE + 𝛽4 BEDT + 𝛽5 GROWTH + 𝛽6 INDUSTRY+ ε     
Where Tobin’s Q = market value of assets / book value of assets (where market value of 
assets is measured by book value of assets minus book value of common equity and then 
adding market value of the common equity) (Chen et al., 2010); Share return (Ri,t) = ln 
(Pi,t/Pi,t-1); VED is the voluntary environmental disclosure index; FSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB at the end of year; ROE is profitability: return 
on shareholders’ equity; DEBT is the leverage ratio of total liabilities divided by total 
assets at the end of year; GROWTH is the ratio of sales in the current year to sales in the 
previous year; INDUSTRY is the dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, 
coded as 1 for if the firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 
otherwise. 
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5.5 RESULTS 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
Table 5.2 provides the descriptive statistics on the independent and dependent variables 
based on 2,850 firm-year observations during a period between 2009 and 2011. 
Dependent variable LnMTBR is measured by	  the natural logarithm of the ratio (market 
value of equity / book value of equity), which shows a minimum score of -0.85 and a 
maximum of 3.36 with a mean value of 1.18. A normal distribution of this independent 
variable is shown in figure 5.1. There are two types of environmental disclosure: the 
quantity of environmental disclosure (DISCQuantity) and the quality of environmental 
disclosure (DISCQuality) in this study. The table displays that the minimum scores of 
both DISCQuantity and DISCQuality are 0, which indicates that there are some Chinese 
listed companies without environmental disclosure. The maximum scores (64 for 
DISCQuantity and 24 for DISCQuality) and mean values (9.5 for DISCQuantity and 5.92 
for DISCQuality) express that both qualitative and quantitative environmental disclosure 
is quite insufficient in the annual reports of most Chinese listed companies. The 
skewness value of 2.00 in DISCQuantity implies that some but few companies disclose 
comparatively sufficient quantitative environmental information in the annual report. In 
this research, it is worth mentioning that there are just 145 observations without any 
environmental disclosure out of a total of 2,850 valid observations. It shows that almost 
95 per cent of Chinese listed companies reveal at least some environmental information. 
  
The mean value of INDUSTRY (0.63) and the median value (1) indicate that Chinese 
listed companies tend to belong to environmentally sensitive industries. Table 5.3 
summarises the mean values of variables by industries. It clearly shows that firms in 
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environmentally sensitive industries place a relatively high value on both quantity and 
quality environmental disclosure. In detail, the Mining industry discloses the largest 
volume (19.720) and highest quality level (10.040) of environmental information in the 
annual report, and which is then followed by Manufacturing (DISCQuantity = 10.535; 
DISCQuality =6.721), Water, electricity, and gas (DISCQuantity = 16.008; DISCQuality 
= 9.016), and Construction (DISCQuantity = 10.182; DISCQuality = 5.924). It proves 
that the firms in environmentally sensitive industries give more attention to both quantity 
and quality of environmental information practice in the annual report to remit concern 
from the public. 
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Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
 
Variables
Mean 
(Median)
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum 
(Maximum)
Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: Dependent
LnMTBR 1.18 0.61 -0.85 0.04 2.92
(1.19) (3.36)
Tobin's Q 2.56 1.60 0.78 2.34 11.20
(2.08) (15.11)
Ri,t 0.09 0.61 -1.76 0.23 2.25
(-0.002) (1.81)
Panel B: Independent 
DISCQuantity 9.50 10.23 0.00 2.00 7.62
(6.00) (64.00)
DISCQuality 5.92 4.35 0.00 0.94 3.73
(5.00) (24.00)
Ln(1/BVOE) -21.25 1.09 -26.96 -0.92 4.64
(-21.10) (-18.56)
LnROE -2.51 0.83 -8.25 -1.27 5.82
(-2.37) (-0.82)
SCSIZE 0.74 0.41 0.01 0.80 4.00
(0.68) (3.11)
LnGROWTH 0.16 0.28 -1.59 0.23 10.17
(0.15) (1.86)
FSIZE 21.99 1.21 19.24 0.84 4.14
(21.82) (27.75)
ROE 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.98 4.13
(0.09) (0.44)
DEBT 0.49 0.19 0.01 -0.20 2.35
(0.49) (0.96)
GROWTH 1.23 0.42 0.20 4.59 41.81
(1.16) (6.42)
INDUSTRY 0.63 0.48 0.00 -0.55 1.31
(1.00) (1.00)
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Figure 5.1 
Dependent variable distribution 
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Table 5.3 
Variable mean values by industry 
Variable
No	  obs
S.D.	  of	  
DISCQuantity
S.D.	  of	  
DISCQuality DISCQuantity DISCQuality LnMTBR Tobin's	  Q Ri,t Ln(1/BVOE) ROE ROA SCSIZE GROWTH LEVERAGE FSIZE INDUSTRY
Agriculture,	  forestry,	  
animal	  husbandry	  and	  
fisheries
57 8.776 3.525 9.895 4.965 1.503 3.105 0.086 -­‐20.698 0.092 0.048 0.652 1.214 0.128 21.349 0
Mining 75 12.907 4.528 19.720 10.040 1.369 3.013 0.088 -­‐23.099 0.171 0.094 0.620 1.283 0.345 23.719 1
Manufacturing 1536 10.046 4.282 10.535 6.721 1.259 2.759 0.116 -­‐21.078 0.106 0.058 0.673 1.217 0.169 21.751 1
Water,	  electricity,	  and	  
gas
129 12.070 4.644 16.008 9.016 0.825 1.767 0.097 -­‐21.823 0.089 0.039 0.941 1.220 0.912 22.764 1
Construction 66 11.993 4.291 10.182 5.924 1.008 1.666 0.036 -­‐21.605 0.124 0.032 1.388 1.270 0.454 22.993 1
Transport	  and	  storage 147 11.397 4.173 9.395 5.381 0.735 1.918 0.021 -­‐21.953 0.097 0.058 0.584 1.213 0.439 22.537 0
Communication 195 8.184 3.058 4.656 2.979 1.382 3.481 0.070 -­‐20.951 0.098 0.062 0.529 1.229 0.064 21.480 0
Retail/trade 213 6.100 2.996 3.737 2.953 1.238 2.297 0.078 -­‐21.001 0.118 0.048 0.929 1.227 0.205 21.930 0
Real	  estate 222 7.606 3.479 6.288 4.176 0.846 1.615 0.038 -­‐21.672 0.105 0.036 1.070 1.306 0.592 22.741 0
Services	  sectors 90 9.860 3.583 8.100 4.756 1.257 2.585 0.116 -­‐20.907 0.093 0.050 0.744 1.276 0.211 21.651 0
Media	  and	  culture 27 2.736 1.797 2.556 2.333 1.226 2.668 0.069 -­‐21.452 0.098 0.062 0.522 1.122 0.237 21.974 0
Comprehensive	  industry	   93 8.640 3.620 8.860 5.699 1.096 2.178 0.109 -­‐21.329 0.091 0.039 0.841 1.207 0.401 22.170 0
228
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firm value, 
and 
The highest
in this paper. 
the
et al., 1983;
is 1.27 for 
of 10. Therefore, 
5.5.2 Multicollinearity 
This paper employs Pearson's Correlation to explore the relationship between firm 
value, company characteristics, and environmental disclosure. The results are shown in 
Table 5.4. Although there is a correlation value of 0.8128 between DISCQuantity and 
DISCQuality, these two dependent variables do not appear in the same regression. 
Thus, this high correlation between them is not considered in multicollinearity. The 
highest correlation coefficient is 0.3255 between DISCQuality and INDUSTRY in this 
paper. Harmful levels of multicollinearity could be present when the correlation 
coefficient reaches ±0.8 or ±0.9 (Farrar and Glauber, 1967). It accords with the view of 
Hossain et al (1995), which claims collinearity does not occur when the correlation 
coefficient is less than 0.8. Thus, there is no unacceptable level of multicollinearity 
between the independent and control variables. Moreover, Moroney et al. (2011) and 
Leng and Ding (2011) mentioned that very low tolerance levels (approaching zero) or 
very high variance inflation factors (VIF) would suggest that multicollinearity may be a 
concern. When the VIF value exceeds 10, it would indicate a threat of multicollinearity 
(Neter et al., 1983; Pallant, 2007; Wang, et al., 2012). In this study, the top value of VIF 
scores is 1.27 for DISCQuality as showed in Table 5.6, which is well below the VIF 
value of 10. Therefore, multicollinearity is not a concern in this research.
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Table 5.4 
Correlation coefficients of key variables 
LnMTBR is the natural logarithm of the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of year; VED is voluntary environmental disclosure index; BVOE is the book 
value at financial year; LnROE is the natural logarithm of the ration of net profit to book value of equity at the end of year; SCSIZE is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total assets 
to book value of equity at the end of year; LnGROWTH is the natural logarithm of the ratio of sales in current year to sales in the previous year; INDUSTRY is dummy variable for 
environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for the firm belongs to environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise 
LnMTBR DISCQuantity DISCQuality Ln(1/BVOE) LnROE SCSIZE LnGROWTH INDUSTRY
LnMTBR 1
DISCQuantity -0.1258 1
DISCQuality -0.1567 0.8125 1
Ln(1/BVOE) 0.5092 -0.3111 -0.3013 1
LnROE 0.2629 0.0191 0.0077 -0.1638 1
SCSIZE -0.1285 0.0730 0.0654 -0.1096 0.0136 1
LnGROWTH 0.0511 0.0166 0.0339 -0.0890 0.2362 0.1136 1
INDUSTRY 0.0864 0.2311 0.3255 0.0221 0.0132 -0.0823 0.0196 1
Note:  N=2850 observations
LnMTBR  is the natural logarithm of the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of year; VED  is voluntary environmental
disclosure index; BVOE  is the book value at financial year; LnROE  is the natural logarithm of the ration of net profit to book value of equity at the
end of year; SCSIZE  is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total assets to book value of equity at the end of year; LnGROWTH  is the natural
logarithm of the ratio of sales in current year to sales in the previous year; INDUSTRY  is dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, coded 
as 1 for the firm belongs to environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise
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5.5.3 Endogeneity test 
Endogeneity problems have been addressed in previous value-relevant studies (e.g., Chen 
et al., 2010; Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012) in order to avoid any impact from 
them upon empirical findings. Greene (1993) pointed out that the relationship between 
CSR and firm value should be overstated if the endogeneity problem is not controlled in 
the research. Ntim et al. (2012), referring to the studies of Wooldridge (2002) and 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010), explained that a variable, generally, is classified as 
endogenous if it is correlated with the error term, and if it arises mainly from omitted 
variable bias and simultaneity (p.98). In the study on the value relevance of corporate 
governance disclosure, Nitm et al. (2012) employed a number of ways, which included 
lagged corporate governance disclosure practices (independent variables) from the firm 
value (dependent variable) and two stage least squares (2SLS), to address the potential 
endogeneity problems. In the research of Jo and Harjoto (2011), Heckman’s two-stage 
estimation and the instrumental variable (IV) method are employed to correct the 
specification for endogeneity and explore the effect of CSR activities on firm value. 
In this empirical chapter, single-equation instrumental-variables regression with a 2SLS 
estimator has been adopted to conduct the endogeneity test. The research distinguishes 
independent variables as endogenous variables and control variables as exogenous 
variables, and then employs lagged independent variables as instrumental variables to run 
the single-equation instrumental-variables regression. The result of Hausman Test in this 
study shows that F value is equal to 0.027261 (with p = 0.8689) and 0.85748 (with p = 
0.3546) for the tests of the impact on firm value from environmental disclosure quantity 
and quality. An insignificant F value (>0.05) suggests the study does not have an 
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endogeneity problem and vice versa. Thus, endogeneity problems are not considered to 
be relevant in this research. 
 
5.5.4 Results of empirical testing 
The empirical results of the association study on the value relevance of environmental 
disclosure (both quality and quantity) are tested by the STATA 10.0. This paper employs 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and Panel data to explore the relationship 
between firm value and environmental disclosure in the same year as shown in Table 5.5 
and Table 5.7, and the effect on firm value by 1-year lagged environmental disclosure is 
as shown in Table 5.6 and Table 5.8. In the OLS regression, Tables 5.5 and 5.6 reveal 
adjusted R-square of 0.392, 0.391, 0.418 and 0.417, respectively, which explains more 
than 39 per cent of the variation in the firm value level. The F value of them with 
significance at p=0.000, lower than 0.001, means that these regression models are 
statistically significant (Leng and Ding, 2011).  
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Table 5.5 
The relationship between firm value and environmental disclosure 
	  
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
LnMTBR is the natural logarithm of the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of year; 
VED is the voluntary environmental disclosure index; BVOE is the book value at end of financial year; LnROE is 
the natural logarithm of the ratio of net profit to book value of equity at the end of year; SCSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of total assets to book value of equity at the end of year; LnGROWTH is the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of sales in the current year to sales in the previous year; INDUSTRY is a dummy variable for 
environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for where the firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 
0 otherwise 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIF VIF
Variable Coeff. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 8.589 *** (0.205) 8.426 *** (0.205)
DISCQuantity 0.002 ** (0.001) 1.19
DISCQuality -­‐0.001 (0.002) 1.26
Ln(1/BVOE) 0.318 *** (0.010) 1.16 0.310 *** (0.010) 1.16
LnROE 0.256 *** (0.014) 1.08 0.254 *** (0.014) 1.09
SCSIZE -­‐0.107 *** (0.026) 1.04 -­‐0.102 *** (0.026) 1.04
LnGROWTH 0.056 * (0.034) 1.08 0.055 (0.034) 1.08
INDUSTRY 0.068 *** (0.019) 1.08 0.084 *** (0.020) 1.15Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.392 Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.391N 2850 2850
Notes: 	  *,	  **,	  ***	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  90%,	  95%	  and	  99%	  level	  of	  confidence,	  respectively.
OLS	  Regression OLS	  RegressionQuantity	  of	  VED	   Quality	  of	  VEDRobust	  Std.	  Err.
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Table 5.6 
The relationship between firm value and 1-year lagged environmental disclosure 
	  
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
LnMTBR is the natural logarithm of the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of year; 
VED is the voluntary environmental disclosure index; BVOE is the book value at the end of the financial year; 
LnROE is the natural logarithm of the ratio of net profit to book value of equity at the end of year; SCSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of total assets to book value of equity at the end of year; LnGROWTH is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of sales in the current year to sales in the previous year; INDUSTRY is a dummy variable for 
environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for where the firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 
0 otherwise 
 
From these two tables, it can be seen that quantity of environmental disclosure has 
positive regression coefficients which are significant at the 0.05 level and 0.1 level, 
respectively. It means that quantitative environmental disclosure effectively influences 
on firm value. It indicates that, in the same year, quantity of environmental disclosure is 
more value relevant, than it is with 1-year lagged disclosure. However, there is no 
significant value relevance of qualitative environment disclosure found either in the same 
year or in the 1-year lagged calculations. In addition, all of the other dependent variables 
are significant at the 0.01 level in both tables, except LnGROWTH in Table 5.5. It 
VIF VIF
Variable Coeff. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 8.484 *** (0.207) 8.336 *** (0.207)
DISCQuantity 0.002 * (0.001) 1.19
DISCQuality -­‐0.002 (0.002) 1.27
Ln(1/BVOE) 0.323 *** (0.010) 1.16 0.316 *** (0.010) 1.17
LnROE 0.246 *** (0.013) 1.11 0.244 *** (0.013) 1.12
SCSIZE -­‐0.119 *** (0.026) 1.04 -­‐0.115 *** (0.026) 1.05
LnGROWTH 0.272 *** (0.038) 1.09 0.277 *** (0.038) 1.09
INDUSTRY 0.098 *** (0.019) 1.08 0.112 *** (0.020) 1.15Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.418 Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.417N 2850 2850
Notes: 	  *,	  **,	  ***	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  90%,	  95%	  and	  99%	  level	  of	  confidence,	  respectively.
OLS	  Regression OLS	  RegressionQuantity	  of	  VED	   Quality	  of	  VEDRobust	  Std.	  Err.
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implies that firm growth is not closely related with firm value in the same year based on 
cross-sectional data during the period 2009-2011. 
This research also employs panel data using the information from the same three-year 
period (from 2009 to 2011) by fixed and random effect models (with and without 
industry effects) to do the Hausman test as shown in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. Wang et al. 
(2012) explained that purpose of the Hausman test is to find whether the intercept item 
should be conducted using the fixed or random effect model. The figures in parentheses 
are standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. The significant values in Table 5.7 
(280.88 with p=0.000, 343.52 with p=0.000, 480.24 with p=0.000, and 459.14 with 
p=0.000) and Table 5.8 (480.74 with p=0.000, 439.54 with p=0.000, 497.85 with 
p=0.000, and 497.85 with p=0.000) for the Hausmen test indicate that the random effect 
estimators are inconsistent and fixed effect estimates are more appropriate. In contrast to 
the pooled data, the difference in panel data shows a positively significant association at 
the 0.01 level between firm value and environmental disclosure (both quantity and 
quality) in the same year based on the fixed effect estimates. It denotes that both 
quantitative and qualitative environmental disclosure is value relevant, which assists to 
add to firm value, based on time series analysis. However, there is no evidence found to 
support any effect on firm value by 1-year lagged qualitative environmental disclosure in 
the fixed effect estimates, which is the same as the finding in OLS regression by pooled 
cross-sectional data. To sum up, quantitative environmental disclosure is positively value 
relevant in the market, and it also influences the firm value in the next year. In contrast, 
qualitative environmental disclosure merely relates with firm value in the same year, but 
it does not affect the market value of the companies in the following year. The findings 
of this empirical chapter are consistent with the principle of signalling theory and the 
concept of information asymmetry that good environmental disclosure in the annual 
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reports gives good signals in the stock market. It effectively influences on the market 
value of the firm by enhancing investors’ confidence, improving their appreciation of the 
firm, and reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors. Based on 
Chinese evidence, good environmental disclosure with good signals more means positive 
information rather than high level of information. One typical feature of Chinese 
environmental disclosure is that all information is just “good news” and no “bad news” 
revealed, which is decided by the property of Chinese society that strong uncertainty 
avoidance. 
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Table 5.7 
Panel data: the relationship between firm value and environmental disclosure 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
	  
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
LnMTBR is the natural logarithm of the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of year; VED 
is the voluntary environmental disclosure index; BVOE is the book value at the end of the financial year; LnROE is the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of net profit to book value of equity at the end of year; SCSIZE is the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of total assets to book value of equity at the end of year; LnGROWTH is the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
sales in the current year to sales in the previous year; INDUSTRY is a dummy variable for environmentally sensitive 
firms, coded as 1 for where the firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise 
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 23.47 *** (0.963) 10.235 *** (0.263) 10.501 *** (0.270)
DISCQuantity 0.003 *** (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001)
Ln(1/BVOE) 1.019 *** (0.045) 0.401 *** (0.012) 0.408 *** (0.012)
LnROE 0.131 *** (0.015) 0.215 *** (0.015) 0.211 *** (0.015)
SCSIZE -0.472 *** (0.062) -0.092 *** (0.031) -0.054 (0.033)
LnGROWTH 0.131 *** (0.027) 0.021 (0.027) 0.020 (0.027)
INDUSTRY 0.052 * (0.029) -0.169 (0.128)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 280.88 *** 343.52 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 23.606 *** (0.957) 10.144 *** (0.265) 10.430 *** (0.271)
DISCQuality 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002)
Ln(1/BVOE) 1.026 *** (0.045) 0.397 *** (0.012) 0.404 *** (0.012)
LnROE 0.131 *** (0.015) 0.216 *** (0.015) 0.213 *** (0.015)
SCSIZE -0.481 *** (0.062) -0.091 *** (0.031) -0.051 (0.033)
LnGROWTH 0.130 *** (0.027) 0.016 (0.027) 0.015 (0.027)
INDUSTRY 0.056 * (0.029) 0.626 *** (0.130)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 480.24 *** 459.14 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
PANEL DATA -  The first model 
Quantity of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Yes***
Yes***
Quality of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
i oe f. Coeff.
I ( . ) 10.235 *** (0.263) 10.501 * (0.270)
I ( . ) 0.005 *** (0.001) 0. 05 * (0. 01)
( /  . ( . ) 0.401 *** (0.012) 0.408 * (0.012)
. ( . ) 0.215 *** (0.015) 0.2 1 * (0.015)
I - . ( . ) -0.092 *** (0.031) -0.054 (0.0 3)
. ( . ) 0.021 (0.027) 0.020 (0.027)
I  0.052 * (0.029) -0.169 (0.128)
Industry effect o o
Haus an 280.88 *** 343.52 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 23.606 *** (0.957) 10.144 *** (0.265) 10.430 *** (0.271)
DISCQuality 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002)
Ln(1/BVOE) 1.026 *** (0.045) 0.397 *** (0.012) 0.404 *** (0.012)
LnROE 0.131 *** (0.015) 0.216 *** (0.015) 0.213 *** (0.015)
SCSIZE -0.481 *** (0.062) -0.091 *** (0.031) -0.051 (0.033)
LnGROWTH 0.130 *** (0.027) 0.016 (0.027) 0.015 (0.027)
INDUSTRY 0.056 * (0.029) 0.626 *** (0.130)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 480.24 *** 459.14 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
t t . rr. Robust Std. E r. Robust Std. Err.
tity of  
ando Random
Yes***
Yes***
Quality of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
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Table 5.8 
Panel data: the relationship between firm value and 1-year lagged environmental 
disclosure 
Panel A 
	  
Panel B 
	  
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
LnMTBR is the natural logarithm of the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of year; VED 
is the voluntary environmental disclosure index; BVOE is the book value at the end of the financial year; LnROE is the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of net profit to book value of equity at the end of year; SCSIZE is the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of total assets to book value of equity at the end of year; LnGROWTH is the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
sales in the current year to sales in the previous year; INDUSTRY is a dummy variable for environmentally sensitive 
firms, coded as 1 for where the firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise 
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 28.01 *** (0.804) 10.853 *** (0.302) 11.209 *** (0.310)
DISCQuantity 0.003 *** (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001)
Ln(1/BVOE) 1.237 *** (0.037) 0.442 *** (0.014) 0.451 *** (0.014)
LnROE 0.117 *** (0.011) 0.201 *** (0.013) 0.199 *** (0.012)
SCSIZE -0.455 *** (0.056) -0.070 ** (0.031) -0.041 (0.033)
LnGROWTH 0.243 *** (0.027) 0.253 *** (0.028) 0.251 *** (0.028)
INDUSTRY 0.082 *** (0.031) -0.158 (0.135)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 480.74 *** 439.54 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 28.205 *** (0.806) 10.739 *** (0.302) 11.122 *** (0.310)
DISCQuality 0.003 (0.002) 0.006 *** (0.002) 0.006 ** (0.002)
Ln(1/BVOE) 1.245 *** (0.037) 0.436 *** (0.014) 0.445 *** (0.014)
LnROE 0.117 *** (0.011) 0.203 *** (0.013) 0.200 *** (0.013)
SCSIZE -0.464 *** (0.056) -0.067 ** (0.031) -0.038 (0.034)
LnGROWTH 0.247 *** (0.027) 0.260 *** (0.028) 0.257 *** (0.028)
INDUSTRY 0.090 *** (0.032) -0.171 (0.138)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 497.85 *** 497.85 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Yes***
Yes***
Quality of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
PANEL DATA -  The first model - ved(t-1)
Quantity of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 28.01 *** (0.804) 10.853 *** (0.302) 11.209 *** (0.310)
DISCQuantity 0.003 *** (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001)
Ln(1/BVOE) 1.237 *** (0.037) 0.442 *** (0.014) 0.451 *** (0.014)
LnROE 0.117 *** (0.011) 0.201 *** (0.013) 0.199 *** (0.012)
SCSIZE -0.455 *** (0.056) -0.070 ** (0.031) -0.041 (0.033)
LnGROWTH 0.243 *** (0.027) 0.253 *** (0.028) 0.251 *** (0.028)
INDUSTRY 0.082 *** (0.031) -0.158 (0.135)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 480.74 *** 439.54 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 28.205 *** (0.806) 10.739 *** (0.302) 11.122 *** (0.310)
DISCQuality 0.003 (0.002) 0.006 *** (0.002) 0.006 ** (0.002)
Ln(1/BVOE) 1.245 *** (0.037) 0.436 *** (0.014) 0.445 *** (0.014)
LnROE 0.117 *** (0.011) 0.203 *** (0.013) 0.200 *** (0.013)
SCSIZE -0.464 *** (0.056) -0.067 ** (0.031) -0.038 (0.034)
LnGROWTH 0.247 *** (0.027) 0.260 *** (0.028) 0.257 *** (0.028)
INDUSTRY 0.090 *** (0.032) -0.171 (0.138)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 497.85 *** 497.85 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Yes***
Yes***
Quality of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
PANEL DATA -  The first model - ved(t-1)
Quantity of VED 
Fixed Random Random
	  	  
	  
239	  
In this paper, profitability (LnROE/ROE) and book value of equity (Ln(BVOE)) are 
found significantly at the 0.01 level to correlate with the value of the firm by both pooled 
data and panel data, which accords with the framework supplied by Ohlson’s (1995) 
model. The value of the firm is reflected by a combination of information which refers to 
the income statement (profits/earnings), the balance sheet (book value of equity), and 
other value-relevant information (Berry and Wright, 2001). Therefore, the regression in 
this paper is confirmed well. Under the time series data, the growth of the firm 
(LnGROWTH) is found to be an important determinate which affects the market value 
positively. It reflects there is a dynamic market reaction to the fast growth of firms and 
vice versa. In other words, fast growing firms would attract more funding from investors. 
Those slow and negative growing firms should therefore utilise other methods to add to 
their market value, such as increasing environmental disclosure. 
Firm size (SCSIZE), a control variable, is found to impact on dependent variables 
(LnMTBR) significantly and negatively in this study. It is inconsistent with the finding of 
Hassan et al. (2009). They argued that a large-size firm is expected to have a high level 
of firm value and indicated that a significantly positive link between firm size and firm 
value is found based on evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt. However, 
the result in this paper accords with the empirical study of Wu and Shen (2010), which 
investigated the relationship between environmental disclosure practice and firm value 
based on 145 listed chemical firms in China.  They found that firm size associates with 
Tobin’s Q with a negative regression coefficient which is significant at the 0.01 level. In 
other words, in the Chinese market, a negative association between firm size and firm 
value is proved. There are some possible reasons to explain why this phenomenon	  
emerges in the Chinese market which are as follows: 1) In contrast to large firms, there 
are more growth prospects and also development potential in small companies, which 
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attract more investor interest; 2) At present, the Chinese stock markets are highly 
speculative and volatile, which leads to speculative short-term trading as the main market 
form in China. Large firms with market saturation and steady stock price cannot be 
favoured by these short-term investors; 3) Lower stock market prices are issued by small 
companies compared with those of large firms, which are more easily undertaken by a 
larger range of investors. 
 
5.5.5 Results of Robustness test 
Tobin’s Q and share return are employed as dependent variables in this paper in order to 
measure the robustness of the empirical test. We utilise Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression to investigate the value relevance of environmental disclosure based on pooled 
cross-sectional data. From Table 5.10 Panels A and B, we did not find any evidence to 
support that quantitative and qualitative environmental disclosures are value relevant for 
the stock market in the following year. However, in Table 5.9, both quantity and quality 
of environmental disclosure, with positive regression coefficients which are significant at 
the 0.01 level, are found to relate with share return in the same year. In addition, there is 
a negative impact on Tobin’s Q found from quality of environmental disclosure. These 
results reveal that the role of environmental disclosure is very important for share return 
in the same year, which is the same result as when it used LnMTBR. In addition, the 
findings indicate that, in the Robustness test, 1-year lagged environmental disclosure has 
no effect in the stock market. It accords with the results of the association between 1-year 
lagged qualitative environmental information and the market value of the firm 
(LnMTBR). There is a faint difference on the role of quantitative environmental 
disclosure found as a slight impact on share return from 1-year lagged quantity of 
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information when a significant effect on LnMTBR is shown. Table 5.11 shows the 
relationship between share return and environmental disclosure by Panel data. In this 
case, the Hausman test lends support for fixed effect specification. The results indicate 
that quality of environmental disclosure does not, in effect, provide value relevant 
information to the market by time series analysis, but quantitative environmental 
informational does. In these three tables, the findings prove again that there is a 
significant and negative effect from firm size (FSIZE) on firm value (Tobin’s Q/Ri,t) in 
Chinese listed companies.  
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Table 5.9 
Panel A: The relationship between Tobin’s Q and environmental disclosure 
	  
	  
Panel B: The relationship between share return and environmental disclosure 
	  
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
Tobin’s Q = market value of assets / book value of assets (where market value of assets is measured by book value of 
assets minus book value of common equity and then add market value of the common equity); Share return (Ri,t) = ln 
(Pi,t/Pi,t-1); VED is the voluntary environmental disclosure index; FSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets in RMB at the end of year; ROE is profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; DEBT is leverage ratio of total 
liabilities divided by total assets at the end of year; GROWTH is the ratio of sales in the current year to sales in the 
previous year; INDUSTRY is a dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for where the firm 
belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise. 
VIF VIF
Variable Coeff. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 14.683 *** (0.473) 14.451 *** (0.469)
DISCQuantity 0.001 (0.001) 1.19
DISCQuality -­‐0.009 * (0.005) 1.26
FSIZE -­‐0.543 *** (0.022) 1.43 -­‐0.530 *** (0.022) 1.43
ROE 8.478 *** (0.452) 1.07 8.444 *** (0.451) 1.07
DEBT -­‐2.502 *** (0.150) 1.26 -­‐2.508 *** (0.150) 1.26
GROWTH 0.055 (0.044) 1.05 0.054 (0.044) 1.05
INDUSTRY 0.090 * (0.047) 1.08 0.121 ** (0.048) 1.15Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.438 Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.438N 2850 2850
Notes: 	  *,	  **,	  ***	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  90%,	  95%	  and	  99%	  level	  of	  confidence,	  r spectiv ly.
OLS	  Regression OLS	  RegressionQuantity	  of	  VED	   Quality	  of	  VEDRobust	  Std.	  Err.
VIF VIF
Variable Coeff. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 2.643 *** (0.212) 2.479 *** (0.214)
DISCQuantity 0.007 *** (0.001) 1.19
DISCQuality 0.010 *** (0.003) 1.26
FSIZE -­‐0.127 *** (0.010) 1.43 -­‐0.119 *** (0.010) 1.43
ROE 0.916 *** (0.170) 1.07 0.911 *** (0.170) 1.07
DEBT 0.292 *** (0.066) 1.26 0.285 *** (0.066) 1.26
GROWTH -­‐0.055 (0.035) 1.05 -­‐0.058 (0.035) 1.05
INDUSTRY -­‐0.004 (0.023) 1.08 0.002 (0.024) 1.15Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.051 Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.044N 2850 2850
Notes: 	  *,	  **,	  ***	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  90%,	  95%	  and	  99%	  level	  of	  confidence,	  respectively.
OLS	  Regression OLS	  RegressionQuantity	  of	  VED	   Quality	  of	  VEDRobust	  Std.	  Err.
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Table 5.10 
Panel A: The relationship between Tobin’s Q and 1-year lagged environmental disclosure 
	  
	  
Panel B: The relationship between share return and 1-year lagged environmental disclosure 
	  
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
Tobin’s Q = market value of assets / book value of assets (where market value of assets is measured by book value of 
assets minus book value of common equity and then add market value of the common equity); Share return (Ri,t) = ln 
(Pi,t/Pi,t-1); VED is the voluntary environmental disclosure index; FSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets in RMB at the end of year; ROE is profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; DEBT is leverage ratio of total 
liabilities divided by total assets at the end of year; GROWTH is the ratio of sales in the current year to sales in the 
previous year; INDUSTRY is a dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, coded as 1 for where the firm 
belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise. 
 
VIF VIF
Variable Coeff. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 12.582 *** (0.451) 12.406 *** (0.449)
DISCQuantity 0.001 (0.002) 1.19
DISCQuality -­‐0.006 (0.005) 1.26
FSIZE -­‐0.479 *** (0.021) 1.46 -­‐0.470 *** (0.021) 1.46
ROE 8.054 *** (0.445) 1.08 8.020 *** (0.445) 1.08
DEBT -­‐1.880 *** (0.139) 1.30 -­‐1.884 *** (0.139) 1.30
GROWTH 0.198 *** (0.051) 1.05 0.199 *** (0.051) 1.05
INDUSTRY 0.134 *** (0.045) 1.08 0.157 *** (0.046) 1.15Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.404 Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.405N 2850 2850
Notes: 	  *,	  **,	  ***	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  90%,	  95%	  and	  99%	  level	  of	  confidence,	  r spectiv ly.
OLS	  Regression OLS	  RegressionQuantity	  of	  VED	   Quality	  of	  VEDRobust	  Std.	  Err.
VIF VIF
Variable Coeff. Robust	  Std.	  Err. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 0.440 *** (0.135) 0.418 *** (0.134)
DISCQuantity 0.001 (0.001) 1.19
DISCQuality 0.001 (0.002) 1.26
FSIZE -­‐0.037 *** (0.006) 1.46 -­‐0.036 *** (0.006) 1.46
ROE 0.706 *** (0.109) 1.08 0.705 *** (0.110) 1.08
DEBT 0.132 *** (0.039) 1.30 0.131 *** (0.039) 1.30
GROWTH 0.046 ** (0.020) 1.05 0.046 ** (0.020) 1.05
INDUSTRY -­‐0.005 (0.014) 1.08 -­‐0.004 (0.015) 1.15Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.025 Adj	  R-­‐squared 0.025N 2850 2850
Notes: 	  *,	  **,	  ***	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  90%,	  95%	  and	  99%	  level	  of	  confidence,	  respectively.
OLS	  Regression OLS	  RegressionQuantity	  of	  VED	   Quality	  of	  VEDRobust	  Std.	  Err.
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Table 5.11 
Panel data: the relationship between share return and environmental disclosure 
Panel A 
	  
Panel B 
	  
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1 
Share return (Ri,t) = ln (Pi,t/Pi,t-1); VED is the voluntary environmental disclosure index; FSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets in RMB at the end of year; ROE is profitability: return on shareholders’ equity; 
DEBT is leverage ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of year; GROWTH is the ratio of sales in the 
current year to sales in the previous year; INDUSTRY is a dummy variable for environmentally sensitive firms, coded 
as 1 for where the firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise. 
 
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 42.778 *** (1.604) 2.643 *** (0.212) 2.761 *** (0.232)
DISCQuantity 0.005 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.001) 0.007 *** (0.001)
FSIZE -1.975 *** (0.074) -0.127 *** (0.010) -0.136 *** (0.011)
ROE 0.696 ** (0.347) 0.916 *** (0.170) 0.914 *** (0.172)
DEBT 1.108 *** (0.264) 0.292 *** (0.066) 0.311 *** (0.072)
GROWTH 0.085 ** (0.038) -0.055 (0.035) -0.054 (0.035)
INDUSTRY -0.004 (0.023) 0.196 * (0.106)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 1299.23 *** 1485.80 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 43.092 *** (1.603) 2.479 *** (0.214) 2.621 *** (0.235)
DISCQuality 0.003 (0.005) 0.010 *** (0.003) 0.009 *** (0.003)
FSIZE -1.988 *** (0.074) -0.119 *** (0.010) -0.128 *** (0.011)
ROE 0.703 ** (0.347) 0.911 *** (0.170) 0.909 *** (0.172)
DEBT 1.093 *** (0.267) 0.285 *** (0.066) 0.310 *** (0.073)
GROWTH 0.085 ** (0.039) -0.058 (0.035) -0.057 (0.036)
INDUSTRY 0.002 (0.024) 0.197 * (0.107)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 1236.62 *** 1406.24 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
PANEL DATA - 
Quantity of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Yes
Yes
Quality of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 42.778 *** (1.604) 2.643 *** (0.212) 2.761 *** (0.232)
DISCQuantity 0.005 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.001) 0.007 *** (0.001)
FSIZE -1.975 *** (0.074) -0.127 *** (0.010) -0.136 *** (0.011)
ROE 0.696 ** (0.347) 0.916 *** (0.170) 0.914 *** (0.172)
DEBT 1.108 *** (0.264) 0.292 *** (0.066) 0.311 *** (0.072)
GROWTH 0.085 ** (0.038) -0.055 (0.035) -0.054 (0.035)
INDUSTRY -0.004 (0.023) 0.196 * (0.106)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 1299.23 *** 1485.80 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
INTERCEPT 43.092 *** (1.603) 2.479 *** (0.214) 2.621 *** (0.235)
DISCQuality 0.003 (0.005) 0.010 *** (0.003) 0.009 *** (0.003)
FSIZE -1.988 *** (0.074) -0.119 *** (0.010) -0.128 *** (0.011)
ROE 0.703 ** (0.347) 0.911 *** (0.170) 0.909 *** (0.172)
DEBT 1.093 *** (0.267) 0.285 *** (0.066) 0.310 *** (0.073)
GROWTH 0.085 ** (0.039) -0.058 (0.035) -0.057 (0.036)
INDUSTRY 0.002 (0.024) 0.197 * (0.107)
Industry effect No No
Hausman 1236.62 *** 1406.24 ***
Number of observations 2850 2850 2850
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
PANEL DATA - 
Quantity of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Yes
Yes
Quality of VED 
Fixed Random Random
Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. Robust Std. Err.
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
China, one of the largest developing countries, is the most populous nation in the world. 
It is recognised as a country with a pivotal role in global environmental protection (Rowe 
et al., 2009). In the last three decades, the rapid economic growth has left severe air and 
water problems in many cities in China. These serious environmental issues have not 
only increased the attention of the government and residents, it has also attracted many 
scholars to explore the association between corporations and environmental disclosure in 
order to assist various stakeholders in realising the effect of environmental disclosure and 
therefore to contribute to sustainable development. In this empirical paper, signalling 
theory and the concept of information asymmetry have been developed to explore the 
market response to quantitative and qualitative environmental disclosure in the annual 
report through examining evidence from Chinese listed companies between 2009 and 
2011. This paper contributes to the association studies (long-term relationships) on value 
relevance research. It extends the study of Wu and Shen (2010) from 145 listed chemical 
firms in 2008 to 2,850 firm-year observations during the period 2009-2011 covering 12 
different industries. The lack of time-series analysis and the problems of unitary 
industrial research in their study are improved upon. In addition, this paper employs 
LnMTBR instead of Tobin’s Q to measure firm value based on the Ohlson (1995) model 
with size-control factors. At the same time, Tobin’s Q and share returns are employed to 
test the robustness of the regression. The findings indicate that quantitative 
environmental disclosure is positively value relevant in the market, and it also influences 
the firm value in the next year. In contrast, qualitative environmental disclosure merely 
relates with the firm value in the same year, but it does not affect the market value of 
companies in the following year. In other words, quantitative environmental information 
in the annual report is more effective in the Chinese market than qualitative information. 
	  	  
	  
246	  
To some extent, it implies that the quantity of environmental disclosure provides more 
value relevant information, which is very popular for investors in China, and that quality 
environmental information is underdeveloped which Chinese listed companies should 
perhaps pay more attention to. In addition, it is worth mentioning that a negative 
association is found between firm size and firm value in the Chinese stock market, which 
is contrary to the view of large-size firms being expected to relate with high firm value. 
Furthermore, this study denotes that much less environmental information is disclosed in 
the annual reports of most Chinese listed companies and that China is in a budding stage 
of development in disclosure practice. The positive value relevance of environmental 
disclosure is supported by empirical evidence in this paper. Voluntary disclosure practice 
could mitigate the information asymmetry and attract long-term investment from outside 
investors, instead of speculative short-term trading, in order to create an efficient stock 
market. It suggests that firms should reveal more environmental information in the future 
in order to reduce information asymmetry, improve the firms’ signals to stakeholders, 
and thus increase firm value.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this thesis concerns four domains: the Chinese context; corporate 
governance; environmental disclosure; and its value relevance. The precise natures of the 
relations between these domains are explored to gain greater clarity. Due to the unique 
characteristics of Chinese corporate governance, the rapidly growing economy in the last 
three decades in China, the extremely serious environmental issues faced by the residents 
and the direction of sustainable development, research on the determinants of 
environmental disclosure and its value relevance based on empirical evidence of Chinese 
firms is meaningful and significant.  
This thesis expects to contribute to a more comprehensive knowledge of voluntary 
environmental disclosure in three main areas. First, this study provides an up-to-date 
commentary on the status of both quantitative and qualitative voluntary environmental 
disclosures in the annual reports of Chinese listed companies. It also points out that the 
trend of the increasing development of environmental disclosure in the Chinese market 
should continue in the future. Second, based on the unique characteristics of ownership 
structure and board composition in China and the gap in previous research, the effect of 
these two characteristic mechanisms of corporate governance on environmental 
information is investigated. In addition, it presents a comparison between the different 
determinants of quantitative and qualitative environmental disclosures. Third, this thesis 
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provides an updated research on the value relevance of voluntary environmental 
disclosures under both cross-sectional and time-series data in order to explore the 
importance and value of this kind of environmental practice by firms in fast developing 
countries such as China based on a large sample size during consecutive years.  
This thesis achieved in answering the research questions and improved upon the issues 
relating to the previous research on environmental information disclosure. This 
concluding chapter summarises the thesis in relation to its main objectives. The 
following sections provide a synopsis of this research; a summary of research 
methodology; and a summary of the research findings. Then, the potential implications of 
these findings are discussed and the recommendations in promoting environmental 
responsibility and accountability are given. The next section discusses the limitations of 
this study along with recommendations for future research. It is very important to realise 
the limitations in the thesis, which could provide guidance and direction for future 
studies. The final section gives a brief summary of this chapter. 
 
6.2 SYNOPSIS 
According to the main research aims, this thesis is divided into three empirical parts. 
Before these empirical chapters, it distinguished the unique characteristics of corporate 
governance in China from the UK and the US. It provided a comprehensive definition of 
corporate governance in both broad and narrow perspectives. Then the differences 
between China and Western countries were evaluated and analysed, with a focus on the 
unique characteristics of China which took in five aspects: the corporate governance 
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model, the development of Corporate Governance Codes, ownership structure, board 
structure, and the agency problem.  
In the first two empirical chapters, it highlighted the gap in the previous studies on the 
relationship between corporate governance and voluntary environmental disclosure, 
which supports the motivation and importance of this research. Based on the discussion, 
analysis and estimation of the theoretical frameworks (legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory, agency theory, and stakeholder-agency theory), the research hypotheses were 
presented based on the stakeholder-agency theory and the actual status of China.  
In the first and the second empirical chapters, the roles of ownership structure and board 
composition on the quantity and quality of environmental disclosure in the annual reports 
are examined through the data of 3,690 firm-year observations during the period 2009-
2011 covering 12 industries based on the Chinese market. 
The third empirical chapter provides an updated research on the value relevance of 
voluntary environmental disclosures. The limitations of the previous research propel a 
time-series analysis of the association study on value relevance based on the Chinese 
evidence because of its uniqueness and its stock market environment under the nation’s 
distinct political, legal, and economic context. 
In the third empirical chapter, this thesis developed signalling theory and the concept of 
information asymmetry to explore the market response to quantitative and qualitative 
environmental disclosure in the annual report using evidence from Chinese listed 
companies between 2009 and 2011.  
 
	  	  
	  
250	  
6.3 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In measurement of environmental disclosure, the research integrated mechanistic content 
analysis approach and interpretative approach to measure both quantity and quality of 
disclosure information. In detail, the number of sentences has been chosen as the “unit of 
analysis” (Gray et al., 1995) to measure the quantity of environmental disclosure; and a 
score system based on 9 items has been chosen to measure the quality. The reliability of 
environmental information collection was proved by the reliability test of content 
analysis based on the measurement of stability and reproducibility (Krippendorff, 2004) 
and Coefficient alpha (Waltz et al., 1991, p.166). 
The primary measurement of value relevance in this research employed lnMTBR, which 
is a better and more powerful measure in firm value than using the logarithm of market 
equity alone (Hassan et al., 2009). The equation of lnMTBR is the natural logarithm of 
the ratio (market value of equity / book value of equity). In this study, market value of 
equity is measured as the number of outstanding shares at the end of year multiplied by 
the share price of the stock at the end of year. In the robustness test, Tobin’s Q and Share 
return were engaged to measure the value relevance. These two popular approaches have 
been frequently applied in previous value-relevant studies (e.g., Murray et al., 2006; 
Ragothaman and Carr, 2008; Murcia and Santos, 2010; Wu and Shen, 2010; Moroney et 
al., 2011).  
The Ohlson (1995) model is the ‘best-known conceptual model of value relevance 
analysis’ (Carnevale et al., 2009). It supplies a framework that ‘is fully articulated in that 
it relates the value of the firm to the information provided in the income statement 
(earnings), the balance sheet (book value of equity), and other value-relevant information’ 
(Berry and Wright, 2001, p745). In previous studies (e.g., Moneva and Cuellar, 2009; 
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Semenova et al., 2009; De Klerk and de Villiers, 2012), they mentioned that all 
accounting and market-based variables should be divided by the total assets/equity of the 
firm at the beginning of the period in order to control the size differences. Therefore, the 
model of value relevance in this study was developed based on the Ohlson (1995) model 
with this size-control factor. 
The empirical parts emphasised that, although OLS regression is commonly employed in 
examining the relationship between the extent of social and environmental disclosure and 
its determinants, there is a limitation in ordinary least squares when the dependent 
variable is measured by content analysis to generate a part of the sample without any 
disclosure and hence being scored with a zero value (Salama et al., 2012) whilst the other 
parts are more than zero. TOBIT formulation supplies a powerful check on the model 
which has the value of the dependent variable as not less than zero. Therefore, TOBIT 
and ordered PROBIT regressions were also employed to examine the relationship 
between the extent of voluntary environmental disclosure and characteristics of corporate 
governance for minimising any loopholes in regressions. In other words, a robustness test 
was completed through running these three regressions.  
As alluded to above, this study explored the determinants of both quantitative and 
qualitative environmental disclosure through OLS, TOBIT, and ordered PROBIT 
regressions. The findings are consistent between OLS and TOBIT regressions, which 
points to the stability and robustness of the research model. Furthermore, panel data by 
fixed and random effect models (with and without industry effects) was also employed to 
do the empirical tests. In contrast with pooled data (cross-sectional data), panel data 
(time series data) supplied an analysis on measurements of the relationship over time. In 
the empirical part of value relevance, this study employed Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
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regression and Panel data to explore the relationship between firms’ environmental 
disclosure and firms’ market to book ratio in the same and the subsequent year.  
 
6.4 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS  
In this research, the features of Chinese corporate governance was found to be mainly a 
combination of the Anglo-American and continental European models which have 
formed a mixed model containing Chinese characteristic dual boards, which are 
controlled by a highly concentrated state-owned ownership structure. A large proportion 
of shares are untradeable, in the hands of the state, which leads to ‘a high level of 
ownership concentration and a low level of marketability’ (Ma et al., 2010). In China, the 
state holds two significant roles in corporate governance: the controlling shareholder (the 
main owner) and the political power holder (the main regulator of the corporate sector). 
The contrary duties between “player” and “judge” are put into a single unit, which means 
where there are conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholders (the state) and 
minority shareholders, the state with its political power has the difficulty of deciding 
whose interest is protected: either its own interest or the fair interest of all shareholders. 
And then, the agency problems arise at a new level in the relationship between the strong 
controlling shareholders (the principal) and the weak minority shareholder (the principal); 
another is between the directors (the agent) and the minority shareholders (the principal). 
In the other hand, the state’s dual role in a good way could increase monitoring to 
managers and protection for its own rights by its political power. In other words, it gets 
the state and managers together to protect the state’s interest, which means most people’s 
interest, and overlook minority shareholders’ interest (minority people’s interest). That is 
a possible reason why China had the rapid economic growth in the last three decades and 
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avoided the serious impact from the 2007 financial crisis. At present, the state cannot 
withdraw its control form Chinese corporations, because there is no mechanism in place 
of this control to prevent managers abusing their power. Although there are still many 
issues and immature mechanisms in Chinese corporate governance which need to be 
improved as soon as possible, the government has been making efforts to set up an 
effective corporate governance system and a mature market.  
Following this, the empirical chapters provided an up-to-date commentary on the status 
of both quantitative and qualitative voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual 
reports of Chinese listed companies through the manual data collection and its analysis. 
When the figures were compared with the data revealed by the previous studies, it 
showed that the developing trend of increasing levels of environmental disclosure did not 
only keep growing at all times through the years, but also it accelerated by an amazing 
rate. According to studies of Li and Xiao (2002), Xiao and Hu (2004), and Liu and 
Anbumozhi (2009), it found an increase in Chinese listed companies with voluntary 
environmental disclosure as shown by 34 per cent in 2002, 37 per cent in 2003, and 
approximately 60 per cent in 2006. This study showed a level of 95 per cent of Chinese 
listed companies with environmental disclosure between 2009 and 2011. However, it is 
worth mentioning that both qualitative and quantitative environmental disclosure is quite 
insufficient in the annual reports of most Chinese listed companies, with the exception of 
a few companies which reveal comparatively sufficient quantitative environmental 
information. The study reflected that Chinese firms pay more attention to the quantity of 
environmental disclosure rather than quality, which means that quantity is more 
important than quality in the minds of the managers. Furthermore, this study found that 
companies just report ‘good news’ and hide ‘bad news’, which is the current status of 
environmental disclosure practice in the annual reports of Chinese listed companies. The 
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above abnormal phenomena reflect an unbalanced view of managers and control 
shareholders on environmental disclosure in China. They just focus on the immediate 
benefits from quantitative and positive information, and always overlook the meaning of 
disclosure practices in the annual reports. A good environmental disclosure, which 
should involve high level of environmental information both “good news” and “bad 
news”, assists various stakeholders to realise the actual status of companies dealing with 
environmental issues. It needs to attract attention of the government and the public for its 
improvement in future.  
The empirical results on the relationship between corporate governance and 
environmental disclosure indicated that environmental disclosure positively relates to 
state ownership, blockholder ownership, managerial ownership, and size of the 
supervisory board; that it negatively relates to legal person ownership and foreign share 
ownership; and it doesn’t relate significantly with the proportion of independent directors 
on the board of directors (IND). In detail, state ownership and a larger size of the 
supervisory board with an effective monitoring role in the company encourage the firm 
be engaged in voluntary environmental disclosure. The findings are consistent with the 
organisational and managerial perspective and the accountability perspective evolved 
from stakeholder theory. In China, state ownership, which is powerful and where it is 
important for the managers’ positions, meets the requirement in the organisation and 
managerial perspective. Therefore, the firm would satisfy the information demands of 
state ownership. In regard to the supervisory board, which is more inclined to the firms 
rather than aligned with management, it requires the firm to supply disclosures 
explaining firm’s actions to stakeholders and society and reducing information 
asymmetry, which is accordant with the stakeholder-agency theory and the accountability 
perspective. However, there was no empirical evidence to support that the IND 
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effectively acts on environmental disclosure. It reflected an immature mechanism and 
some remaining problems in Chinese corporate governance at the moment. Furthermore, 
this research found that large firms in ‘environmentally-sensitive’ industry play a 
significant and positive role on environmental disclosure practice in the annual report in 
China. The finding is consistent with many previous studies (e.g., Gray et al., 2001; 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Beck et al., 2010;	  Buniamin, 
2010; Salama et al., 2012; Zeng et al., 2012). In other words, the results of these two 
control variables (LogFSIZE and INDUSTRY) proved that the model and data in this 
empirical study are effective. 
The empirical findings on the value relevance of environmental disclosure indicated that 
quantitative environmental disclosure is positively value relevant in the market, and it 
also influences the firm value in the following year. It confirmed well the hypothesis 
which founded on the signalling theory and the concept of information asymmetry. In 
detail, good environmental disclosure practice supplies good signals in the stock market 
that increase firms’ reputation and reduce information asymmetry between investors and 
mangers to enhance investors’ confidence on investment decisions. In contrast, 
qualitative environmental disclosure merely relates with the firm value in the same year, 
but it does not affect the next year market value of companies. In other words, 
quantitative environmental information in the annual report is more effective in the 
Chinese market than qualitative information. To some extent, it implied that the quantity 
of environmental disclosure provides more value relevant information which is preferred 
by investors in China, and the quality of environmental information is underdeveloped 
which should be paid more attention by Chinese listed companies. In addition, it is worth 
mentioning that a negative association was found between firm size and the market value 
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of the firm in the Chinese stock market, which is in opposition to the view of larger-sized 
firm being expected to relate with high firm value.  
To look back at Chinese history, the seeds of capitalism began in the late feudal society. 
But the communist revolution pushed China to skip over the capitalism and go to a new 
stage of socialism. After the communists took over the means of production and 
established its own regime, the government restructured all private-ownership enterprises 
to SOEs and dedicated making the country self-sufficient. However, in the late Mao’s, 
many state-owned enterprise needed state subsidy because of the natural and man-made 
disaster. In the 1970s, a new leader, Xiaoping Deng, introduced a form of market 
economy, but with a centralised, Communist-state orientation for economic development 
(Tricker, 2012). Compared with Neo-corporatism pursued a more “equitable” division of 
economic production for members of society, Chinese government utilises the 
corporatism to reduce the number of challengers and consolidate its own political power. 
From the above, the government has been engaging in the protection of its one-party 
dictatorship, whether politically or economically. The findings in this thesis provided 
evidences to realise the uniqueness of Chinese case. In China, state ownership, which 
possesses two significant roles in corporate governance: “player” and “judge”, holds 
dominant status and power in the Chinese listed companies, which are important for 
managers’ position. Therefore, managers have to satisfy state ownership’s information 
demands and interests. The empirical results in the relationship between state ownership 
and environmental disclosure (both quantity and quality) provided it. However, the 
affiliation of state ownership and managers would impact minority shareholders’ 
interests, which is reflected by the empirical findings of the relationship between foreign 
ownership and environmental disclosure. Moreover, the role and duty of independent 
directors are also influenced by this affiliation, as the empirical findings in the 
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association between the proportion of independent directors and environmental 
disclosure. On the current situation, the uniqueness of Chinese corporate governance 
gave the fast economic growing in the last three decides and 2007 financial crisis 
avoidance, because the state’s interests means most of the people's interests. However, in 
the long run, the unbalanced market economy would hinder the establishment of a fair 
and effective market in China.  
To sum up, this study denoted that there is much less quantity and low level 
environmental information disclosed in the annual report of most Chinese listed 
companies, compared to Western countries, and that China is in a budding stage of 
development in disclosure practice. It suggested that firms should reveal more 
environmental information in the future to create a win-win situation between themselves 
and their stakeholders, under the stakeholder-agency framework. Corporate governance 
(different ownership structures and supervisory board) was found as determinant factor 
influencing environmental disclosure practice in China. It means that effective corporate 
governance assists the development of environmental information in the annual reports. 
In the relationship between firms’ market value and firms’ disclosure practice, it found 
that both quantity and quality of environmental disclosures are value relevant. The 
findings suggested that managers should put more attention to improve environmental 
information practice in the annual report, which could reduce information asymmetry, 
improve the firms’ signals to stakeholders, and thus increase firm value. In short, 
improving corporate governance means better environmental disclosure practice, and 
then increases firms’ value and advances economic development.  
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6.5 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis may have potential implications for policy makers and managers. In terms of 
policy makers, the study provides two potential policy implications. First, the empirical 
finding discovered that the effect of independent directors on the board of directors on 
environmental disclosure practice is more useless compared with other characteristics of 
corporate governance in ownership structure and board component. Moreover, 
overlapped role between supervisory board and independent directors are big issues in 
the development of the Chinese corporate governance. It reflects an immature 
mechanism with some remaining problems in the Chinese market at present. The results 
inform standard-setters and regulators to strengthen requirements of the code of 
corporate governance and corporate law in order to improve the role of independent non-
executive directors and enhance their power and initiatives. Second, the study indicated 
that, in contrast with the UK and the US, both the quantity and the quality of 
environmental information disclosed in China is more scattered, unsystematic, and 
incomplete. It informs regulators the importance in enforcing compliance with 
regulations about disclosure practices, especially for qualitative environmental 
information, in future. A good information environment of voluntary environmental 
disclosure should be underpinned by an appropriate legal framework. 
In terms of managers, the findings provide valuable insights to assist them having 
effective conversations with various stakeholders. In the third empirical chapter, findings 
indicated that quantitative environmental information in the annual report is more 
effective in the Chinese market than qualitative information. To some extent, it implies 
that the quantity of environmental disclosure provides more value relevant information 
which is preferred by investors in China. It helps managers to realise how to use 
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voluntary environmental disclosure satisfying investors and increasing a firm’s market 
value, and thus to decide on their own company’s disclosure practices; for scholars and 
environmental groups, managers should to balance the development of quantitative and 
qualitative environmental disclosure practice. It could have negative influence if they just 
pay attention to quantity of environmental information. To sum up, managers should find 
effective ways to address varies requirements of various shareholders. 
 
6.6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
The research has some limitations that could be addressed in future research. First, the 
collection of environmental disclosure in this thesis relies solely on the annual report. 
One of main reasons is that the annual report is a primary information source that is a 
more publicised and visible document than other information sources (Halme and Huse, 
1997) and can be easily accessed (Wilmshurst, and Frost, 2000). In addition, ‘the annual 
report possesses a degree of credibility not associated with other forms of advertising’ 
(Neu et al., 1998, p.269). Although almost all studies research disclosure practices 
depending on the annual reports, they overlook a wide range of media, such as 
advertisements, booklets, focus groups, press releases, and employed councils (Gray et 
al., 2001), which are also employed by the firms to communicate with stakeholders about 
environmental information. These mediums provide multiplex information about 
environmental practices, ecological protection, and green development. The wider range 
of media were not be adopted in this thesis, because a large sample size is applied in the 
study, which increases the difficulties in collecting manual data from various sources. In 
addition, these kinds of medium are not currently widely utilised as a dialogue between 
the majority of firms and their stakeholders. However, these mediums of communication 
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are likely to be improved and become more widely used in this rapidly changing 
technological information age. Therefore, the research on this area in future could 
consider environmental information revealed by the wider range of media. It would 
enhance the accuracy of the empirical findings. Moreover, further studies could employ 
integrated environmental disclosure from at least two media to conduct a comparison. 
Second, there are only non-financial listed companies employed in the sample to 
examine the influence from corporate governance on environmental disclosure and the 
market response to environmental disclosure, because the listed companies in the 
financial sector are subject to a separate disclosure requirement in China. Consequently, 
the result may not extend across all listed companies in China. Therefore, the role of 
ownership structure and board composition on the extent of environmental disclosure and 
the value relevance of environmental disclosure in financial firms is still an open 
question, which needs to be considered in further research. The financial crisis of 2007 
pushed the financial firms, especially banks, to the forefront of discussion and research 
again. Caused by the big issues faced by banks, the financial crisis shook the economies 
of many countries seriously, such as the UK, the US, and Japan. A large rate of 
unemployment, bankrupt corporations, and increased criminal activity are the main 
phenomena which were produced by the financial crisis. In contrast, however, the 
Chinese economy was less impacted by the worldwide slowdown. This situation has 
increased research interest on Chinese corporate governance and its relationship with 
corporate social responsibility, which includes environmental practice.    
Third, this study investigated the effect of two characteristics of corporate governance 
(ownership structure and board composition) on disclosure practice. The monitoring role 
played by other mechanisms, such as family control, auditing committee, and 
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Chairman/CEO, on environmental information disclosure based on the empirical 
evidence of Chinese firms has not yet been explored. It expects this to be developed by 
further studies. Although the previous empirical research received almost consistent 
results from family control, auditing committee and Chairman/CEO duality related to 
voluntary disclosure in other countries, the unique characteristics of Chinese corporate 
governance offers feasibility in this area. It would find different results based on the 
different mechanisms in Chinese corporate governance.  
Fourth, this thesis merely groups environmental information in the annual report into two 
types, quantity and quality, to investigate its value relevance. It suggests that scholars 
should further divide the content of environmental disclosure into different aspects, such 
as information about environmental policy, information about environmental assets and 
so on, to compare and look for which kind of environmental disclosure effectively 
influences on the market reaction. In other words, future research could explore in-depth 
the specific content of environmental disclosure, which would help managers to further 
understand the preferences of stakeholders and then to dispose environmental practices. 
Moreover, environmental disclosure is divided into mandatory and voluntary information 
for research in many studies. There has been a series of regulations and standards on 
environmental disclosure published by the Chinese government recently. However, at 
present, Chinese companies are still in an emerging stage of revealing voluntary 
disclosure because of the large costs of implementation and difficulty of supervision 
(Chen, 2013). As mentioned above, the Chinese government has been making efforts to 
set up an effective corporate governance system and a mature market. The regulations 
and standards have yet to be implemented by pressure from the government in order to 
achieve a mature market in the future. Therefore, this change provides a motivation to 
observe environmental disclosure in these two classes in future research.  
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Finally, based on the manual data collection, this study found that all observed 
companies merely disclose positive environmental information in the annual reports. It 
means that the bias created by including only good news from the annual reports in the 
analysis. However, it is a common phenomenon that firms just reveal good news and 
hides bad news in Chinese market at present. Regard to this issue, the Chinese 
government and policy makers need to motivate or compel companies to supply bad 
environmental information in the annual reports. At the same time, scholars and 
environmental groups should give firms pressures for more comprehensive 
environmental disclosure. Future research could pay attention on the development of bad 
news in the annual reports of Chinese listed companies.  
 
6.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a brief summary to conclude the research and findings, which 
answers and explains the research question addressed above. At the same time, it 
attempts to implement the major contribution highlighted in the introductory chapter. 
Under the motivation and main objective of this study, this thesis proved the importance 
of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual reports and the determinants of 
environmental information from the characteristics of corporate governance in Chinese 
market. According to the empirical findings, there is clear and positive market response 
to both quantitative and qualitative environmental disclosure in the same year, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis based on signalling theory and the concept of information 
asymmetry. However, it indicated that there is a difference in the role between quantity 
and quality of environmental information revealed in the annual report, in terms of 
influencing the firm value in the following year. The empirical results confirmed well 
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that state ownership and a larger size of the supervisory board with an effective 
monitoring role in the company effectively encourage the firm be engaged in both 
quantity and quality of voluntary environmental disclosure. However, there was no 
empirical evidence to support the theory that the IND effectively acts on environmental 
disclosure. The findings exposed the advantages and disadvantages of the characteristics 
in Chinese corporate governance for the development of environmental disclosure. 
Furthermore, this study denoted that much less environmental information is disclosed in 
the annual reports of most Chinese listed companies compared with those of developed 
countries, and that China is in a budding stage of development in the disclosure practice. 
It suggests that firms should reveal more environmental information in the future to 
reduce information asymmetry, improve the firms’ signals to stakeholders, and thus 
increase firm value in order to obtain a favourable situation for both themselves and their 
stakeholders under the stakeholder-agency framework. 
This thesis also provided the limitations of this study, which include just a single 
approach (annual reports) for environmental information data collection, and financial 
firms being overlooked. In addition, it pointed out that future research could explore the 
monitoring role played by other mechanisms on environmental disclosure other than 
ownership structure and board composition. Environmental disclosures could be grouped 
by their content, such as information about environmental policy, information about 
environmental assets and so on, to look for the different roles of different types of 
environmental information. These limitations and recommendations mentioned in this 
thesis would be guidance and direction for future research in this area.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Source: World Resources Institute Data 
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